Justice for All
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E-mail: immortalguardofiran@yahoo.com
Freedom, Honor, Justice, Courage
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Friday April 24th, 2009
“Men was born free, and everwhere he is in chains. There are some who may believe themeselves masters of others, and are no less enslaved than they”; Jean-Jacques Rousseaui
The below document was extracted from the book “The Rotted Garden of Paradise” by Iran Zamin which was forthcoming April 2009, and it would available for purchase at www.amazon.com. Hoping readers would enjoy reading the below paper.
Black Gold and Agony for Iran:
In May 1901, King Mozzafar al-Din from Qajar Dynasty negotiated an oil concession with William Knox D’Arcy for sixty years who was representing interest of Britain.ii King Mozzafar al-Din agreed for sixty years oil concession because the King wanted to alleviate his personal debt to Britain.iii Interestingly, William Knox D’Arcy was facing financial pressure due to high cost of exploration in Iran, and he was forced to sell substantial amount of his stock of Burmah Oil Company Ltd.iv in order to recover his oil exploration expanses.
In 1909, oil reserves were discovered in city of Masjed Soleiman, and Burmah Oil Company Ltd. created Anglo-Persian Oil Company.v In 1913, Abadan Refinery became operational, and Winston Churchill instructed First Lord of the Admiralty to partially nationalize Iran’s oil so that the United Kingdom would control Iran’s oil.vi As it turned out King Mozzafar al-Din made poor negotiation with D’Arcy, and only 16% of net profit was given to Iran.vii Iranian demanded more profit sharing and when Abdol Hussein Teymoutash became Minister of Foreign Affairs, and John Cadman was chairperson of Anglo-Persian Oil Company from 1928-1932 began to negotiate on terms of oil concession with each other.viii Abdol Hussein Teymoutash took a position that in 1901 King Mozzafar al-Din was from previous dynasty, and today Iran was governed under Constitutional Monarchy of Pahlavi Dynasty.ix Henceforth, the past oil concession was declared null, and Teymourtash invited the Birtish to have a new oil concession. “The Persian Government would have insisted not on 25 % but on a 50-50 basis. Teymourtash also asked for a minimum guaranteed interest of 12.5% on dividends from the shares of the company, plus 2s per ton of oil produced. In addition, he specified that the company was to reduce the existing area of the concession. The intent behind reducing the area of the concession was to push APOC operations to the southwest of the country so as to make it possible for Iran to approach and lure non-British oil companies to develop oil fields on more generous terms in areas not part of APOC's area of concession.”x
In 1931, First Baron John Cadman stated that Teymourtash won negotiation in principle.xi However, Teymourtash soon learned economic lesson in a hardway as supply increased demand would decline, and price of goods would decline. “In that year APOC informed the Iranian government that its royalties for the year would amount to a mere 366,782 pounds, while in the same period the company's income taxes paid to the British Government amounted to approximately 1,000,000. Furthermore, while the company's profits declined 36 % for the year, the revenues paid to the Iranian government pursuant to the company's accounting practices, decreased by 76%t. Such a precipitous drop in royalties appeared to confirm suspicions of bad faith, and Teymourtash indicated that the parties would have to revisit negotiations.”xii His Imperial Majesty, King of Kings Reza PAHLAVI the Great assumed Teymourtash was an incompetent man who was unable to handle negotiation with the Britain, and His Imperial Majesty dismissed Teymourtash from the negotiation process, and His Imperial Majesty Reza PAHLAVI took over the negotation process with the British.xiii His Imperial Majesty Reza PAHLAVI drafted a letter to the British and declared D’Arcy agreement to be null.xiv The British took the matter before International Justice at the Hauge, and there was a Czech Foreign Minister who was appointed as a mediator for this matter. The mediator put the matter into abeyance so both parties Iran and the British would resolve their problems by means of dialogue rather than a third party to pass a judgment between them which would create a winner and loser situation.xv
On May 28th, 1933 Iran and the Britain came to a mutual agreement and Iran’s parliament ratified D’Arcy agrement, “the terms of the new agreement provided for a new sixty year concession. The Agreement reduced the area under APOC control to 100,000 square miles, required annual payments in lieu of Iranian income tax, as well as guaranteeing a minimum annual payment of 750,000 pounds to the Iranian government. These provisions while appearing favourable are widely agreed to have represented a squandered opportunity for the Iranian government. The agreement extended the life of the D'Arcy concession by an additional thirty-two years, negligently allowed APOC to select the best 100,000 square miles, the minimum guaranteed royalty was far too modest, and in a fit of carelessness the company's operations were exempted from import or customs duties. Finally, Iran surrendered its right to annul the agreement, and settled on a complex and tediously elaborates arbitration process to settle any disagreements that would arise.”xvi
In 1951, Major-General Ali RAZMARA was Prime Minister of Iran, and “successfully ratifying the Supplemental Oil Agreement between Iran and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), which would have improved the revenues paid to Iran by the company.”xvii His Excellency RAZMARA took drastic measure by promoting “a plan for decentralization of government together with decentralization of the Seven-Year Plan for infrastructure development and improvement.”xviii His Excellency wanted to establish 84 local councils or manuciplaities in order to deal with “health, education, and agricultural programs.”xix His Excellency implemented “Point IV Program via Agreement with US President Harry Truman.”xx
His Excellency's policy was not welcomed by some individuals whom became his enemy, when His Excellency eliminated 187,000 civil-servant jobs.xxi Additionally, His Excellency eliminated 400 high paying offical jobs.xxii At this point, His Excellency made enemy with feudal lords, merchants, clerics, and the Tudeh Party.xxiii His Excellency made matter worst, when he opposed “to expropriation of AIOC assets at Abadan earned him the wrath of the small but powerful group of Majlis deputies known as the National Front. The National Front was lead by Majlis Member, Mohammad Mossadegh, whose leading ally in Parliament was Assembly Speaker Ayatollah Kashani.”xxiv
On March 07th, 1951 His Excellency went to Shah Mosque, and was attending a funeral of a deceased mullah. Once, funeral session was over, and he was leaving the Shah Mosque, Khalil TAHMASSEBI positioned himself behind His Excellency and opened fire at His Excellency's head. The culprit fired two more rounds of shot at His Excellency as the bullets ripped apart His Excellency's chest, and his vital organs were mutilated. His Excellency departed from this world instantly.
His Imperial Majesty Mohammad Reza PAHLAVI appointed Dr. MUSADDIQ, from National Front Party, to Prime Minister Office “within two months of Razmara's assassination. However, control of the party was held by Ayatollah Seyid Abol Ghasim Kashani, the leader of the country's mullahs. Kashani, along with other National Frontists, defended the act as justified. The National Front declared Prime Minister Ali Razmara an enemy of Islam and a traitor to Iran for his opposition to the terms of the Oil Nationalization Law.”xxv
RAZMARA culprit’s never brought before justice, as the Tudeh Party, the National Front Party and the Fadayan-e-Islam seized the street of Tehran and demanded release of the assassin. Also, the mobs stated that it would carry another act of terrorism by murdering His Imperial Majesty Mohammad Reza PAHLAVI {already detail of the above account was given and no need to write}. In November 1952, the parliament issued a pardon to the assassin, and the culprit was relased from the prison. “He was hailed as a hero and was granted an audience with Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh. Mossadegh barred photographers from the meeting.”xxvi
Road to the 1953 Coup d'état:
“The assassination of Prime Minister Ali Razmara effectively put an end to the democratic aspirations of Iran. Iran was plunged into a period of assassination, threats of assassination and mob rule. For the next few years political leaders would not endure the inconvenience of appealing to the people's best judgment. Rather, they would call on the mob to upset order until their aims were met. These riots and demonstrations were usually accompanied by threats against political enemies who made constant use of the privilege of bast.”xxvii
His Imperial Majesty with power of constitution “appointed Hussein Ala to succeed Razmara as Prime Minister. This move was met by further assassinations, riots and demonstrations throughout the country. Ala ultimately resigned his post as Prime Minister. The Shah opted to go with former Primer Minister Sayyid Ziya al-Din Tabatabai but the Majlis, lead by the National Front, [voted 79-12] on a referendum naming Mohammed Mossadegh to the post. Although the Shah had sole constitutional authority to appoint Prime Ministers, he reluctantly acquiesced and gave Mossadegh his appointment on April 28, 1951.”xxviii
In March 1951 Iran’s parliament passed a bill to nationalization Iran’s oil, and His Excellency Dr. Muhammad MUSADDIQ made sure the parliament would pass the bill.xxix Particularly, the Britain was taking 85% of Iran’s oil profit.xxx The International Court of Justice settled Iran and British dispute by sharing 50/50 of profit. His Excellency and the Britian rejected International Court of Justice’s settlement.xxxi Consequently, “the Abadan Crisis occurred from 1951 to 1954, after Iran nationalized the Iranian assets of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) and expelled Western companies from oil refineries in the city of Abadan. Britain was brought close to outright war with Iran, who retained an ally in the United States, hoping Iran would continue as a bulwark against.”xxxii
His Excellency Mohammad MUSADDIQ asked lawyers to alter constitution in order to curtail His Imperial Majesty King of Kings Mohammad Reza PAHLAVI’s constitutional authority in the parliament to the point that His Imperial Majesty would not become head of state of Iran. Also, His Excellency was not working on any kind of policy to improve Iran’s econmy because the British would not allow Iran to generate revenue from its oil. In the mean time, public servants did not receive any kind of salary for a long time, as poverty began to prevail in Iran. There was social unrest in Iran.
1953 Coup d'état:
In February 1953 His Imperial Majesty Mohammad Reza PAHLAVI asked His Excellency to render his resgination from Prime Minister Office, and His Execllency refused to do so.xxxiii There was General Fazlollah ZAHEDI and his son Ardasher ZAHEDI that they wanted the Prime Minister out of Office, and there was a general will among masses that they wanted His Excellency out of office, as riot and social unrest began to escalate in Iran.
In August 1953, His Excellency suggested to His Imperial Majesty Mohammad Reza PAHLAVI to leave the country, and His Imperial Majesty declined His Excellency's request. His Imperial Majesty issued a Royal Decree to His Excellency and dismissed His Excellency from the Prime Minister Office.xxxiv However, His Excellency did not follow the Royal Decree from His Imperial Majesty.xxxv On August 15th, 1953 His Imperial Majesty left Iran to Baghdad, and went to Rome because there was social unrest in Iran, and Iran was no longer a safe place for His Imperial Majesty to stay. On August 19th, 1953 “Zahedi sent out thousands of copies, along with the proclamation of himself as Prime Minister of Iran,”xxxvi these thousands of copies disseminated in Tehran, and questioned legitimacy of His Excellency Dr. Muhammad MUSADDIQ's government. The Imperial Iranian Armed Forces intervened as a last resource to bring back social order in Tehran. The Imperial Iranian Armed Forces had a duty to their country, Iranian and their King, the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces decided to detain His Excellency because His Imperial Majesty already declared His Excellency government as an illegal one, as the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces used reasonable force against His Excellency, and His Excellency agreed to surrender to the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces.
On August 22nd, 1953 His Imperial Majesty Mohamamd Reza PAHLAVI returned to Iran, and from this point on His Imperial Majesty was no longer a Constitutional Monarch.
His Excellency Dr. MUSADDIQ faced military court and was sentence to death. His Imperial Majesty commuted His Excellency’s death sentence to three years of house arrest.
On March 05th, 1967, His Excellency departed from this world, and was burried in his own home.
What is a Coup d'état?
The term coup d'état “is French for "a (sudden) blow (or strike) to a state" (literally, coup, hit, and état, state). The term coup can also be used in a casual sense to mean a gain in advantage of one nation or entity over another.”xxxvii A coup d'état is the sudden overthrow of a government.xxxviii Proffessor Thomas Childers of the University of Pennsylvania defined coup as “a sudden unconstitutional change of government derives from the political institutions of England.”xxxix
The coup “involves control of some active portion of the military while neutralizing the remainder of a country's armed services. This active group captures or expels leaders, seizes physical control of important government offices, means of communication, and the physical infrastructure, such as streets and power plants. The coup succeeds if its opponents fail to dislodge the plotters, allowing them to consolidate their position, obtain the surrender or acquiescence of the populace and surviving armed forces, and claim legitimacy.”xl
Edward Nicolae Luttwak defined a coup in term of “pronunciamiento literally, "pronouncement" or "declaration"xli or “near cousins of the coup”xlii “The difference, according to Edwrd Luttwak, between a Pronouncement Coup and a coup d'etat is that in a coup, the overthrow of the civilian government is undertaken by a faction of the country's armed forces, whereas a pronunciamiento is the overthrow of a civilian government by the official action of the command structure of its armed forces. The term itself de-emphasizes the forceful aspect of the coup, and instead focuses on the customary statement issued by the leader or leaders of the military, which declares the existing government null and void and explains their reasons for assuming control. These pronunciamientos were often published as formal written documents in order to attract popular support for the uprising, thus blurring the line between coup and insurrection.”xliii
Therefore, the 1953 coup would be “Pronouncement Coup” as public began to revolt against His Excellency Dr. Muhammad MUSADDIQ's government, and His Imperial Majesty dissolved the government, but His Excellency refused to accept order from His Imperial Majesty. Eventually, the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces stepped in to end the saga in Iran, and to direct Iran toward road of progress.
Who did Mastermind the 1953 Coup d'états in Iran?
There were three CIA documents that they explained how the Tudeh Party was staging a coup in Iran, and in case the Tudeh Party failed to do a coup in Iran, Russia would invade Iran. As a result, the US had to provide arsenal to the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces to repel the Russia from Iran. In case, the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces was defeated by the Russia, the US would launch direct military strike at the Russia.
On November 20th, 1952 United States drafted the below paper:
“1. It is of critical importance to the United States that Iran remain an independent and sovereign nation, not dominated by the USSR. Because of its key strategic position, its petroleum resources, its vulnerability to intervention or armed attack by the USSR, and its vulnerability to political subversion, Iran must be regarded as a continuing objective of Soviet expansion. The loss of Iran by default or by Soviet intervention would:
Be a major threat to the security of the entire Middle East, including Pakistan and India.
Permit communist denial to the free world access to Iranian oil and seriously threaten the loss of other Middle Eastern oil.
Increase the Soviet Union’s capability to threaten important United States-United Kingdom lines of communication.
Damage United States prestige in nearby countries and with the exception of Turkey and possible to resist communist pressures.
Set off a series of military, political and economic developments, the consequences of which would seriously endanger the security interests of the United States.
Present trends in Iran are unfavorable to the maintence of control by a non-communist regime for an extended peroid of time. In wresting the political initiative from the Shah, the landlords, and other traditional holders of power, the National Fron politicans now in power have at least temporarly eliminated every alternative to their own rule except the Communist Tudeh Party. However, the ability of the National Front to maintian control of the situation indefinitely is uncertian. The political upheaval which brought the nationalists to power has heightened popular desire for promised economic and social betterment and has increased social unrest. At the same time, nationalist failure to restore the oil industry to operation has led to near-exhaustionof the governent’s financial reserves and to deficit finacing to meet current expenses, and is likely to produce a progressive deterioration of the economy at large.
It is now estimated that communist forces will propably not gain control of the Iranian government during 1953*. Nevertheless, the Iranian situation contains very great elements if instability. Any US policy regarding Iran must accordingly take into account the danger that the communists might be enable to gain the ascendency as a result of such possible development as a struggle for power within the National Front, more effective communist infiltration of the government than now appears probable, government failure to maintain the security forces and to take effective action against communist activity, or a major crop failure. It is clear that the United Kingdom no longer possesses the capability unilaterally to assure stability in the area. If present trends continue unchecked, Iran could be effectively lost to free world in advance of an actual Communist takeover of the Iranian Government. Failure to arrest present trends in Iran involves a serious risk to the national security of the United States.
For the reasons outlined above, the major United States policy objective with respect to Iran is to prevent the country from coming under communist control. The United States should, therefore, be prepared to pursue the policies which would be most effective in accomplishing this objective. In the light of the present situation the United States should adopt and presue the following policies:
Continue to assist in every practiable way to effect an early and equitable liquidation of the oil controversy.
Be prepared to take the necessary measures to help Iran to start up her oil industry and to secure markets for her oil so that Iran may benefit from substantial oil revenues.
Be prepared to provide prompt United States budgetary aid to Iran if, pending restoration of her oilindustry and oil markets, such aid is necessary to halt a serious deterioration of the financial and political situation in Iran
……..
Recognizing the strength of Iranian nationalistfeeling; try to direct it into constructive chennels and be ready to exploit any opportunity to do so, bearing in mind the desirability of strengthening in Iran the ability and desire of the Iranian people to resist communist pressure.
Continue present programs of military, economic and technical assistance to the extent they will help to restore stability and increase intenal security, and be prepare to increase such assistance to support Iranian resistance to communist pressure.
Encourage the adoption by the Iranian Government of necessary financial, judicial and administrative and other reforms.
Continue special political measures designed to assist in achieving the above purpose.
Plan now for the eventual inclusion of Iran in any regional defense arragment which may be developed in the Middle East if such inclusion should later prove feasible.
In the event of either an attempted or an actual communist seizure of power in one or more of the provincess of Iran or in Tehran, the United States should support a non communist Iranian Government, including participation in the military support such a government if necessary and useful.* Preparation for such an eventuality should include:
Plans for the specific military, economic, diplomatic, and spychological measures which should be taken to support a non-communist Iranian Government or to prevent all or part of Iran adjacent areas from falling under communist domination.
Political-military discussion with the Biritish Government and such other governments as may be appropriate, with a view to determining (1) courses of action which might be pursued and (2) the allocation of responsibility in carrying out such courses of action in the area.
Preparatory measures for the implementation of special political operations in Iran and adjacent Middle East areas, including the procurment of such equipment as may be required. Effective liaison with the United Kingdom should be maintained with respect to such operations.
Perfection of pplans concerning the handling of the matter by the United Nations if and when that becomes necessary.
In the event that a communist government achieves complete control of Iran so rapidly that no non-communist Iranian Government is available to request assistance, the position of the United States would have to be determined in the light of the situation at the time, although politico-military-economic discussions leading to plans for meeting such a situation should be carried on with the British Government and with such other governments as may be appropriate. In this contingency, the United States should make every feasible effort, particularly through special political operations, to endeavor to develop or maintain localized centers of resistance and to harras, undermine, and if possible, to bring about the overthrow of the communist government.
In the event of a Soviet attck by organized USSR militray forces against Iran, the United States in common…would have to proceed on the assupmtion that global war is probably imminent. Accordingly, the United States would then immediately:
Deciede in the light of the circumstances existing at the time whether to attempt to localize the action or to treat it as a cause belli. In either case necessary measures should include direct diplomatic action and resort to the United Nations with the objective of:
Making clear to the world the aggressive charcter of the Soviet acction.
Making clear to the world United States preference for a peaceful solution and the conditions upon which the United States would, in concret with other members of the United Nations, accept such a settlement.
Obtaining the authorization of the United Nations for member nations to take appropriate actionin the name of the United Nations to assist Iran.
Consider a direct approach to the highest Soviet leaders.
Place itslef in the best possible position to meet the increased threat of global war.
Consult with selected allies to perfect coordinated plans.
Take action against the aggressor to the extend and in the manner which would best continue to the security of the United States.
Prepare to maintain, if necessary, an Iranian Government-in-exile.”xliv
On March 20th, 1953 Department of State Washington D.C. ratified November 20th, 1952 US policy with regard to Iran and made clear their policy toward Iran.
Measures to be taken to support a non-communist Iranian Government in the event of an attempted commnist seizure of power:
Military: Predicated on the assumption that the Iranian Government makes an appeal to the U.S. for direct military assistance, the JCS have recognized three feasible U.S. military courses of action, namely:
To conduct a show of force by peroidic flights of carrier aircraft, or aircraft from land bases outside of Iran, over key centers. Recommendations concerning possible employment of U.S. naval SAC units have been requested from CINCELM and CGSAC, respectively. To date these recommendations have not been received.
To assist the legal Iranian Army with logistic support by augmenting the present policy of arms aid. Since there is no way of foretelling what assistance might he needed or requested by the Iranians, meaningful pplans cannot be prepared in advance. However, the Chief of Staff. U.S. Army, could draw up the necessary plans very quickly when the necessary specfic information became available.
Furnishing additional arms aid to appropriate Middle East countries so as to eventually enable them to possess the strength to secure their fronties against effective communist inflitration. The joint Chiefs of Staff keep this matter under continuous review.
Economic: It is doubtful that any increase in the present level of MDAP and Point Four programs ($66.6 and $20.8 million, respectively) would be justified if the Iranian situation became more unstable. If economic conditions in Iran continue to deteriorate as a result of the continued instability of the government and its inability to makert oil, it is possible that a situation might arise where it would be in the U.S. interest o give the National Front Government direct financial assistance should such a request be received. The Department of State has recommended that a contingency fund of $45 million be set aside for this purpose, and the matter is currently under consideration by the Bureau of the Budget. This action would be consistent with NSC 136/1, but would have to be justified in the light of the situation existing at the same time the request us made.
Diplomatic: An attempted commuist seizure of power would probably be designed to exploit the increasing economic and politically difficulties facing Iran. Thus, U.S. diplomatic planning in such a situation requires continued efforst on the part of our Ambassador in Tehran to negotiate a settlement of the oil controversy between Mosadeq and the U.K. and in the event of an attempted coup, to urge positive action, including the prompt use of security forces, upon such Iranian authorities as may be capable of such action with a view to preventing a communist seizure of power.
Psychological: The PSB on January 15, 1953, approved a “Psycological Strategy Program for the Middle East” (D-22) which includes within this broader framework guidance for psycological operations in Iran. When prepared, plans for specific psycological measures in the event of an attempetd communist coup in Iran will be consistent with this program and with the approved PSB policies contained in “A Strategic Concept for a National Psycological Program with Particular Reference to ‘Cold War’ Operations under NSC 10/5” (D-31).
Special Political Operations: Current special political operations in Iran, which are directed toward counter acting and reducing Tudeh influence, would be continued and, if circumstances permit, intesified in the event of an attempted communist coup. These operations are designed to:
Influence specific political, military and religious leaders to speak out strongly against the Tudeh threat.
Induce certain political and military leaders to institute administrative and security actions to curbTudeh activities (demonstrations, strikes, ect.).
Maintain anti-Tudeh propaganda.
Instigate physical attacks upon Tudeh facilities and demonstrations.
Obtain the publication of anti-Tudeh material in the press, and in pamphlets, books, posters, etc.
Influnce the choice of a successor to Mosadeq in the event of his resignation or death.
Maintain liaison with potential resistance groups, in particular elements of certain strong tribal elements in southern Iran.
….
Measures to be taken to prevent all or a part of Iran or adjacent areas from falling from falling under communist domination in the event of an actual communist seizure of power in one or more of the provinces of Iran or in Tehran:
Military: In the event of a Tudeh coup in Iran, the JCS have recognized three feasible U.S. military courses of action, namely:
Furnish additional arms aid to appropriate Middle East countries so as to eventually enable them to possess the strength to secure their frontiers against effective communist infiltration. The Joint Chiefs of Staff keep this matter under continuous review.
Deploy appropriate Air Force units, on the order of 1-1/2 wings plus support units, to southern Turkey with a mission of assisting Middle East governments in preventing the spread of communist power to their countries. The Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, has been requested to recommend the composition of the Air Force organization to be deployed to southern Turkey under this contingency.
Deploy U.S. ground … one Division, reinforced and…and naval forces to the vicinity of Basra with a mission of assisting Middle East governments in preventing the spread of communist power to their countries. This would be accomplished by the physical presence of U.S. military power, demonstrations of strength and as a last resort, when authorized by proper authority, combat operations. CINCNELM has been requested to make appropriate recommendation with regard to this course of action but his reply has not yet been received. Our present state of preparedness is such that the 82nd Airborne Division, the 2nd Marine Division or an infantry division in Europe could be moved on short notice provided the necessary shipping were made available. The movement of any one of these divisions would take approximately 60 days. The logistice support required to maintain the development of these forces could be accompplished only at the expense of critical supplies now destined for Korea. Similarly any force deployments to the Middle East would necessitate a substantial upward revision of U.S. force ceilings or a reduction of our commitments elsewhere.
Economic: The U.S.Government would provide such economic assistance as required to sustain and strengthen whatever non-communist Iranian Government remained after the communist coup. Specific plans for this eventuality cannot be prepared in advance, but it is likely that requirments for such ai would follow the general pattern, though on a reduced scale of the economic assistance being given the ROK Government. The early appointment of an over-all coordinator for economic aid would, on the basis of Korean experince, greatlyincrease the effectivness of any specific economic measures which might be undertaken in such a contingency.
Diplomatic: (1) The United States Government will not recognize a communist government of Iran and will publicly support anti-communist Iranian elements in Iran or abroad. Such support might involve the recongnition of an Iranian Government in exile. Since the Shah might be a useful rallying point for such a Government, arrangments to facilitate his escape from Tehran in an emergency are under consideration. In addition, there will probably always be some prominent Iranian public figures outside of Iran (such as the Iranian Ambassador to the United States) who could participate in such a movement. For political and security reason, no advance planning in this regard can be attempted with any Iranian leaders, including Shah.
….
Special Political Operations: (1) At the present time CIA has a stockpile of small arms, ammunition and demolition material under USAF cover. Wheelus Field Tripoli. The stockpile is in quantity designed to supply a 10, 000-man guerrilla forces for six months without re-supply. In other increments there is sufficeint material to equip basically a 4000-man guerrilla force (Locales of storage are New Jersey, Ismailia Suzez Canal Zone, and Tripoli.) CIA is now considering the feasibility of adding essential food stuffs and clothing to existing or other stockpiles. An estimate of such requirments is in the process of preparation.
These supplies could, within 3 to 4 weeks, be transported by air and sea to certain strong tribal elements in southern Iran (in particular the Qashqai tribe) who might, in the event of a Tudeh coup, be prepare to conduct resistance activity against such a Communist givernment. However, for political and security reasons, no attempt has been made to conduct advanced planning of this sorr with Iranian officials.
CIA has an agreement with the Qashqai tribal leaders in southern Iran to establish a clnadstine safe haven base from which querrilla and intelligence operations could be conducted utlizing the manpower of these elements (estimated 20,000). Four members of one group have been given radio communications traning by CIA. Conditions in South Iran, attitude of the Iranian Army and neighboring tribes, status of an Iranian rump government or goervnment in exile, the political attitudes of the tribe in questions, and degree of our support in time of Tudeh control have a bearing, however, on the tribal will and ability to conduct resistance activity. To date CIA has trained and equiped a total of approximately 10 indigenous clandestine radio operators to be located throughout Iran and who can be called upon to maintain communications with CIA when desire. Others are being trained.
Reception points in the Tehran and Tabriz area and in South Iran where supplies and personel can be clandestinely introduced into Iran are in the process of being established. A certain quantity of communications equipmet, cash and gold has been cached within Iran, and a considerable amount of cash is avaliable in Tehran.”xlv
Overall reading the above CIA documents illustrated the US never drafted a blue print to do a coup in Iran. As a matter of fact, the Tudeh Party was contemplating to do a coup in Iran and overthrowing the MUSADDIQ's government, and in case the Tudeh Party would not be able to do the coup, Russia would invade Iran.
There was a third CIA document which was blurry and difficult to read. It would not lead to anywhere constructive.
Why Some Claim the US Masterminded the 1953 Coup in Iran:
There were some individuals that they claimed the US overthrow democratically elected Prime Minister MUSADDIQ from the Office. However, according to the above legal documents, as well as, historical events, the US did not overthrow democratically elected Prime Minister MUSADDIQ from the Office. In addition, there were good reasons for one author or media outlets to reinvent Iran's history, and acting in bad faith. One, there was an agenda to make Iranian feeling indifference about Iran that the US was controling Iran's domestic politics and not Iranian. Thus, the Islamic Republic would last very long in Iran, as the US would sell arsenal to Iran and other neighboring nations of Iran at high price. Two, these type of individuals that they endorsed conspiracy theory of 1953, they were gaining some kind of reward from the conspiracy theory of 1953. What was so imperative here that the conspiracy theory of 1953 failed because Imperial Iranian Armed Forces took part in th 1953 coup in order to bring back social order in Iran, and did not receive any kind of fund from anyone. The Imperial Iranian Armed Forces carried its duty as it was supposed to be, and their act would be constituted as patriotic for Iran, Iranian and their King. Last, there was this theory that 1953 coup lead to the 1979 fiasco in Iran. In 1979, there were democrat individuals that they wanted to create a green crescent in Middle East to prevent Russia to expand its dominion in other part of the Middle East, and cause the 1979 fiasco in Iran and it turned out not the way the democrated wanted. Thus, the democrat was relying on “post hoc fallacy” that variable “A” caused variable “B”. Assuming, the variable “A” was the 1953 coup in Iran, so by product of the variable “A” would be the 1979 fiasco in Iran which would be the variable “B”. There was no relation between the variable “A” and the variable “B”, and these individuals had not rationality to interrelate the variable “A” to the variable “B”. In fact, in 1953, there was a dynamic for a coup in Iran, but, in 1979, there were foreign elements that they wanted His Imperial Majesty to die right away.
Therefore, Iranian needed to understand that future of Iran was in their own hands, and not to listen to the enemy's propaganda that the US did coup in Iran. Aiming last sentence of this paper to Iranian from diverse background from National Front Party to Monarchist that they needed to work together to emancipate Iran from hands of mullah who have occupied Iran since 1979. There was no alternative way to liberate Iran from hands of callous mullah who received support from the West to remain in Iran in order to plunder Iran's wealth. So what was going to be? Allowing enemy to divide and conquer us, or determining our own future? Determining future of Iran by working together toward freedom of Iran.
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC):
His Imperial Majesty King of Kings Mohammad Reza PAHLAVI was pioneer of OPEC, and was first chairperson of OPEC. His Imperial Majesty's nickname was “Eagle of OPEC”. His Imperial Majesty formed OPEC so that oil exporting countries would sell their oil at equilibrium price. OPEC main’s task was determining quantity of crude oil which would be produced to the world to consume in a year so that the price of crude oil per barrel would be at market value. OPEC had governing body which was determining “best means for safeguarding their interests, individually and collectively; devising ways and means of ensuring the stabilization of prices in international oil markets with a view to eliminating harmful and unnecessary fluctuations; giving due regard at all times to the interests of the producing nations and to the necessity of securing a steady income to the producing countries; an efficient, economic and regular supply of petroleum to consuming nations, and a fair return on their capital to those investing in the petroleum industry.”xlvi
Dr. Benjamin Zycher reflected light on history of OPEC that it “was formed in response to the U.S. imposition of import quotas on oil. In 1959 the U.S. government established a Mandatory Oil Import Quota Program (MOIP) restricting the amount of crude oil (and refined products) that could be imported into the United States. The MOIP gave preferential treatment to oil imports from Mexico and Canada. This partial exclusion of the U.S. market to Persian Gulf producers depressed prices for their oil. As a result oil prices "posted" (paid to the selling nations) by the major oil companies were reduced in February 1959 and August 1960. In its early years the U.S. import quota program also discriminated against oil from Venezuela. In September 1960 four Persian Gulf nations (Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia) and Venezuela formed OPEC, the purpose of which was to obtain higher prices for crude oil. By 1973 eight other nations (Qatar, Indonesia, Libya, the United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Nigeria, Ecuador, and Gabon) had joined OPEC. Ecuador withdrew on the last day of 1992.”xlvii
OPEC was unsuccessful in its first decade. Real (that is, inflation-adjusted) world prices for crude oil continued to fall until 1971. In 1958 the real price was $10.85 per barrel (in 1990 dollars). By 1971 it had fallen to $7.46 per barrel. However, real prices began to rise slowly beginning in 1971, and then jumped dramatically in late 1973 and 1974 from roughly $8 per barrel to over $27 per barrel in the wake of the Arab-Israeli (“Yom Kippur”) War.xlviii
War and Black Gold Price:
“Contrary to what many non-economists believe, the 1973 price increase was not caused by the oil “embargo” (refusal to sell) directed at the United States and the Netherlands that year by the Arab members of OPEC. Instead, OPEC reduced its production of crude oil, thus raising world oil prices substantially. The embargo against the United States and the Netherlands had no effect whatever: both nations were able to obtain oil at the same prices as all other nations. The failure of this selective embargo was predictable. Oil is a fungible commodity that can easily be resold among buyers. Therefore, sellers who try to deny oil to buyer A will find other buyers purchasing more oil, some of which will be resold by them to buyer A. Nor, as is commonly believed, was OPEC the cause of oil shortages and gasoline lines in the United States. Instead, the shortages were caused by price and allocation controls on crude oil and refined products, originally imposed in 1971 by President Nixon as part of the Economic Stabilization Program. By preventing prices from rising sufficiently, the price controls stimulated desired consumption above the quantities available at the legal maximum prices. Shortages were the inevitable result. Countries that avoided price controls, such as West Germany and Switzerland, also avoided shortages, queues, and the other perverse effects of the controls.”xlix
iRousseau Jean-Jacques. The Social Contract. NY, NY:Oxford University Press. 1994. PG 46
ii Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company> 20 September 2007. PG 01
iii Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Ajax> 20 September 2007. PG 01
iv Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company >20 September 2007. PG 01
v Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company > 20 September 2007. PG 01
vi Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company >20 September 2007. PG 01
vii Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company >20 September 2007. PG 01
viii Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company >20 September 2007. PG 02
ix Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company > 20 September 2007. PG 02
x Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company > 20 September 2007. PG 02
xi Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company > 20 September 2007. PG 02
xii Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company > 20 September 2007. PG 02-03
xiii Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company > 20 September 2007. PG 03
xiv Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company > 20 September 2007. PG 03
xv Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company > 20 September 2007. PG 03
xvi Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company > 20 September 2007. PG 03
xvii Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Razmara>20 September 2007. PG 01
xviii Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Razmara>20 September 2007. PG 01
xix Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Razmara>20 September 2007. PG 01
xx Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Razmara>20 September 2007. PG 01
xxi Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Razmara>20 September 2007. PG 02
xxii Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Razmara>20 September 2007. PG 02
xxiii Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Razmara>20 September 2007. PG 02
xxiv Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Razmara#Effects_on_Iranian_Government > 20 September 2007. PG 02
xxv Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Razmara#Effects_on_Iranian_Government >20 September 2007. PG 02
xxvi Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Razmara#Effects_on_Iranian_Government > 20 September 2007. PG 02
xxvii Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Razmara > 20 September 2007. PG 02
xxviii Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Razmara > 20 September 2007. PG 02
xxix Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company > 20 September 2007. PG 04
xxx Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company > 20 September 2007. PG 04
xxxi Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company > 20 September 2007. PG 04
xxxii Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abadan_Crisis > 20 September 2007. PG 01
xxxiii Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fazlollah_Zahedi> 20 September 2007. PG 02
xxxiv Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fazlollah_Zahedi > 20 September 2007. PG 02
xxxv Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fazlollah_Zahedi > 20 September 2007. PG 02
xxxviWikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fazlollah_Zahedi > 20 September 2007. PG 02
xxxvii Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coup > 21 September 2007. PG 01
xxxviii Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coup > 21 September 2007. PG 01
xxxix Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coup > 21 September 2007. PG 01
xl Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coup > 21 September 2007. PG 01
xli Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coup > 21 September 2007. PG 03
xlii Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coup > 21 September 2007. PG 03
xliii Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coup > 21 September 2007. PG 02
xliv http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB126/iran521120.pdf
xlv http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB126/iran530320.pdf
xlvi Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opec#_note-2 > 01 August 2007. PG 01
xlvii Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opec#_note-2 > 01 August 2007. PG 01
xlviii Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opec#_note-2 > 01 August 2007. PG 01
xlix OPEC <http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/OPEC.html > 28 September 2007. PG 01
The below document was extracted from the book “The Rotted Garden of Paradise” by Iran Zamin which was forthcoming April 2009, and it would available for purchase at www.amazon.com. Hoping readers would enjoy reading the below paper.
Black Gold and Agony for Iran:
In May 1901, King Mozzafar al-Din from Qajar Dynasty negotiated an oil concession with William Knox D’Arcy for sixty years who was representing interest of Britain.ii King Mozzafar al-Din agreed for sixty years oil concession because the King wanted to alleviate his personal debt to Britain.iii Interestingly, William Knox D’Arcy was facing financial pressure due to high cost of exploration in Iran, and he was forced to sell substantial amount of his stock of Burmah Oil Company Ltd.iv in order to recover his oil exploration expanses.
In 1909, oil reserves were discovered in city of Masjed Soleiman, and Burmah Oil Company Ltd. created Anglo-Persian Oil Company.v In 1913, Abadan Refinery became operational, and Winston Churchill instructed First Lord of the Admiralty to partially nationalize Iran’s oil so that the United Kingdom would control Iran’s oil.vi As it turned out King Mozzafar al-Din made poor negotiation with D’Arcy, and only 16% of net profit was given to Iran.vii Iranian demanded more profit sharing and when Abdol Hussein Teymoutash became Minister of Foreign Affairs, and John Cadman was chairperson of Anglo-Persian Oil Company from 1928-1932 began to negotiate on terms of oil concession with each other.viii Abdol Hussein Teymoutash took a position that in 1901 King Mozzafar al-Din was from previous dynasty, and today Iran was governed under Constitutional Monarchy of Pahlavi Dynasty.ix Henceforth, the past oil concession was declared null, and Teymourtash invited the Birtish to have a new oil concession. “The Persian Government would have insisted not on 25 % but on a 50-50 basis. Teymourtash also asked for a minimum guaranteed interest of 12.5% on dividends from the shares of the company, plus 2s per ton of oil produced. In addition, he specified that the company was to reduce the existing area of the concession. The intent behind reducing the area of the concession was to push APOC operations to the southwest of the country so as to make it possible for Iran to approach and lure non-British oil companies to develop oil fields on more generous terms in areas not part of APOC's area of concession.”x
In 1931, First Baron John Cadman stated that Teymourtash won negotiation in principle.xi However, Teymourtash soon learned economic lesson in a hardway as supply increased demand would decline, and price of goods would decline. “In that year APOC informed the Iranian government that its royalties for the year would amount to a mere 366,782 pounds, while in the same period the company's income taxes paid to the British Government amounted to approximately 1,000,000. Furthermore, while the company's profits declined 36 % for the year, the revenues paid to the Iranian government pursuant to the company's accounting practices, decreased by 76%t. Such a precipitous drop in royalties appeared to confirm suspicions of bad faith, and Teymourtash indicated that the parties would have to revisit negotiations.”xii His Imperial Majesty, King of Kings Reza PAHLAVI the Great assumed Teymourtash was an incompetent man who was unable to handle negotiation with the Britain, and His Imperial Majesty dismissed Teymourtash from the negotiation process, and His Imperial Majesty Reza PAHLAVI took over the negotation process with the British.xiii His Imperial Majesty Reza PAHLAVI drafted a letter to the British and declared D’Arcy agreement to be null.xiv The British took the matter before International Justice at the Hauge, and there was a Czech Foreign Minister who was appointed as a mediator for this matter. The mediator put the matter into abeyance so both parties Iran and the British would resolve their problems by means of dialogue rather than a third party to pass a judgment between them which would create a winner and loser situation.xv
On May 28th, 1933 Iran and the Britain came to a mutual agreement and Iran’s parliament ratified D’Arcy agrement, “the terms of the new agreement provided for a new sixty year concession. The Agreement reduced the area under APOC control to 100,000 square miles, required annual payments in lieu of Iranian income tax, as well as guaranteeing a minimum annual payment of 750,000 pounds to the Iranian government. These provisions while appearing favourable are widely agreed to have represented a squandered opportunity for the Iranian government. The agreement extended the life of the D'Arcy concession by an additional thirty-two years, negligently allowed APOC to select the best 100,000 square miles, the minimum guaranteed royalty was far too modest, and in a fit of carelessness the company's operations were exempted from import or customs duties. Finally, Iran surrendered its right to annul the agreement, and settled on a complex and tediously elaborates arbitration process to settle any disagreements that would arise.”xvi
In 1951, Major-General Ali RAZMARA was Prime Minister of Iran, and “successfully ratifying the Supplemental Oil Agreement between Iran and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), which would have improved the revenues paid to Iran by the company.”xvii His Excellency RAZMARA took drastic measure by promoting “a plan for decentralization of government together with decentralization of the Seven-Year Plan for infrastructure development and improvement.”xviii His Excellency wanted to establish 84 local councils or manuciplaities in order to deal with “health, education, and agricultural programs.”xix His Excellency implemented “Point IV Program via Agreement with US President Harry Truman.”xx
His Excellency's policy was not welcomed by some individuals whom became his enemy, when His Excellency eliminated 187,000 civil-servant jobs.xxi Additionally, His Excellency eliminated 400 high paying offical jobs.xxii At this point, His Excellency made enemy with feudal lords, merchants, clerics, and the Tudeh Party.xxiii His Excellency made matter worst, when he opposed “to expropriation of AIOC assets at Abadan earned him the wrath of the small but powerful group of Majlis deputies known as the National Front. The National Front was lead by Majlis Member, Mohammad Mossadegh, whose leading ally in Parliament was Assembly Speaker Ayatollah Kashani.”xxiv
On March 07th, 1951 His Excellency went to Shah Mosque, and was attending a funeral of a deceased mullah. Once, funeral session was over, and he was leaving the Shah Mosque, Khalil TAHMASSEBI positioned himself behind His Excellency and opened fire at His Excellency's head. The culprit fired two more rounds of shot at His Excellency as the bullets ripped apart His Excellency's chest, and his vital organs were mutilated. His Excellency departed from this world instantly.
His Imperial Majesty Mohammad Reza PAHLAVI appointed Dr. MUSADDIQ, from National Front Party, to Prime Minister Office “within two months of Razmara's assassination. However, control of the party was held by Ayatollah Seyid Abol Ghasim Kashani, the leader of the country's mullahs. Kashani, along with other National Frontists, defended the act as justified. The National Front declared Prime Minister Ali Razmara an enemy of Islam and a traitor to Iran for his opposition to the terms of the Oil Nationalization Law.”xxv
RAZMARA culprit’s never brought before justice, as the Tudeh Party, the National Front Party and the Fadayan-e-Islam seized the street of Tehran and demanded release of the assassin. Also, the mobs stated that it would carry another act of terrorism by murdering His Imperial Majesty Mohammad Reza PAHLAVI {already detail of the above account was given and no need to write}. In November 1952, the parliament issued a pardon to the assassin, and the culprit was relased from the prison. “He was hailed as a hero and was granted an audience with Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh. Mossadegh barred photographers from the meeting.”xxvi
Road to the 1953 Coup d'état:
“The assassination of Prime Minister Ali Razmara effectively put an end to the democratic aspirations of Iran. Iran was plunged into a period of assassination, threats of assassination and mob rule. For the next few years political leaders would not endure the inconvenience of appealing to the people's best judgment. Rather, they would call on the mob to upset order until their aims were met. These riots and demonstrations were usually accompanied by threats against political enemies who made constant use of the privilege of bast.”xxvii
His Imperial Majesty with power of constitution “appointed Hussein Ala to succeed Razmara as Prime Minister. This move was met by further assassinations, riots and demonstrations throughout the country. Ala ultimately resigned his post as Prime Minister. The Shah opted to go with former Primer Minister Sayyid Ziya al-Din Tabatabai but the Majlis, lead by the National Front, [voted 79-12] on a referendum naming Mohammed Mossadegh to the post. Although the Shah had sole constitutional authority to appoint Prime Ministers, he reluctantly acquiesced and gave Mossadegh his appointment on April 28, 1951.”xxviii
In March 1951 Iran’s parliament passed a bill to nationalization Iran’s oil, and His Excellency Dr. Muhammad MUSADDIQ made sure the parliament would pass the bill.xxix Particularly, the Britain was taking 85% of Iran’s oil profit.xxx The International Court of Justice settled Iran and British dispute by sharing 50/50 of profit. His Excellency and the Britian rejected International Court of Justice’s settlement.xxxi Consequently, “the Abadan Crisis occurred from 1951 to 1954, after Iran nationalized the Iranian assets of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) and expelled Western companies from oil refineries in the city of Abadan. Britain was brought close to outright war with Iran, who retained an ally in the United States, hoping Iran would continue as a bulwark against.”xxxii
His Excellency Mohammad MUSADDIQ asked lawyers to alter constitution in order to curtail His Imperial Majesty King of Kings Mohammad Reza PAHLAVI’s constitutional authority in the parliament to the point that His Imperial Majesty would not become head of state of Iran. Also, His Excellency was not working on any kind of policy to improve Iran’s econmy because the British would not allow Iran to generate revenue from its oil. In the mean time, public servants did not receive any kind of salary for a long time, as poverty began to prevail in Iran. There was social unrest in Iran.
1953 Coup d'état:
In February 1953 His Imperial Majesty Mohammad Reza PAHLAVI asked His Excellency to render his resgination from Prime Minister Office, and His Execllency refused to do so.xxxiii There was General Fazlollah ZAHEDI and his son Ardasher ZAHEDI that they wanted the Prime Minister out of Office, and there was a general will among masses that they wanted His Excellency out of office, as riot and social unrest began to escalate in Iran.
In August 1953, His Excellency suggested to His Imperial Majesty Mohammad Reza PAHLAVI to leave the country, and His Imperial Majesty declined His Excellency's request. His Imperial Majesty issued a Royal Decree to His Excellency and dismissed His Excellency from the Prime Minister Office.xxxiv However, His Excellency did not follow the Royal Decree from His Imperial Majesty.xxxv On August 15th, 1953 His Imperial Majesty left Iran to Baghdad, and went to Rome because there was social unrest in Iran, and Iran was no longer a safe place for His Imperial Majesty to stay. On August 19th, 1953 “Zahedi sent out thousands of copies, along with the proclamation of himself as Prime Minister of Iran,”xxxvi these thousands of copies disseminated in Tehran, and questioned legitimacy of His Excellency Dr. Muhammad MUSADDIQ's government. The Imperial Iranian Armed Forces intervened as a last resource to bring back social order in Tehran. The Imperial Iranian Armed Forces had a duty to their country, Iranian and their King, the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces decided to detain His Excellency because His Imperial Majesty already declared His Excellency government as an illegal one, as the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces used reasonable force against His Excellency, and His Excellency agreed to surrender to the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces.
On August 22nd, 1953 His Imperial Majesty Mohamamd Reza PAHLAVI returned to Iran, and from this point on His Imperial Majesty was no longer a Constitutional Monarch.
His Excellency Dr. MUSADDIQ faced military court and was sentence to death. His Imperial Majesty commuted His Excellency’s death sentence to three years of house arrest.
On March 05th, 1967, His Excellency departed from this world, and was burried in his own home.
What is a Coup d'état?
The term coup d'état “is French for "a (sudden) blow (or strike) to a state" (literally, coup, hit, and état, state). The term coup can also be used in a casual sense to mean a gain in advantage of one nation or entity over another.”xxxvii A coup d'état is the sudden overthrow of a government.xxxviii Proffessor Thomas Childers of the University of Pennsylvania defined coup as “a sudden unconstitutional change of government derives from the political institutions of England.”xxxix
The coup “involves control of some active portion of the military while neutralizing the remainder of a country's armed services. This active group captures or expels leaders, seizes physical control of important government offices, means of communication, and the physical infrastructure, such as streets and power plants. The coup succeeds if its opponents fail to dislodge the plotters, allowing them to consolidate their position, obtain the surrender or acquiescence of the populace and surviving armed forces, and claim legitimacy.”xl
Edward Nicolae Luttwak defined a coup in term of “pronunciamiento literally, "pronouncement" or "declaration"xli or “near cousins of the coup”xlii “The difference, according to Edwrd Luttwak, between a Pronouncement Coup and a coup d'etat is that in a coup, the overthrow of the civilian government is undertaken by a faction of the country's armed forces, whereas a pronunciamiento is the overthrow of a civilian government by the official action of the command structure of its armed forces. The term itself de-emphasizes the forceful aspect of the coup, and instead focuses on the customary statement issued by the leader or leaders of the military, which declares the existing government null and void and explains their reasons for assuming control. These pronunciamientos were often published as formal written documents in order to attract popular support for the uprising, thus blurring the line between coup and insurrection.”xliii
Therefore, the 1953 coup would be “Pronouncement Coup” as public began to revolt against His Excellency Dr. Muhammad MUSADDIQ's government, and His Imperial Majesty dissolved the government, but His Excellency refused to accept order from His Imperial Majesty. Eventually, the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces stepped in to end the saga in Iran, and to direct Iran toward road of progress.
Who did Mastermind the 1953 Coup d'états in Iran?
There were three CIA documents that they explained how the Tudeh Party was staging a coup in Iran, and in case the Tudeh Party failed to do a coup in Iran, Russia would invade Iran. As a result, the US had to provide arsenal to the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces to repel the Russia from Iran. In case, the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces was defeated by the Russia, the US would launch direct military strike at the Russia.
On November 20th, 1952 United States drafted the below paper:
“1. It is of critical importance to the United States that Iran remain an independent and sovereign nation, not dominated by the USSR. Because of its key strategic position, its petroleum resources, its vulnerability to intervention or armed attack by the USSR, and its vulnerability to political subversion, Iran must be regarded as a continuing objective of Soviet expansion. The loss of Iran by default or by Soviet intervention would:
Be a major threat to the security of the entire Middle East, including Pakistan and India.
Permit communist denial to the free world access to Iranian oil and seriously threaten the loss of other Middle Eastern oil.
Increase the Soviet Union’s capability to threaten important United States-United Kingdom lines of communication.
Damage United States prestige in nearby countries and with the exception of Turkey and possible to resist communist pressures.
Set off a series of military, political and economic developments, the consequences of which would seriously endanger the security interests of the United States.
Present trends in Iran are unfavorable to the maintence of control by a non-communist regime for an extended peroid of time. In wresting the political initiative from the Shah, the landlords, and other traditional holders of power, the National Fron politicans now in power have at least temporarly eliminated every alternative to their own rule except the Communist Tudeh Party. However, the ability of the National Front to maintian control of the situation indefinitely is uncertian. The political upheaval which brought the nationalists to power has heightened popular desire for promised economic and social betterment and has increased social unrest. At the same time, nationalist failure to restore the oil industry to operation has led to near-exhaustionof the governent’s financial reserves and to deficit finacing to meet current expenses, and is likely to produce a progressive deterioration of the economy at large.
It is now estimated that communist forces will propably not gain control of the Iranian government during 1953*. Nevertheless, the Iranian situation contains very great elements if instability. Any US policy regarding Iran must accordingly take into account the danger that the communists might be enable to gain the ascendency as a result of such possible development as a struggle for power within the National Front, more effective communist infiltration of the government than now appears probable, government failure to maintain the security forces and to take effective action against communist activity, or a major crop failure. It is clear that the United Kingdom no longer possesses the capability unilaterally to assure stability in the area. If present trends continue unchecked, Iran could be effectively lost to free world in advance of an actual Communist takeover of the Iranian Government. Failure to arrest present trends in Iran involves a serious risk to the national security of the United States.
For the reasons outlined above, the major United States policy objective with respect to Iran is to prevent the country from coming under communist control. The United States should, therefore, be prepared to pursue the policies which would be most effective in accomplishing this objective. In the light of the present situation the United States should adopt and presue the following policies:
Continue to assist in every practiable way to effect an early and equitable liquidation of the oil controversy.
Be prepared to take the necessary measures to help Iran to start up her oil industry and to secure markets for her oil so that Iran may benefit from substantial oil revenues.
Be prepared to provide prompt United States budgetary aid to Iran if, pending restoration of her oilindustry and oil markets, such aid is necessary to halt a serious deterioration of the financial and political situation in Iran
……..
Recognizing the strength of Iranian nationalistfeeling; try to direct it into constructive chennels and be ready to exploit any opportunity to do so, bearing in mind the desirability of strengthening in Iran the ability and desire of the Iranian people to resist communist pressure.
Continue present programs of military, economic and technical assistance to the extent they will help to restore stability and increase intenal security, and be prepare to increase such assistance to support Iranian resistance to communist pressure.
Encourage the adoption by the Iranian Government of necessary financial, judicial and administrative and other reforms.
Continue special political measures designed to assist in achieving the above purpose.
Plan now for the eventual inclusion of Iran in any regional defense arragment which may be developed in the Middle East if such inclusion should later prove feasible.
In the event of either an attempted or an actual communist seizure of power in one or more of the provincess of Iran or in Tehran, the United States should support a non communist Iranian Government, including participation in the military support such a government if necessary and useful.* Preparation for such an eventuality should include:
Plans for the specific military, economic, diplomatic, and spychological measures which should be taken to support a non-communist Iranian Government or to prevent all or part of Iran adjacent areas from falling under communist domination.
Political-military discussion with the Biritish Government and such other governments as may be appropriate, with a view to determining (1) courses of action which might be pursued and (2) the allocation of responsibility in carrying out such courses of action in the area.
Preparatory measures for the implementation of special political operations in Iran and adjacent Middle East areas, including the procurment of such equipment as may be required. Effective liaison with the United Kingdom should be maintained with respect to such operations.
Perfection of pplans concerning the handling of the matter by the United Nations if and when that becomes necessary.
In the event that a communist government achieves complete control of Iran so rapidly that no non-communist Iranian Government is available to request assistance, the position of the United States would have to be determined in the light of the situation at the time, although politico-military-economic discussions leading to plans for meeting such a situation should be carried on with the British Government and with such other governments as may be appropriate. In this contingency, the United States should make every feasible effort, particularly through special political operations, to endeavor to develop or maintain localized centers of resistance and to harras, undermine, and if possible, to bring about the overthrow of the communist government.
In the event of a Soviet attck by organized USSR militray forces against Iran, the United States in common…would have to proceed on the assupmtion that global war is probably imminent. Accordingly, the United States would then immediately:
Deciede in the light of the circumstances existing at the time whether to attempt to localize the action or to treat it as a cause belli. In either case necessary measures should include direct diplomatic action and resort to the United Nations with the objective of:
Making clear to the world the aggressive charcter of the Soviet acction.
Making clear to the world United States preference for a peaceful solution and the conditions upon which the United States would, in concret with other members of the United Nations, accept such a settlement.
Obtaining the authorization of the United Nations for member nations to take appropriate actionin the name of the United Nations to assist Iran.
Consider a direct approach to the highest Soviet leaders.
Place itslef in the best possible position to meet the increased threat of global war.
Consult with selected allies to perfect coordinated plans.
Take action against the aggressor to the extend and in the manner which would best continue to the security of the United States.
Prepare to maintain, if necessary, an Iranian Government-in-exile.”xliv
On March 20th, 1953 Department of State Washington D.C. ratified November 20th, 1952 US policy with regard to Iran and made clear their policy toward Iran.
Measures to be taken to support a non-communist Iranian Government in the event of an attempted commnist seizure of power:
Military: Predicated on the assumption that the Iranian Government makes an appeal to the U.S. for direct military assistance, the JCS have recognized three feasible U.S. military courses of action, namely:
To conduct a show of force by peroidic flights of carrier aircraft, or aircraft from land bases outside of Iran, over key centers. Recommendations concerning possible employment of U.S. naval SAC units have been requested from CINCELM and CGSAC, respectively. To date these recommendations have not been received.
To assist the legal Iranian Army with logistic support by augmenting the present policy of arms aid. Since there is no way of foretelling what assistance might he needed or requested by the Iranians, meaningful pplans cannot be prepared in advance. However, the Chief of Staff. U.S. Army, could draw up the necessary plans very quickly when the necessary specfic information became available.
Furnishing additional arms aid to appropriate Middle East countries so as to eventually enable them to possess the strength to secure their fronties against effective communist inflitration. The joint Chiefs of Staff keep this matter under continuous review.
Economic: It is doubtful that any increase in the present level of MDAP and Point Four programs ($66.6 and $20.8 million, respectively) would be justified if the Iranian situation became more unstable. If economic conditions in Iran continue to deteriorate as a result of the continued instability of the government and its inability to makert oil, it is possible that a situation might arise where it would be in the U.S. interest o give the National Front Government direct financial assistance should such a request be received. The Department of State has recommended that a contingency fund of $45 million be set aside for this purpose, and the matter is currently under consideration by the Bureau of the Budget. This action would be consistent with NSC 136/1, but would have to be justified in the light of the situation existing at the same time the request us made.
Diplomatic: An attempted commuist seizure of power would probably be designed to exploit the increasing economic and politically difficulties facing Iran. Thus, U.S. diplomatic planning in such a situation requires continued efforst on the part of our Ambassador in Tehran to negotiate a settlement of the oil controversy between Mosadeq and the U.K. and in the event of an attempted coup, to urge positive action, including the prompt use of security forces, upon such Iranian authorities as may be capable of such action with a view to preventing a communist seizure of power.
Psychological: The PSB on January 15, 1953, approved a “Psycological Strategy Program for the Middle East” (D-22) which includes within this broader framework guidance for psycological operations in Iran. When prepared, plans for specific psycological measures in the event of an attempetd communist coup in Iran will be consistent with this program and with the approved PSB policies contained in “A Strategic Concept for a National Psycological Program with Particular Reference to ‘Cold War’ Operations under NSC 10/5” (D-31).
Special Political Operations: Current special political operations in Iran, which are directed toward counter acting and reducing Tudeh influence, would be continued and, if circumstances permit, intesified in the event of an attempted communist coup. These operations are designed to:
Influence specific political, military and religious leaders to speak out strongly against the Tudeh threat.
Induce certain political and military leaders to institute administrative and security actions to curbTudeh activities (demonstrations, strikes, ect.).
Maintain anti-Tudeh propaganda.
Instigate physical attacks upon Tudeh facilities and demonstrations.
Obtain the publication of anti-Tudeh material in the press, and in pamphlets, books, posters, etc.
Influnce the choice of a successor to Mosadeq in the event of his resignation or death.
Maintain liaison with potential resistance groups, in particular elements of certain strong tribal elements in southern Iran.
….
Measures to be taken to prevent all or a part of Iran or adjacent areas from falling from falling under communist domination in the event of an actual communist seizure of power in one or more of the provinces of Iran or in Tehran:
Military: In the event of a Tudeh coup in Iran, the JCS have recognized three feasible U.S. military courses of action, namely:
Furnish additional arms aid to appropriate Middle East countries so as to eventually enable them to possess the strength to secure their frontiers against effective communist infiltration. The Joint Chiefs of Staff keep this matter under continuous review.
Deploy appropriate Air Force units, on the order of 1-1/2 wings plus support units, to southern Turkey with a mission of assisting Middle East governments in preventing the spread of communist power to their countries. The Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, has been requested to recommend the composition of the Air Force organization to be deployed to southern Turkey under this contingency.
Deploy U.S. ground … one Division, reinforced and…and naval forces to the vicinity of Basra with a mission of assisting Middle East governments in preventing the spread of communist power to their countries. This would be accomplished by the physical presence of U.S. military power, demonstrations of strength and as a last resort, when authorized by proper authority, combat operations. CINCNELM has been requested to make appropriate recommendation with regard to this course of action but his reply has not yet been received. Our present state of preparedness is such that the 82nd Airborne Division, the 2nd Marine Division or an infantry division in Europe could be moved on short notice provided the necessary shipping were made available. The movement of any one of these divisions would take approximately 60 days. The logistice support required to maintain the development of these forces could be accompplished only at the expense of critical supplies now destined for Korea. Similarly any force deployments to the Middle East would necessitate a substantial upward revision of U.S. force ceilings or a reduction of our commitments elsewhere.
Economic: The U.S.Government would provide such economic assistance as required to sustain and strengthen whatever non-communist Iranian Government remained after the communist coup. Specific plans for this eventuality cannot be prepared in advance, but it is likely that requirments for such ai would follow the general pattern, though on a reduced scale of the economic assistance being given the ROK Government. The early appointment of an over-all coordinator for economic aid would, on the basis of Korean experince, greatlyincrease the effectivness of any specific economic measures which might be undertaken in such a contingency.
Diplomatic: (1) The United States Government will not recognize a communist government of Iran and will publicly support anti-communist Iranian elements in Iran or abroad. Such support might involve the recongnition of an Iranian Government in exile. Since the Shah might be a useful rallying point for such a Government, arrangments to facilitate his escape from Tehran in an emergency are under consideration. In addition, there will probably always be some prominent Iranian public figures outside of Iran (such as the Iranian Ambassador to the United States) who could participate in such a movement. For political and security reason, no advance planning in this regard can be attempted with any Iranian leaders, including Shah.
….
Special Political Operations: (1) At the present time CIA has a stockpile of small arms, ammunition and demolition material under USAF cover. Wheelus Field Tripoli. The stockpile is in quantity designed to supply a 10, 000-man guerrilla forces for six months without re-supply. In other increments there is sufficeint material to equip basically a 4000-man guerrilla force (Locales of storage are New Jersey, Ismailia Suzez Canal Zone, and Tripoli.) CIA is now considering the feasibility of adding essential food stuffs and clothing to existing or other stockpiles. An estimate of such requirments is in the process of preparation.
These supplies could, within 3 to 4 weeks, be transported by air and sea to certain strong tribal elements in southern Iran (in particular the Qashqai tribe) who might, in the event of a Tudeh coup, be prepare to conduct resistance activity against such a Communist givernment. However, for political and security reasons, no attempt has been made to conduct advanced planning of this sorr with Iranian officials.
CIA has an agreement with the Qashqai tribal leaders in southern Iran to establish a clnadstine safe haven base from which querrilla and intelligence operations could be conducted utlizing the manpower of these elements (estimated 20,000). Four members of one group have been given radio communications traning by CIA. Conditions in South Iran, attitude of the Iranian Army and neighboring tribes, status of an Iranian rump government or goervnment in exile, the political attitudes of the tribe in questions, and degree of our support in time of Tudeh control have a bearing, however, on the tribal will and ability to conduct resistance activity. To date CIA has trained and equiped a total of approximately 10 indigenous clandestine radio operators to be located throughout Iran and who can be called upon to maintain communications with CIA when desire. Others are being trained.
Reception points in the Tehran and Tabriz area and in South Iran where supplies and personel can be clandestinely introduced into Iran are in the process of being established. A certain quantity of communications equipmet, cash and gold has been cached within Iran, and a considerable amount of cash is avaliable in Tehran.”xlv
Overall reading the above CIA documents illustrated the US never drafted a blue print to do a coup in Iran. As a matter of fact, the Tudeh Party was contemplating to do a coup in Iran and overthrowing the MUSADDIQ's government, and in case the Tudeh Party would not be able to do the coup, Russia would invade Iran.
There was a third CIA document which was blurry and difficult to read. It would not lead to anywhere constructive.
Why Some Claim the US Masterminded the 1953 Coup in Iran:
There were some individuals that they claimed the US overthrow democratically elected Prime Minister MUSADDIQ from the Office. However, according to the above legal documents, as well as, historical events, the US did not overthrow democratically elected Prime Minister MUSADDIQ from the Office. In addition, there were good reasons for one author or media outlets to reinvent Iran's history, and acting in bad faith. One, there was an agenda to make Iranian feeling indifference about Iran that the US was controling Iran's domestic politics and not Iranian. Thus, the Islamic Republic would last very long in Iran, as the US would sell arsenal to Iran and other neighboring nations of Iran at high price. Two, these type of individuals that they endorsed conspiracy theory of 1953, they were gaining some kind of reward from the conspiracy theory of 1953. What was so imperative here that the conspiracy theory of 1953 failed because Imperial Iranian Armed Forces took part in th 1953 coup in order to bring back social order in Iran, and did not receive any kind of fund from anyone. The Imperial Iranian Armed Forces carried its duty as it was supposed to be, and their act would be constituted as patriotic for Iran, Iranian and their King. Last, there was this theory that 1953 coup lead to the 1979 fiasco in Iran. In 1979, there were democrat individuals that they wanted to create a green crescent in Middle East to prevent Russia to expand its dominion in other part of the Middle East, and cause the 1979 fiasco in Iran and it turned out not the way the democrated wanted. Thus, the democrat was relying on “post hoc fallacy” that variable “A” caused variable “B”. Assuming, the variable “A” was the 1953 coup in Iran, so by product of the variable “A” would be the 1979 fiasco in Iran which would be the variable “B”. There was no relation between the variable “A” and the variable “B”, and these individuals had not rationality to interrelate the variable “A” to the variable “B”. In fact, in 1953, there was a dynamic for a coup in Iran, but, in 1979, there were foreign elements that they wanted His Imperial Majesty to die right away.
Therefore, Iranian needed to understand that future of Iran was in their own hands, and not to listen to the enemy's propaganda that the US did coup in Iran. Aiming last sentence of this paper to Iranian from diverse background from National Front Party to Monarchist that they needed to work together to emancipate Iran from hands of mullah who have occupied Iran since 1979. There was no alternative way to liberate Iran from hands of callous mullah who received support from the West to remain in Iran in order to plunder Iran's wealth. So what was going to be? Allowing enemy to divide and conquer us, or determining our own future? Determining future of Iran by working together toward freedom of Iran.
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC):
His Imperial Majesty King of Kings Mohammad Reza PAHLAVI was pioneer of OPEC, and was first chairperson of OPEC. His Imperial Majesty's nickname was “Eagle of OPEC”. His Imperial Majesty formed OPEC so that oil exporting countries would sell their oil at equilibrium price. OPEC main’s task was determining quantity of crude oil which would be produced to the world to consume in a year so that the price of crude oil per barrel would be at market value. OPEC had governing body which was determining “best means for safeguarding their interests, individually and collectively; devising ways and means of ensuring the stabilization of prices in international oil markets with a view to eliminating harmful and unnecessary fluctuations; giving due regard at all times to the interests of the producing nations and to the necessity of securing a steady income to the producing countries; an efficient, economic and regular supply of petroleum to consuming nations, and a fair return on their capital to those investing in the petroleum industry.”xlvi
Dr. Benjamin Zycher reflected light on history of OPEC that it “was formed in response to the U.S. imposition of import quotas on oil. In 1959 the U.S. government established a Mandatory Oil Import Quota Program (MOIP) restricting the amount of crude oil (and refined products) that could be imported into the United States. The MOIP gave preferential treatment to oil imports from Mexico and Canada. This partial exclusion of the U.S. market to Persian Gulf producers depressed prices for their oil. As a result oil prices "posted" (paid to the selling nations) by the major oil companies were reduced in February 1959 and August 1960. In its early years the U.S. import quota program also discriminated against oil from Venezuela. In September 1960 four Persian Gulf nations (Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia) and Venezuela formed OPEC, the purpose of which was to obtain higher prices for crude oil. By 1973 eight other nations (Qatar, Indonesia, Libya, the United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Nigeria, Ecuador, and Gabon) had joined OPEC. Ecuador withdrew on the last day of 1992.”xlvii
OPEC was unsuccessful in its first decade. Real (that is, inflation-adjusted) world prices for crude oil continued to fall until 1971. In 1958 the real price was $10.85 per barrel (in 1990 dollars). By 1971 it had fallen to $7.46 per barrel. However, real prices began to rise slowly beginning in 1971, and then jumped dramatically in late 1973 and 1974 from roughly $8 per barrel to over $27 per barrel in the wake of the Arab-Israeli (“Yom Kippur”) War.xlviii
War and Black Gold Price:
“Contrary to what many non-economists believe, the 1973 price increase was not caused by the oil “embargo” (refusal to sell) directed at the United States and the Netherlands that year by the Arab members of OPEC. Instead, OPEC reduced its production of crude oil, thus raising world oil prices substantially. The embargo against the United States and the Netherlands had no effect whatever: both nations were able to obtain oil at the same prices as all other nations. The failure of this selective embargo was predictable. Oil is a fungible commodity that can easily be resold among buyers. Therefore, sellers who try to deny oil to buyer A will find other buyers purchasing more oil, some of which will be resold by them to buyer A. Nor, as is commonly believed, was OPEC the cause of oil shortages and gasoline lines in the United States. Instead, the shortages were caused by price and allocation controls on crude oil and refined products, originally imposed in 1971 by President Nixon as part of the Economic Stabilization Program. By preventing prices from rising sufficiently, the price controls stimulated desired consumption above the quantities available at the legal maximum prices. Shortages were the inevitable result. Countries that avoided price controls, such as West Germany and Switzerland, also avoided shortages, queues, and the other perverse effects of the controls.”xlix
iRousseau Jean-Jacques. The Social Contract. NY, NY:Oxford University Press. 1994. PG 46
ii Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company> 20 September 2007. PG 01
iii Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Ajax> 20 September 2007. PG 01
iv Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company >20 September 2007. PG 01
v Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company > 20 September 2007. PG 01
vi Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company >20 September 2007. PG 01
vii Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company >20 September 2007. PG 01
viii Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company >20 September 2007. PG 02
ix Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company > 20 September 2007. PG 02
x Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company > 20 September 2007. PG 02
xi Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company > 20 September 2007. PG 02
xii Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company > 20 September 2007. PG 02-03
xiii Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company > 20 September 2007. PG 03
xiv Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company > 20 September 2007. PG 03
xv Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company > 20 September 2007. PG 03
xvi Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company > 20 September 2007. PG 03
xvii Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Razmara>20 September 2007. PG 01
xviii Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Razmara>20 September 2007. PG 01
xix Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Razmara>20 September 2007. PG 01
xx Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Razmara>20 September 2007. PG 01
xxi Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Razmara>20 September 2007. PG 02
xxii Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Razmara>20 September 2007. PG 02
xxiii Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Razmara>20 September 2007. PG 02
xxiv Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Razmara#Effects_on_Iranian_Government > 20 September 2007. PG 02
xxv Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Razmara#Effects_on_Iranian_Government >20 September 2007. PG 02
xxvi Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Razmara#Effects_on_Iranian_Government > 20 September 2007. PG 02
xxvii Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Razmara > 20 September 2007. PG 02
xxviii Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Razmara > 20 September 2007. PG 02
xxix Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company > 20 September 2007. PG 04
xxx Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company > 20 September 2007. PG 04
xxxi Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company > 20 September 2007. PG 04
xxxii Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abadan_Crisis > 20 September 2007. PG 01
xxxiii Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fazlollah_Zahedi> 20 September 2007. PG 02
xxxiv Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fazlollah_Zahedi > 20 September 2007. PG 02
xxxv Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fazlollah_Zahedi > 20 September 2007. PG 02
xxxviWikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fazlollah_Zahedi > 20 September 2007. PG 02
xxxvii Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coup > 21 September 2007. PG 01
xxxviii Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coup > 21 September 2007. PG 01
xxxix Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coup > 21 September 2007. PG 01
xl Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coup > 21 September 2007. PG 01
xli Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coup > 21 September 2007. PG 03
xlii Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coup > 21 September 2007. PG 03
xliii Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coup > 21 September 2007. PG 02
xliv http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB126/iran521120.pdf
xlv http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB126/iran530320.pdf
xlvi Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opec#_note-2 > 01 August 2007. PG 01
xlvii Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opec#_note-2 > 01 August 2007. PG 01
xlviii Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opec#_note-2 > 01 August 2007. PG 01
xlix OPEC <http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/OPEC.html > 28 September 2007. PG 01
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