News June 2009

Justice for All

Address
E-mail: immortalguardofiran@yahoo.com
Freedom, Justice, Honor, Courage
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On line News for June-2009

Index:

The Dirty Dozen

Think Globally, Act Locally

Talking Trash

Movie Review





The Dirty Dozen

There were plenty of televisions, radio stations and websites that they appeared to be working toward emancipation of Iran, and each and everyone one of them were playing their own drums as it created this image in mind that there was this melody in the air that it did not have any tone into it. It was havoc and mayhem among all these televisions, radio stations and websites. They were working in such a disarray with each other as if the whole world was about to collapse. There was a logical reason for the televisions, radio stations, and websites to work in such a chaotic environment because the above entities like televisions, radio stations, and websites were owned by bunch of fossils, and they were “among the dirty dozen attributes is a “threat-rigidity” response in which people become conservative. They hunker down and become self-protective and increasingly rely on old, first learned habits and past behaviors. In reaction to a perceived threat, they do that which they know how to do best or that which has worked best in past. Despite new circumstances in which old behaviors may not be effective, there is an escalation commitment to habitual behavior. People consider fewer options, look for information that confirms their previous biases, and become more narrow-minded in their perspectives.”1

Kindly look at some of these fossils at televisions, radio stations, and websites. They were merely enforcing their own bias ideas about H. I. M Mohammad Reza PAHALAVI vs MUSSADIQ, Khomeini HENDI stole the 1979 Revolution from the left wing factions while the theocratic regime in Iran was plundering Iran's wealth, and was enjoying a free ride.

Let's forget the past, and move on with our lives, and secure future of Iran, there was not much which would be done for past mistake, but there was a bright future for Iranian which was waiting to be embrace. Last, these fossils were stuck in their own bias, and past experience and were self-promoting their own profile like little children look at me, look at me, I am coming from this type of family and so on.

Think Globally, Act Locally

Environmentalist groups have one common slogan which unites them globally in their cause toward environmental issues, as the environmentalist groups chant their slogan that they “think globally, act locally”. Now, Iranian who did not want the theocratic regime in reign in Iran, Iranian should incorporated the environmentalist's slogan in its cause by thinking globally and acting locally. There were many venues for Iranian to follow through the above slogan, and the key point was to paralyze the Islamic Republic in Iran's economy in order to make sure Revolutionary Guard, and other branch of security forces would lose their loyalty to the system, and would take side with Iranian in order to execute justice in Iran.

There was one way to paralyze economic of the theocratic regime in Iran, which was by imposing economic sanction on the regime, and Iranian really should not rely on any entity to do the job, but to take the initiative, and impose their own smart economic sanction against establishment in Iran. For example, recently, Justice for All tried to imposed sanction on the theocratic regime in Iran by drafting the below petition with good intention of not allowing the regime in Iran to transfer fund in Canada.

http://www.petitiononline.com/mod_perl/signed.cgi?cndmulkl&1
Other Iranian should develop their own strategy and charge at the establishment in Iran in order to execute justice in Iran, and must not wait for anyone to do anything. Be a leader, think globally and act locally. It is a key to bright future for Iran.

Talking Trash

This was life cycle of “Iranian Opposition”for toppling the Islamic Republic in Iran. This Iranian Opposition would form a team and would appear before camera as this team would make some outrageous promise and lie to their viewers like saying that this team has formulated a tactical operation in Iran to topple the regime. Of course, all Iranian were desperate, and were looking for a window of hope to open so Iran would be liberated from hands of mullah. This dream team began to move to next stage which was presenting a superheroes, and these superheroes would call themselves technocrat, elite of the society, think tank, and many more fancy and colorful words. It appeared that these individuals were on top of their studies, and seriously they were going to do it. This dream team moved to other logical stage which was to confirm it lies. This team would claim that the regime in Iran published some articles in the state media and it would be shown to everyone. This team would claim that they were determined to topple the regime in Iran and needed some cash from public to do it. Plus, this was registered under 503(1) charity and it was tax refundable. Now, everyone was all excited that the regime's demise was on horizon, it was about time to go back home. This team began to make more promise and lie to their members that how the regime in Iran did not have any stability and was about to fall down. As time passes by, it became clear that this team was like previous team, it did not have any juice into it. Now, it was time to exit for this team. It would begin to play blame game that how public did not support them in this national uprising, and if public would support them, the regime in Iran would be toppled at no time.

Fact, the US was providing funds to Iranian Opposition to keep Iranian busy while the regime in Iran would be threatening by bogyman of the US. The US was providing funds to Iranian Opposition because Iranian Oppositions was composed of disgruntle individuals toward Iran, and never would take any step toward freedom of Iran. For example, one television station was asking public to come out of their homes another television station was saying exactly opposite of other one.

Movie Review

Narrator: H. Schneider
Movie: The Lucky Ones

weblink:
http://www.amazon.com/review/RXQR1A1XW9Q2I/ref=cm_aya_cmt?ie=UTF8&ASIN=B001KP2J2G#wasThisHelpful

The movie combines the well established road movie genre with the more recent 'returners from Iraq' genre. It is a comedy that makes light of personal tragedies and does it gracefully. I watched it in a 'combi pack' with 'Stop Loss', the much more serious film about soldiers who are forced to return to the front after their contracted term has expired.

In The Lucky Ones, Robbins is a sergeant who has completed his term and who looks forward to return to wife and teenage son. Pena and McAdams are on a 30 days home leave. The three get accidentally grouped together for a car trip from New York to Las Vegas and experience the difficulties of outsiders in an ambiguous situation. None of them has stable social circumstances, as even the Robbins character finds out to his shock. Their social backgrounds are quite divergent. They are variously feted as war heroes or attacked by the home crowd for being either too stupid to stay away from trouble or too luke warm about the war effort itself. The backseat drivers in middle American require heroic attitudes, not a statement that survival is a soldier's main objective.

This is the kind of movie that discusses problems without indoctrinating you.
Thank you

Long Live Pure Divine Motherland of Iran

Contributors are Caesar, Shannon, Steve F, Infantry Officer/Vanguard & Military Tribunal Judge, and Peyman

The Practical Implications of the WHTI

By Scott Stewart and Fred Burton
External Link
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative Web site
(STRATFOR is not responsible for the content of other Web sites.)
On June 1, 2009, the land and sea portion of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) will go into effect. The WHTI is a program launched as a result of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 and intended to standardize the documents required to enter the United States. The stated goal of WHTI is to facilitate entry for U.S. citizens and legitimate foreign visitors while reducing the possibility of people entering the country using fraudulent documents.
Prior to the WHTI, American travelers to Mexico, Canada and several countries in the Caribbean needed only a driver’s license and birth certificate to re-enter the United States, while American travelers to other regions of the world required U.S. passports to return. This meant that immigration officials had to examine driver’s licenses and birth certificates from every state, and since the driver’s licenses and birth certificates of all the states change over time, there were literally hundreds of different types of documents that could be used by travelers at points of entry. In practical terms, this meant there was no way immigration officers could be familiar with the security features of each identification document, thereby making it easier for foreigners to use counterfeit or fraudulently altered documents to enter the country by claiming to be returning U.S. citizens.
The air portion of the WHTI went into effect in January 2007 and required that all international air travelers use passports to enter the United States. However, the land and sea implementation of WHTI will be a little different from the air portion. In addition to passports, travelers can also use U.S. passport cards (a driver’s license-sized identification document), an enhanced driver’s license (which are currently being issued by Michigan, New York, Vermont and Washington) or “special trusted” traveler identification cards such as Nexus and Sentri to enter the country by land or sea.
The WHTI will greatly simplify the number of travel documents that immigration officials have to scrutinize. It will also mean that the documents needed to enter the United States will be far harder to counterfeit, alter or obtain by fraud than the documents previously required for entry. This will make it more difficult for criminals, illegal aliens and militants to enter the United States, but it will by no means make it impossible.
An Evolutionary Process
Identity document fraud has existed for as long as identity documents have. Like much sophisticated crime, document fraud has been an evolutionary process. Advancements in document security have been followed by advancements in fraud techniques, which in turn have forced governments to continue to advance their security efforts. In recent years, the advent of color copiers, powerful desktop computers with sophisticated graphics programs and laser printers has propelled this document-fraud arms race into overdrive.
In addition to sophisticated physical security features such as ultraviolet markings and holograms, perhaps the most significant security features of newer identification documents such as passports and visas are that they are machine-readable and linked to a database that can be cross-checked when the document is swiped through a reader at a point of entry. Since 2007, U.S. passports have also incorporated small contactless integrated circuits embedded in the back cover to securely store the information contained on the passport’s photo page. These added security measures have limited the utility of completely counterfeit U.S. passports, which (for the most part) cannot be used to pass through a point of entry equipped with a reader connected to the central database. Such documents are used mostly for traveling abroad rather than for entering the United States.
Likewise, advancements in security features have also made it far more difficult to alter genuine documents by doing things like changing the photo affixed to it (referred to as a photo substitution or “photo sub”). Certainly, there are some very high-end document forgers who can still accomplish this — such as those employed by intelligence agencies — but such operations are very difficult and the documents produced are very expensive.
One of the benefits of the WHTI is that it will now force those wishing to obtain genuine documents by fraud to travel to a higher level — it has, in effect, upped the ante. As STRATFOR has long noted, driver’s licenses pose serious national security vulnerability. Driver’s licenses are, in fact, the closet thing to a U.S. national identity card. However, driver’s licenses are issued by each state, and the process of getting one differs greatly from state to state. Criminals clearly have figured out how to work the system to get fraudulent driver’s licenses. Some states make it easier to get licenses than others and people looking for fraudulent identification flock to those states. Within the states, there are also some department of motor vehicles (DMV) offices — and specific workers — known to be more lenient, and those seeking fraudulent licenses will intentionally visit those offices. In addition to corrupt DMV employees and states that issue driver’s licenses to illegal immigrants, an illegal industry has arisen devoted entirely to producing counterfeit identification documents, compounding the problem.
Birth certificates are also relatively easy to obtain illegally. The relative ease of fraudulently obtaining birth certificates as well as driver’s licenses is seen in federal document-fraud cases (both documents are required to apply for a U.S. passport). In a large majority of the passport-fraud cases worked by Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) special agents, the suspects have successfully obtained fraudulent driver’s licenses and birth certificates, which are submitted in support of a passport application. It is not uncommon for DSS special agents to arrest suspects who possess multiple driver’s licenses in different identities from the same state or even from different states. Such documents could have been used to travel across the U.S. border via land prior to the implementation of the WHTI.
Countermoves
For those able to afford the fees of high-end alien smugglers, who can charge up to $30,000 for a package of identification documents that contains a genuine U.S. passport with genuine supporting documents (birth certificate, social security card and driver’s license), or $10,000 to $15,000 for a genuine U.S. visa (tied to a database, the newer machine-readable visas are very difficult to counterfeit), the WHTI will not make much difference. These high-end document vendors obtain legitimate identification documents by paying corrupt officials who have been carefully cultivated.
That said, the WHTI should succeed in causing the vast majority of criminal aliens, illegal economic immigrants and even militants — people who have not traditionally patronized high-end document vendors — to change the way they enter the United States. Of course, perhaps the simplest way is to take the low road. That is, get to Canada or Mexico and then simply sneak across the border as an undocumented alien — something that hundreds of thousands of people do every year. Once inside the country, such aliens can link up with lower-level document vendors to obtain the driver’s licenses, social security cards and other identity documents they need in order to live, work and travel around the country.
But there are other ways that the WHTI measures can be circumvented. For example, the crush of passport applications the WHTI is now causing will create a distinct vulnerability in the short term. Although the U.S. Department of State has hired a large number of new examiners to process the flood of passport applications it is receiving (and also a number of new DSS special agents to investigate fraud cases), the system is currently overwhelmed by the volume of passport applications.
Historically, passport examiners have had their performance evaluations based on the number of passport applications they process rather than on the number of fraudulent applications they catch (which has long been a source of friction between the DSS and the Bureau of Consular Affairs). This emphasis on numerical quotas has been documented in U.S. Government Accountability Office reports that have noted that the quotas essentially force examiners to take shortcuts in their fraud-detection efforts. As a result, many genuine passports have been issued to people who did not have a legitimate right to them. The current overwhelming flood of passport applications as a result of WHTI, when combined with a batch of new examiners who are rated on numerical quotas, will further enhance this vulnerability. Unless a passport application has an obvious fraud indicator, it will likely slip through the cracks and a fraudulent applicant will receive a genuine U.S. passport.
Stolen passports are another area to consider. In addition to being photo-subbed, which has become more difficult, stolen passports can also be used as travel documents by people who resemble the owner of the document. All the holograms, microprinting and other security features that have been placed on the laminates of passport photo pages tend to make it difficult to clearly see the photo of the passport holder. Also, people change over time, so a person who was issued a passport eight years ago can look substantially different from their passport photo today. The passport process and the laminate can also make it especially difficult to see the facial features of dark-skinned people. This means it is not at all uncommon for a person to be able to impersonate someone and use his or her passport without altering it. This problem persists, even with digital photos being included with the information embedded electronically in the memory chips of newer electronic passports.
Because of these possibilities, stolen passports are worth a tidy sum on the black market. Indeed, shortly after U.S. passports with green covers were issued, they were found to be extremely easy to photo-sub and were soon fetching $7,000 apiece on the black market in places like Jamaica and Haiti. In fact, criminal gangs quickly began offering tourists cash or drugs in exchange for the documents, and the criminal gangs would then turn around and sell them for a profit to document vendors. The problem of U.S. citizens selling their passports also persists today.
On the flip side, many Americans are unaware of the monetary value of their passport — which is several times the $100 they paid to have it issued. They do not realize that when they carry their passport it is like toting around a wad of $100 bills. Tour guides who collect the passports of all the people in their tour group and then keep them in a bag or backpack can end up carrying around tens of thousands of dollars in identification documents — which would make a really nice haul for a petty criminal in the Third World.
But U.S. passports are not the only ones at risk of being stolen. The changes in travel documents required to enter the United States will also place a premium on passports from countries that are included in the U.S. “visa waiver” program — that is, those countries whose citizens can travel to and remain in the United States for up to 90 days without a visa. There are currently 35 countries in the visa waiver program, including EU member states, Australia, Japan and a few others. The risk of theft is especially acute for those countries on the visa waiver list that issue passports that are easier to photo-sub than a U.S. passport. In some visa waiver countries, it is also cheaper and easier to obtain a genuine passport from a corrupt government official than it is in the United States.
While there are efforts currently under way to create an international database to rapidly share data about lost and stolen blank and issued passports, there is generally a time lag before lost and stolen foreign passports are entered into U.S. lookout systems. This lag provides ample time for someone to enter the United States on a photo-subbed passport, and it is not clear if retroactive searches are made once the United States is notified of a stolen passport in order to determine if that passport was used to enter the United States during the lag period. Of course, once a person is inside the United States, it is fairly easy to obtain identification documents in another identity and simply disappear.
There have also been cases of jihadist groups using the passports of militants from visa waiver countries who have died in order to move other operatives into the United States. On Sept. 1, 1992, Ahmed Ajaj and Abdul Basit (also known as Ramzi Yousef) arrived at New York’s Kennedy Airport. The two men had boarded a flight in Karachi, Pakistan, using photo-subbed passports that had been acquired from deceased jihadists. Ajaj used a Swedish passport in the name Khurram Khan and Basit used a British passport in the name Mohamed Azan.
Ultimately, the WHTI will help close some significant loopholes — especially regarding the use of fraud-prone driver’s licenses and birth certificates for international travel — but the program will not end all document fraud. Document vendors will continue to shift and adjust their efforts to adapt to the WHTI and exploit other vulnerabilities in the system.

Iran mosque bombing kills 19 worshippers: agency

TEHRAN (AFP) - A bomb blast at a Shiite mosque in the southeastern Iranian city of Zahedan on Thursday killed at least 19 worshippers and wounded 80 others, the official IRNA news agency reported.
The evening explosion struck the Amir al-Momenin mosque in Zahedan, the restive capital of Sistan-Baluchestan province, which has a substantial Sunni minority, it said.
"The bomb exploded at the time of evening prayer and killed a number of worshippers," Ali Mohammad Azad, the governor general of the province bordering Pakistan and Afghanistan told reporters.
"It was a terrorist attack and the bomb was exploded by a terrorist," Azad told reporters, according to IRNA.
Fars news agency reported that 20 people were killed in the bombing.
Azad said soon after the explosion "members of a terrorist group who wanted to get out of Zahedan were arrested."
"The members of the terrorist group intended to explode bombs in some other areas of Zahedan, but they have been arrested due to the efforts of the provincial intelligence office."
Azad said "bandits and terrorists intended to disturb the order in the province before the election considering the insecurity in the eastern neighbouring countries."
According to IRNA, Zahedan's Friday prayer leader Ayatollah Abbas Ali Soleymani told reporters that "one of the main persons involved (in the attack) had been arrested" and "he will soon be punished in front of the mosque."
Fars said the mosque is the second biggest Shiite mosque in Zahedan and also a "gathering place for revolutionary Shiites."
The agency said no group had so far claimed responsibility for the bombing, and that security and police services were in control of the area.
On February 18, Al-Gadhir mosque in Zahedan was attacked. A bomb apparently carried by a motorcyclist exploded but caused no casualties.
The last major attack in Zahedan was a February 2007 strike by suspected Sunni rebels that killed 13 elite Revolutionary Guards.
Thursday was a public holiday in Iran to mourn the death of Fatima Zahra, the daughter of the Prophet Mohammed.
The explosion comes just weeks ahead of Iran's June 12 presidential election.
Sistan-Baluchestan province has a large ethnic Baluch minority.
In recent years, it has been the scene of a deadly insurgency by Sunni rebels of the Jundullah (Soldiers of God) group which is strongly opposed to predominantly Shiite country's government.
The province also lies on a major narcotics-smuggling route from Afghanistan and Pakistan.
In April 2008, the bombing of a packed mosque in the southern city of Shiraz during evening prayers left 14 people dead.
The strike in Shiraz was the first in decades in Iran's Persian heartland. The normally calm city is not in a border zone, nor is it home to any significant ethnic or religious minority population.
Iran has in the past blamed US and British agents based in neighbouring Iraq and Afghanistan for launching attacks on border provinces with significant ethnic minority populations.

Beyoncé - Halo

The North Korean Nuclear Test and Geopolitical Reality

By Nathan Hughes
North Korea tested a nuclear device for the second time in two and a half years May 25. Although North Korea’s nuclear weapons program continues to be a work in progress, the event is inherently significant. North Korea has carried out the only two nuclear detonations the world has seen in the 21st century. (The most recent tests prior to that were the spate of tests by India and Pakistan in 1998.)
Details continue to emerge through the analysis of seismographic and other data, and speculation about the precise nature of the atomic device that Pyongyang may now posses carries on, making this a good moment to examine the underlying reality of nuclear weapons. Examining their history, and the lessons that can be drawn from that history, will help us understand what it will really mean if North Korea does indeed join the nuclear club.
Nuclear Weapons in the 20th Century
Even before an atomic bomb was first detonated on July 16, 1945, both the scientists and engineers of the Manhattan Project and the U.S. military struggled with the implications of the science that they pursued. But ultimately, they were driven by a profound sense of urgency to complete the program in time to affect the outcome of the war, meaning understanding the implications of the atomic bomb was largely a luxury that would have to wait. Even after World War II ended, the frantic pace of the Cold War kept pushing weapons development forward at a break-neck pace. This meant that in their early days, atomic weapons were probably more advanced than the understanding of their moral and practical utility.
But the promise of nuclear weapons was immense. If appropriate delivery systems could be designed and built, and armed with more powerful nuclear warheads, a nation could continually threaten another country’s very means of existence: its people, industry, military installations and governmental institutions. Battlefield or tactical nuclear weapons would make the massing of military formations suicidal — or so military planners once thought. What seemed clear early on was that nuclear weapons had fundamentally changed everything. War was thought to have been made obsolete, simply too dangerous and too destructive to contemplate. Some of the most brilliant minds of the Manhattan Project talked of how atomic weapons made world government necessary.
But perhaps the most surprising aspect of the advent of the nuclear age is how little actually changed. Great power competition continued apace (despite a new, bilateral dynamic). The Soviets blockaded Berlin for nearly a year starting in 1948, in defiance of what was then the world’s sole nuclear power: the United States. Likewise, the United States refused to use nuclear weapons in the Korean War (despite the pleas of Gen. Douglas MacArthur) even as Chinese divisions surged across the Yalu River, overwhelming U.S., South Korean and allied forces and driving them back south, reversing the rapid gains of late 1950.
Again and again, the situations nuclear weapons were supposed to deter occurred. The military realities they would supposedly shift simply persisted. Thus, the United States lost in Vietnam. The Syrians and the Egyptians invaded Israel in 1973 (despite knowing that the Israelis had acquired nuclear weapons by that point). The Soviet Union lost in Afghanistan. India and Pakistan went to war in 1999 — and nearly went to war twice after that. In none of these cases was it judged appropriate to risk employing nuclear weapons — nor was it clear what utility they might have.
Enduring Geopolitical Stability
Wars of immense risk are born of desperation. In World War II, both Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan took immense geostrategic gambles — and lost — but knowingly took the risk because of untenable geopolitical circumstances. By comparison, the postwar United States and Soviet Union were geopolitically secure. Washington had come into its own as a global power secured by the buffer of two oceans, while Moscow enjoyed the greatest strategic depth it had ever known.
The U.S.-Soviet competition was, of course, intense, from the nuclear arms race to the space race to countless proxy wars. Yet underlying it was a fear that the other side would engage in a war that was on its face irrational. Western Europe promised the Soviet Union immense material wealth but would likely have been impossible to subdue. (Why should a Soviet leader expect to succeed where Napoleon and Hitler had failed?) Even without nuclear weapons in the calculus, the cost to the Soviets was too great, and fears of the Soviet invasion of Europe along the North European Plain were overblown. The desperation that caused Germany to seek control over Europe twice in the first half of the 20th century simply did not characterize either the Soviet or U.S. geopolitical position even without nuclear weapons in play. It was within this context that the concept of mutually assured destruction emerged — the idea that each side would possess sufficient retaliatory capability to inflict a devastating “second strike” in the event of even a surprise nuclear attack.
Through it all, the metrics of nuclear warfare became more intricate. Throw weights and penetration rates were calculated and recalculated. Targets were assigned and reassigned. A single city would begin to have multiple target points, each with multiple strategic warheads allocated to its destruction. Theorists and strategists would talk of successful scenarios for first strikes. But only in the Cuban Missile Crisis did the two sides really threaten one another’s fundamental national interests. There were certainly other moments when the world inched toward the nuclear brink. But each time, the global system found its balance, and there was little cause or incentive for political leaders on either side of the Iron Curtain to so fundamentally alter the status quo as to risk direct military confrontation — much less nuclear war.
So through it all, the world carried on, its fundamental dynamics unchanged by the ever-present threat of nuclear war. Indeed, history has shown that once a country has acquired nuclear weapons, the weapons fail to have any real impact on the country’s regional standing or pursuit of power in the international system.
Thus, not only were nuclear weapons never used in even desperate combat situations, their acquisition failed to entail any meaningful shift in geopolitical position. Even as the United Kingdom acquired nuclear weapons in the 1950s, its colonial empire crumbled. The Soviet Union was behaving aggressively all along its periphery before it acquired nuclear weapons. And the Soviet Union had the largest nuclear arsenal in the world when it collapsed — not only despite its arsenal, but in part because the economic burden of creating and maintaining it was unsustainable. Today, nuclear-armed France and non-nuclear armed Germany vie for dominance on the Continent with no regard for France’s small nuclear arsenal.
The Intersection of Weapons, Strategy and Politics
This August will mark 64 years since any nation used a nuclear weapon in combat. What was supposed to be the ultimate weapon has proved too risky and too inappropriate as a weapon ever to see the light of day again. Though nuclear weapons certainly played a role in the strategic calculus of the Cold War, they had no relation to a military strategy that anyone could seriously contemplate. Militaries, of course, had war plans and scenarios and target sets. But outside this world of role-play Armageddon, neither side was about to precipitate a global nuclear war.
Clausewitz long ago detailed the inescapable connection between national political objectives and military force and strategy. Under this thinking, if nuclear weapons had no relation to practical military strategy, then they were necessarily disconnected (at least in the Clausewitzian sense) from — and could not be integrated with — national and political objectives in a coherent fashion. True to the theory, despite ebbs and flows in the nuclear arms race, for 64 years, no one has found a good reason to detonate a nuclear bomb.
By this line of reasoning, STRATFOR is not suggesting that complete nuclear disarmament — or “getting to zero” — is either possible or likely. The nuclear genie can never be put back in the bottle. The idea that the world could ever remain nuclear-free is untenable. The potential for clandestine and crash nuclear programs will remain a reality of the international system, and the world’s nuclear powers are unlikely ever to trust the rest of the system enough to completely surrender their own strategic deterrents.
Legacy, Peer and Bargaining Programs
The countries in the world today with nuclear weapons programs can be divided into three main categories.
Legacy Programs: This category comprises countries like the United Kingdom and France that maintain small arsenals even after the end of the threat they acquired them for; in this case, to stave off a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. In the last few years, both London and Paris have decided to sustain their small arsenals in some form for the foreseeable future. This category is also important for highlighting the unlikelihood that a country will surrender its weapons after it has acquired them (the only exceptions being South Africa and several Soviet Republics that repatriated their weapons back to Russia after the Soviet collapse).
Peer Programs: The original peer program belonged to the Soviet Union, which aggressively and ruthlessly pursued a nuclear weapons capacity following the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 because its peer competitor, the United States, had them. The Pakistani and Indian nuclear programs also can be understood as peer programs.
Bargaining Programs: These programs are about the threat of developing nuclear weapons, a strategy that involves quite a bit of tightrope walking to make the threat of acquiring nuclear weapons appear real and credible while at the same time not making it appear so urgent as to require military intervention. Pyongyang pioneered this strategy, and has wielded it deftly over the years. As North Korea continues to progress with its efforts, however, it will shift from a bargaining chip to an actual program — one it will be unlikely to surrender once it acquires weapons, like London and Paris. Iran also falls into this category, though it could also progress to a more substantial program if it gets far enough along. Though parts of its program are indeed clandestine, other parts are actually highly publicized and celebrated as milestones, both to continue to highlight progress internationally and for purposes of domestic consumption. Indeed, manipulating the international community with a nuclear weapon — or even a civilian nuclear program — has proved to be a rare instance of the utility of nuclear weapons beyond simple deterrence.
The Challenges of a Nuclear Weapons Program
Pursuing a nuclear weapons program is not without its risks. Another important distinction is that between a crude nuclear device and an actual weapon. The former requires only that a country demonstrate the capability to initiate an uncontrolled nuclear chain reaction, creating a rather large hole in the ground. That device may be crude, fragile or otherwise temperamental. But this does not automatically imply the capability to mount a rugged and reliable nuclear warhead on a delivery vehicle and send it flying to the other side of the earth. In other words, it does not immediately translate into a meaningful deterrent.
For that, a ruggedized, reliable nuclear weapon must be mated with some manner of reliable delivery vehicle to have real military meaning. After the end of World War II, the B-29’s limited range and the few nuclear weapons the United States had on hand meant that its vaunted nuclear arsenal was initially extremely difficult to bring to bear against the Soviet heartland. The United States would spend untold resources to overcome this obstacle in the decade that followed.
The modern nuclear weapon is not just a product of physics, but of decades of design work and full-scale nuclear testing. It combines expertise not just in nuclear physics, but materials science, rocketry, missile guidance and the like. A nuclear device does not come easy. A nuclear weapon is one of the most advanced syntheses of complex technologies ever achieved by man.
Many dangers exist for an aspiring nuclear power. Many of the facilities associated with a clandestine nuclear weapons program are large, fixed and complex. They are vulnerable to airstrikes — as Syria found in 2007. (And though history shows that nuclear weapons are unlikely to be employed, it is still in the interests of other powers to deny that capability to a potential adversary.)
The history of proliferation shows that few countries actually ever decide to pursue nuclear weapons. Obtaining them requires immense investment (and the more clandestine the attempt, the more costly the program becomes), and the ability to focus and coordinate a major national undertaking over time. It is not something a leader like Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez could decide to pursue on a whim. A national government must have cohesion over the long span of time necessary to go from the foundations of a weapons program to a meaningful deterrent capability.
The Exceptions
In addition to this sustained commitment must be the willingness to be suspected by the international community and endure pariah status and isolation — in and of themselves significant risks for even moderately integrated economies. One must also have reasonable means of deterring a pre-emptive strike by a competing power. A Venezuelan weapons program is therefore unlikely because the United States would act decisively the moment one was discovered, and there is little Venezuela could do to deter such action.
North Korea, on the other hand, has held downtown Seoul (just across the demilitarized zone) at risk for generations with one of the highest concentrations of deployed artillery, artillery rockets and short-range ballistic missiles on the planet. From the outside, Pyongyang is perceived as unpredictable enough that any potential pre-emptive strike on its nuclear facilities is too risky not because of some newfound nuclear capability, but because of Pyongyang’s capability to turn the South Korean capital city into a proverbial “sea of fire” via conventional means. A nuclear North Korea, the world has now seen, is not sufficient alone to risk renewed war on the Korean Peninsula.
Iran is similarly defended. It can threaten to close the Strait of Hormuz, to launch a barrage of medium-range ballistic missiles at Israel, and to use its proxies in Lebanon and elsewhere to respond with a new campaign of artillery rocket fire, guerrilla warfare and terrorism. But the biggest deterrent to a strike on Iran is Tehran’s ability to seriously interfere in ongoing U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan — efforts already tenuous enough without direct Iranian opposition.
In other words, some other deterrent (be it conventional or unconventional) against attack is a prerequisite for a nuclear program, since powerful potential adversaries can otherwise move to halt such efforts. North Korea and Iran have such deterrents. Most other countries widely considered major proliferation dangers — Iraq before 2003, Syria or Venezuela, for example — do not. And that fundamental deterrent remains in place after the country acquires nuclear weapons.
In short, no one was going to invade North Korea — or even launch limited military strikes against it — before its first nuclear test in 2006. And no one will do so now, nor will they do so after its next test. So North Korea – with or without nuclear weapons – remains secure from invasion. With or without nuclear weapons, North Korea remains a pariah state, isolated from the international community. And with or without them, the world will go on.
The Global Nuclear Dynamic
Despite how frantic the pace of nuclear proliferation may seem at the moment, the true pace of the global nuclear dynamic is slowing profoundly. With the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty already effectively in place (though it has not been ratified), the pace of nuclear weapons development has already slowed and stabilized dramatically. The world’s current nuclear powers are reliant to some degree on the generation of weapons that were validated and certified before testing was banned. They are currently working toward weapons and force structures that will provide them with a stable, sustainable deterrent for the foreseeable future rooted largely in this pre-existing weapons architecture.
New additions to the nuclear club are always cause for concern. But though North Korea’s nuclear program continues apace, it hardly threatens to shift underlying geopolitical realities. It may encourage the United States to retain a slightly larger arsenal to reassure Japan and South Korea about the credibility of its nuclear umbrella. It also could encourage Tokyo and Seoul to pursue their own weapons. But none of these shifts, though significant, is likely to alter the defining military, economic and political dynamics of the region fundamentally.
Nuclear arms are better understood as an insurance policy, one that no potential aggressor has any intention of steering afoul of. Without practical military or political use, they remain held in reserve — where in all likelihood they will remain for the foreseeable future.

Iran Zamin

Bunch of Sell-out

Khomeini and Slaughtering Iranian

Kindly pay close attention that what Khomeini HENDI is saying about slaughtering Iranian, and when any Iranian is taking side with the normative control model of the Islamic Republic in Iran in any shape or form is a murderer.

Amir Mirzaghassemi Tapesh shepesh goes POLITICAL By Khamenei command-VOTES!

This lady does not have her own mind, and she follows what he says, and he is saying what IRI instructs him to say.

The below video clip is made by the below blogger.

http://www.youtube.com/user/lobby2000

Dubai-Tapesh TV Master Mind of IRI

Steward of IRI in US

IRI Lady is Exposed to Everyone

Exposing Element of IRI in Toronto, Ontario

Toronto, Ontario-Shame Canada-Supporting Terrorism

RAFSANJANI INVESTMENTS/OWNERSHIPS IN CANADA

This above video clip was made by below YouTube blogger.

Thank you, and thank you all of you for signing the petition. I am passing all of your comments on the petition and video clip/s to Prime Minister of Canada and to say NO. We stand firm and strong against this form of criminal activity.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a3MfBg5UlYY&feature=channel_page

Homeira - Mahtabe Eshgh

Another "Puke In My Mouth"

"Puke In My Mouth"

H.I.M King of Kings Mohammad Reza PAHLAVI-CIA Profile

Proving that the Petition was filed at International Court of Justice

Dear Sir or Madam,
We acknowledge good receipt of your message and thank you for your interest in the Court's website.
Your message has been forwarded to the Department of the Court's Registry dealing with the issues you addressed. This Department will send you a reply in due course.

Canadian Politicians, Iranian Mullahs, Terrorism, and Kleptocracy

http://www.petitiononline.com/cndmulkl/petition.html

To: International Court of Justice, Ban Ki-moon Secretary General United Nations,Transparency International Secretariat Prime Minister of Canada Right Honorable Stephen HARPER et al
Justice for All

Peyman DOUSTI
Pawn
E-mail: ImmortalGuardofIran@yahoo.com
Freedom, Justice, Honor, Courage
******************************************************************

Date of Issue:
Friday May 22nd, 2009

File Number:

Canadian Politicians, Iranian Mullahs, Terrorism, and Kleptocracy

Terms:
1.Petition is constituted as a legal document.
2.Asset is defined as fund or anything which has monetary value.
3.Element is defined as a person who is assisting a Revolutionary Guard, Basij, some form of Paramilitary, associating with ruling class of Islamic Republic of Iran.
4.Entity is defined as a person who is assisting a Revolutionary Guard, Basij, some form of Paramilitary, associating with ruling class of Islamic Republic of Iran.
5.Involvement is defined as a person, group, or a political party intentionally or unintentionally is assisting element of Islamic Republic of Iran to transfer asset to Canada.
6.Reserving the right to expand or recede on the terms of this petition.
7.Life cycle of this petition is not applicable to other key component of this petition.
8.Reserving the right to expand or recede any portion of this legal document. Regardless of circumstances.

Warning Issued:
1.Prior of issuing this petition, Office of the Auditor General of Canada, Office of the Privacy Commission, FINTRAC, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Canadian Dignitaries from all three level of governments, Canadian Red Cross, media outlets, and activists were warned about this dire situation. Most importantly, the above entities has been aware of the plight in Iran and the above Canadian elements have done nothing to stop it.

Background:
1.On October 16th, 2006 it became clear that cleric Ali Akbar Hashemi RAFSANJANI, who was an international terrorist from Iran with his son Mehdi, and his daughter Faezeh RAFSANJANI owned HWY 407 in Province of Ontario, country of Canada. In addition, they owned Center Point Mall Center which was located in Province of Ontario, country of Canada.
2.There is sufficient reason to believe that RAFSANJANI and his families have more assets in Canada.
3.There is sufficient reason to believe that there are other individuals that they are acting on behalf of RAFSANJANI in Canada and are protecting his families' assets in Canada.
4.There is sufficient reason to believe that there are other individuals from Islamic Republic of Iran that they use Canada as a base to invest in Canada.

Legal Evidence:
1.CIC2004001660 Citizenship and Immigration Canada Media 6/14/04 0:00 any documents, memos, reports, letters, emails, voice mail transcripts or other written or recorded material concerning direct foreign investment by companies and individuals of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Canada, including but not limited to Highway 407, the Center Point shopping Center in Toronto. Also any material on visits, official or unofficial, to Canada by member of the Iranian government, and/or family members of former Pres. Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsnajani (aka Rafsamjani), including son Mehdi Hashemi Rafsanjani (aka Rafsamjani), and daughter Faezeh Hashemi. Timeframe January 1, 2000-June 14, 2004.”
2.International Trade Canada, Trade Commissioner Service stated that “Iran actively encourages foreign investment in most sectors but requires the involvement of a local partner to whom a technology is transferred. Generally, the local partner is expected to have a minimum share of 51% in the project. The Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act (FIPPA) covers foreign investments including BOT projects and Buy Back contracts. Buy Back contracts are the mechanism used by the Ministry of Oil to award oil and gas production contracts and are closer to service agreements than Production Sharing Agreements. Iran has set up multiple economic and free trade zones which offer 10 - 15 year tax holidays and duty free imports to promote investment. There is no Foreign Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement between Canada and Iran. For more information, contact the Iranian and Foreign Joint Venture Investment Association: info@iran-investment.com other useful information is available at: http://www.ipanet.com.”
3.International Trade Canada, Trade Commissioner Service advised “Medium and long-term financing is available from commercial banks in Iran although foreign investors are encouraged to find offshore sources of finance as commercial banks give preference to national investors. Foreign companies can best access local commercial finance through an Iranian joint venture partner. In many cases, the ability of foreign firms to secure external financing is a driving factor in the establishment of joint ventures and in the awarding of contracts
4.Iran - Canada Cola Corporation (a Canadian company based in Richmond Hill, Ontario) has signed a contract with Modabber Holding Investment Company (an Iranian private joint stock company owned by Imam Executive Headquarters) for the distribution of non-alcoholic children's canned beverages in Iran valued at approximately $3-4 million, as well as for the distribution of glass and PET bottles in Iran valued at approximately $2 million.
5.Iran - Seveil Incorporated Canada (a Canadian company based in Toronto, Ontario) is the exclusive agent of Westeel Grain Storage Systems for the Iranian market. During the past two years, this company has managed to win 11 projects to establish storage facilities for grains and oilseeds in Iran. Seveil has the largest share of the Iranian market for such projects in recent years (over 90%).
6.Element of Islamic Republic of Iran was able to infiltrate in Canadian political system by making political campaign contribution to certain candidates that these candidates were most likely to be elected to offices, and once candidates elected to the offices. Obviously, the agent of the Islamic Republic of Iran has bought the offices for the cleric regime in Canada, and entity like Rafsanjani was able to make investment in Canada despite his criminal record. Particularly, the Islamic Republic of Iran was a corrupt system, and there was no accountability to public. In June 2005, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada reported that “a Freedom House report stated that the country is “prone to corruption.” For example, the report stated that the “bureaucracy gives preferential hiring treatment to graduates of theological seminaries, veterans of the Iran-Iraq war and Besij militiamen rather than to candidates based on their skills and merits” (Freedom House June 2005). Following 1979 revolution, Islamic charitable foundations or “bonyads” {it means charity organization}, came under the State’s jurisdiction (RFEL/RL 5 Apr. 2005) and received many assets from Iran’s wealthiest families (Freedom House June 2005). Freedom House estimated that bonayds control between 10 and 20 per cent of Iran’s gross domestic product. Source also stated that, under that authority of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah {sign of god} Ali Khamenei, and the clerics, the bonyads have become “huge commercial conglomerates” that operate with no accountability and are not subject to any auditing procedures (ibid.; RFE/RL 5Apr. 2005. Freedom House also reported that “loyal supporters and relatives of the regime” are exempted from anti corruption laws.” Further in the matter of “bonyad” or charity foundation, “one way the Rafsanjani and other clerical families maintain their grip is through the Bonyad foundations, says Shaul Bakhash, a visiting fellow at the Brooking Institution, a Washington-based research organization. After the revolution, the Bonyads expropriated assets of foreigners and the former shah’s friends, says Bakhash, who has written extensively on Iran…Companies under Bonyad control account for as much as third of Iran’s economy, he says. The Bonyad don’t disclose their accounting or pay taxes; they get subsidized loans and report only to the Supreme Leader, he says. “The economic power structure is even more opaque than the political system, “Bakhash says. “The Bonyads funnel money to senior religious figures for patronage and suspected clandestine activities. Interestingly, “the Bonyads have been link with funding terror organizations;” such as, providing fund for murdering author of “The Satanic Verses.”
7.The Islamic Republic in Iran had a liaison office in Canada and it is called “Iran Canada Business Council” which is “found in 1992” and the Council had clear mandate and are established on two pillars: one) to “promote and support trade and investment between Iran and Canada [and last to] serve as an advisory body to Government in Canada on matters related to trade and economic relations with Iran.” Furthermore, this Council had its own unique benefit for Iran and Canada which are as follow: “The Iran Canada Business Council provides members with exceptional opportunities to develop business with Iran. Through a wide network of senior business and government contacts both in Canada and in Iran, the Council is able to provide members with entrée into one of the most important and growing markets in the Middle East” which means this Council had connection with high ranking clerics in Iran and Canadian politicians. Most importantly, this Council had its own unique privilege which was providing “opportunities to meet with senior level Iranian business and government missions to Canada.” One of Iranian investor in Canada was mullah Rafsanjani that he built Highway 407 and Center Point Mall in city of Toronto, Province of Ontario, Canada. Interestingly, mullah Rafsanjani was a senior high ranking member of terrorist Hezbollah organization, and wanted by international authority due to his atrocities that he committed in Argentina, as well as, other nations, and Canadian Government allowed an infamous terrorist Rafsanjani to make investment in Canada. Indeed, Canada was sponsoring terrorism because Canada had become an economic nest for terrorist Hezbollah organization which was contrary to Criminal Code of Canada.
i)“83.03 Every one who, directly or indirectly, collects property, provides or invites a person to provide, or makes available property or financial or other related services
ii)(a) intending that they be used, or knowing that they will be used, in whole or in part, for the purpose of facilitating or carrying out any terrorist activity, or for the purpose of benefiting any person who is facilitating or carrying out such an activity, or
iii)(b) knowing that, in whole or part, they will be used by or will benefit a terrorist group, is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years.”
iv)There was also this vital point that individuals were representing the Islamic Republic of Iran in Canada that they were member of Revolutionary Guard and Canadian Government was fully aware of their background because on August 14th, 2004 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada reported that “structure of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), also known as the Sepah and the Pasdaran; its size; its economic activities in construction.” Furthermore, the Immigration and Refugee Board stated that “Iran specialist Michael Eisentadt noted that “the IRGC {Revolutionary Guard} is a key institution in Iran today due to its role as guardian of the revolution, and due to the fact that many senior Revolutionary Guard officers have close personal and family ties to key members of Iran’s clerical establishment” (MERIA Mar. 2001). Additionally, Eisentadt emphasizes that the role the IRGC plays “in the advancement of future senior officers “is” crucial”. Furthermore, that the IRGC maintains considerable influence in domestic security affairs and particularly with respect to political opposition (Byman et al. 2001, 29.”
v)In March 2006 Export Development Canada reported that “the economic disparities in Iran 75% of national income is in the hands of 10% of the population, is a major challenge” which means 90% of Iran’s population was controlling 25% of Iran’s wealth, and making a factual point that after “twenty-five years […] Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini led the revolution that topple Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, a dozen families with religious ties control much of Iran’s 110 billion gross domestic product and shape its politics, industries and finances, says Ray Takeyh, a professor and director of studies at National Defense University’s Near East and South Asia Center in Washington.” Simply, element of Islamic Republic in Iran funnel money in Canada and portion of money was given to Canadian politicians and rest of the money would be put in construction industry in Canada.
vi)There were serious detrimental effects on Iranian, when the cleric regime was investing in Canada and did not invest in Iran because Iranian were facing economic hardship; such as, high unemployment rate and high inflation rate which were having direct effect to quality of life in Iran.
vii)According to Ontario Export Inc. real GDP Growth from year 2000 to year 2002 beings from “4.1%, 0.8% and 4.0%” and CPI inflation from year 2000 to year 2002 “35.4%, 27.3% and 17.5%” unemployment rate from year 2000 to year 2002 begins with “18.1%, 21.7% and 24.9%.”
viii)In March 2007 Export Development Canada reported inflation rate of Iran in year 2006 which was 14.6% and in year 2007, it was 17.8%.

Investigation:
i) Charity Foundations in TO, ON
Canadian Government was fully aware that the Islamic Republic of Iran was establishing bogus charity foundations in Canada Mr. Ahmadreza TABRIZI President of TAIM Canada Inc. office is located at 30 Kern Road, North York, Ontario M3B 1T1 Canada and as Mr. TABRIZI, “Iran Canada Business Council”, clearly stated that he knew high ranking cleric in Iran, and Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada knew well that Revolutionary Guards main task was to make invest in construction industry, as well as, charity foundation. Quite frankly, Mr. TABRIZI was an agent of Islamic Republic of Iran in Canada that he inaugurated “Parya Trillium Foundation” in November 2002 at 30 Kern Road North York, Ontario M3B 1T1 Canada, and Arisha TABRIZI was member of The Law Society of Upper Canada and his law firm was located at 103-30 Kern Rd
North York, Ontario M3B 1T1 and name of law firm is “Tabrizi Law Office Professional Corporation.”
In November 2002 several honorary members attended inauguration for this charity foundation as follow Mayor of Toronto David MILLER, Jim PETERSON, John GODFRY, Alan ROCK from Liberal Party, and Dr. Joseph WONG as Mr. TABRIZI {his last name means that he is from city of Tabriz} claimed that this Parya Foundation did not promote political issues or religious value and he claimed that “we started private fundraising and raised an amount of approximately $30,000.00 CDN. Then, he began to insult Iran’s national language by referring to Persian language as Farsi language as he stated “I would like to give few words in Farsi, Our English speaking audience should excuse me as it is difficult for me to translate it in English.”
The board of “Parya Trillium Foundation” has eight members and among them Arshia TABRIZI, and Dr. Amir MAZINANI were Special Interest Persons in this investigation. There were no doubts that Ahmadreza TABRIZI was father of Arisha TABRIZI. There was Dr. Amir MAZINANI, who was residing at 81 Lord Seaton Road. North York, Ontario M2P 1K6 Canada that in 1984 to 1986 received tuition scholarship from Islamic Republic of Iran and according to Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada after 1979 revolution in Iran only those individuals that they were participant to 1979 revolution in Iran or had loyalty to Islamic Republic of Iran were allowed to attend universities. Moreover, there was a requirement that all university students prior of writing their admission exam to university, all students were required to answer to a questionnaire which would prove their loyalty to the theology state in Iran that the candidate for university was loyal to Islamic Republic in Iran and would uphold value of Islamic Republic in Iran. Therefore, Mr. Amir MAZINANI was loyal to Islamic Republic in Iran because he received scholarship from Islamic Republic in Iran.
Lastly, apparently Mr. Amir MAZINANI was working for his own company with name of “Mazinani Consulting Inc.” and his field of work was “Computer Peripheral and Pre-Packaged Software Wholesaler Distributors 518210 - Data Processing, Hosting, and Related Services Computer consulting, Web design and hosting, Domain name, Digital image processing, Digital ID card, Digital security systems (Exporting) IT consulting for companies Web site design for companies Digital security system for local and remote Digital video and video processing to enhance the picture.”
ii) TABRIZI Formed other Councils:
Ahmadreza TABRIZI continuously was expanding his activity on ground of Non Profit Organization and had formed a council with name of “Persian Circle” which was Non Profit Organization and it had social and cultural objective, at the same time, it was trying to act as a bridge between new Iranian immigrants to Canada.
On February 12th, 2004 Mr. Ahmadreza TABRIZI incepted “Canadian for Bam Reconstruction Committee” and its office is located at 30 Kern Rd. North York, Ontario M3B 1T1. Keynote Speakers was Maria MINNA former Minister for International Cooperation, and Guest Speaker was city of Toronto Mayor David MILLER.
TABRIZI formed “Canadian for Bam Reconstruction Committee” because on December 26th, 2003 at about 05:26 hours earthquake shook the ground violently in city of Bam in Iran and claimed 41, 000 lives and 20, 000 sustained serious physical injuries, 60,000 people became homeless during cold winter time, and 70% of the city turned into rubble. TABRIZI promised that this committee would direct the fundraising money to Iran in order to built school. However, according to Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Revolutionary Guards have monopolized construction industry in Iran, now, there was no doubt that TABRIZI was member of Revolutionary Guards in Iran because he wanted to build school in Iran. In addition, Mr. Ahmadreza TABRIZI and Arshia TABRIZI were part of Liberty Development Corporation which was located at 505 Highway 7 East, suite 303 Thornhill, ON L3T 7T1, and it was incorporated with Darcon Inc. with Mr. Latif FAZEL at same location of Liberty Development Corporation. Also be advice that Mr. FAZEL stated that Darcon Inc. was located in city of Markham, whereas it was located in Thornhill.
TABRIZI claimed that a school was built in Iran and posted on his website that “a dormitory for girls as per photos were build and named as donation of Iranian-Canadian members who are part of CRBC.” The picture illustrated that there were young boys whom were running around and there were no little girls around to be found. Plus, in Iran schools had walls so unsupervised person could not walk in the school. The picture illustrated that there was no wall.
TABRIZI stated that “International Development and Relief Foundation I(IDRF) would collect all contributions and would issue tax receipt and invoices.” Why above institute was collecting money from public? Why above institute was not doing follow-up on project and TABRIZI was doing follow-up? Did any Canadian politicians do follow-up on the project and how money was funneled to Iran? There were countless questions to ask, but it was a difficult task to investigate and to found out answer for the above questions, when Canadian politicians were shaking hands with murderers in Iran.
So far, there was no independent body to verify accuracy of TABRIZI’s claim that if truly money which was generate from “Canadian for Bam Reconstruction Committee” was used toward reconstruction of city of Bam because this picture was shown reconstruction for “Earthquake in city Ghaen, located in Iran's Khorasan Province” and how Bam is related to Province of Khorasan? However, there were six pictures which show that a school is under construction.
Dr. Payam AKHAVAN reported that “suffice it to say that recently the survivors of the Bam earthquake in Iran protested about why the Iranian government is sending hundreds of millions of dollars to Hezbollah in Lebanon when the survivors of the earthquake still have not been provided with adequate housing. And in a democratic Iran, surely, people will ask whether it's worth spending $15 billion on a controversial nuclear program that risks military confrontation with the west at a time when, officially, there's a 25% unemployment rate, and unofficially, a rate that could be as high as 40%.”

On February 10th, 2006 Ahmadreza TABRIZI donated “$4000.00 CDN to “Under The Azure Dome.” The “Under The Azure Dome” was an organization which prepared cultural events in Toronto, and asked individuals to volunteer for this organization. Of course a volunteer would leave behind her /his name with the organization in order to in touch with the volunteers.

Ahmadreza TABRIZI had taken part in “Iranian Canadian Congress” which was a Non Profit Organization, non partisan and non religious. Interestingly, this organization had a mandate to “identify, present and promote the true leaders of the Iranian-Canadian community who can be the voice of the community and to assist them in becoming prominent members of the Canadian society in all level of civic life including at the Municipal, Provincial, and Federal level.” TABRIZI had close ties with Islamic Republic in Iran, and it was frighten to know that he was recruiting individuals to be elected in office in Canada.

On Sunday March 25th, 2007 Mohandes Ahmadreza TABRIZI held a graduate gathering in Toronto for students of Tehran Polytechnic Amir Kabir University. He claimed that in 1969 he was graduated from a university.

When time came to verify Ahmadreza TABRIZI’s NGO if it was legitimate or it was illegitimate, it appeared that Royal Canadian Mounted Police {RCMP} would be right candidate to give direction on how to verify a NGO, and a letter was written to RCMP on how to verify a NGO.

Dear Sir/Madam:

I am interested to verify a NGO in Canada if it is legitimate or not, how can I do that please?

Thank you,

Kind regards

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police responded by making the below statement.

Hello,

“The RCMP does not maintain a list of NGOs, a search of Google may find information on the organization you're looking for.”

Thank you.

Webmaster
National Communication Services
Services nationaux de communications
RCMP-GRC
1200 Vanier Parkway
Ottawa, ON K1A 0R2

Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC) was another government agency which would be useful for verifying NGO and a letter was written to the above governmental agency.

Dear Sir/Madam:

I would like to obtain some financial information on certain NGOs on matter of transaction. Kindly inform me how can I obtain this information from FINTRAC?

Thank you,

Kind regards

iii) The FINTRAC responded as follow:
“In response to your comments to the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC) dated …, we offer this email. The Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act does not allow us to disclose specific information about persons or entities covered by the legislation. Therefore FINTRAC does not provide "references" concerning any reporting entity.”
Canada Tax Revenue refused to answer to similar above question.

iv) Why TABRIZI was Imploring New Arenas to Engage in Canada?

Fedayeen Organization (2004-2006)…it all depends on the case. The Iranian regime knows very well that many have fled Iran for socioeconomic reasons. However, as a general rule, if a person has been implicated in anti-government activities and/or working with subversive organization, whether pro-Monarchy or socialist, and known to have sought political asylum in a foreign country, her/his relatives will definitely be questioned. Whether they would be prosecuted or not depends on several factors and the severity of each factor…the regime is still as intolerant of dissident as it was more than a decade ago, but it has become sophisticated in handling these cases.” Were these charity foundations, and NGO some form of instruments for TABRIZI to collect data on Iranian dissidents in Canada?
TABRIZI has made substantial amount of political campaign contribution to Mayor of Toronto David MILLER.

Toronto 2003 Civic Election Contributions to Candidates
1.“LIBERTY DEVELOPMENT CORP $2,000”
2.“TAIM CANADA INC $1,000”
3.“30 KERN ROAD LTD $2,500.00 CDN”
4.“TABRIZI ARSHIA $800.00 CDN”
5.“Arshia TABRIZI $300.00 CDN”
6.“Ahmad TABRIZI $250.00 CDN”
There were reasonable questions on horizon that who below individuals, how were they related to Ahmadreza TABRIZI or did the register office enter their names incorrectly?
1.“TABRIZI AHMAD $750.00 CDN
2.TABRIZI MOHAMMAD REZA $250.00 CDN”
3.Ms. Gity NASHEY TABRIZI $400.00 CDN
4.M. Motamedi $200.00 CDN
There was a way of checking and verifying the above entities under Municipal Elections Act, 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 32, Sch.
Subsection; “93.No person shall obstruct a person making and investigation or examination under this Act or withhold, conceal or destroy anything relevant to the investigation or examination. 1996, c. 32, Sched., s. 93.”
69. (1) A candidate shall ensure that,
(a) one or more campaign accounts are opened at a financial institution, exclusively for the purposes of the election campaign and in the name of the candidate’s election campaign;
(b) all contributions of money are deposited into the campaign accounts;
(c) all payments for expenses, except for a nomination filing fee, are made from the campaign accounts;
(d) contributions of goods or services are valued;
(e) receipts are issued for every contribution and obtained for every expense;
(f) records are kept of,
(i) the receipts issued for every contribution
(ii) the value of every contribution,
(iii) whether a contribution is in the form of money, goods or services,
and
(iv) the contributor’s name and address;”
…
“Who may contribute
(3) Only the following may make contributions:
1. An individual who is normally resident in Ontario.
2. A corporation that carries on business in Ontario.”
Also, there was “Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act” which would block investigation that under section “14 (3)-Presumed invasion of privacy, a disclosure of personal information is presumed to constitute an unjustified invasion of personal information if the personal information…f) Described an individual’s finances, income, assists, liabilities, net worth, bank balances, financial history or activities or creditworthiness”. However, there is a court order under Court File No. 789/00 Date heard February 28th, 2002, Ontario Superior Court of justice, Divisional Court in matter of LANE, McCOMBS and LaFORME JJ. Would over rule above “Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act” because when “[2] The Commissioner's order upheld the decision of the City of Toronto (the "City") refusing disclosure of an electronic copy of campaign contribution records from the 1997 municipal election. For the reasons that follow, I would allow the application for judicial review and direct that the requested information be disclosed to the applicant…[30] Again, in my view, the Commissioner's conclusion was not reasonable. As I have indicated, the disclosed paper documents contain specific private information such as the contributors' names, addresses, amount contributed, and the candidate to whom the contribution was made. The only additional personal information contained in the electronic database that is not in the disclosed paper documents is the telephone numbers of the contributors. [31] I accept the position of the applicant that the only way that he can meaningfully scrutinize the information about campaign contributions is through the electronic database. Public scrutiny of the democratic election process and the integrity of the process governing political campaign contributions is a matter of significant public importance. In my view, in light of the fact that all but the telephone numbers of the contributors is already required to be disclosed, the public interest in disclosure of the database to enable meaningful scrutiny of the democratic process clearly outweighs other considerations. [32] It follows that the Commissioner's decision not to apply the public interest override in s. 16 of the MFIPPA was unreasonable. [33] In the result, I would allow the appeal, set aside the decision of the Commissioner, and order that the electronic database sought by the applicant be disclosed.”
The real question came down to this point that in November 2003 for municipal election, it was clear that David MILLER would win the election because other candidates were tangling with their own demons and scandals and voters were turn off by them, and MILLER appeared as a good boy, he was holding a broom and promising that he would clean-up the City. Thus, TABRIZI made significant amount of campaign contribution to MILLER because MILLER was a right person and he would win the election and there was no way to lose the election. Now, there was a question that did TABRIZI received instructed from the cleric regime to make a campaign contribution to MILLER?
Kindly be advise that Mr. MILLER has accepted donation from a strip joint with name of Zanzibar Tavern Inc. for amount of “$300” where ladies were exploited sexually by men, and this illustrated level of mentality of Mr. MILLER.

v) Liberal Party was Favorite Party:
In 1999, Arshia TABRIZI made $200.00 CDN political campaign contribution to Liberal Party, Azin TABRIZI made $250.00 CDN political campaign contribution to Liberal Party and S. TABRIZI made $400.00 CDN political campaign contribution to Liberal Party.
“2005 Central Party By-Election Campaign Period Return CR-4 Ontario Liberal Party Scarborough - Rouge River By-Election Statement Of Campaign Period Income and Expenses for the Period From October 26, 2005 to February 24, 2006 Reza MORIDI contributed $ 175.00 CDN.
Mr. TABRIZI was vibrant to announce that “now we are witnessing the presence of a new successful runner Dr. Moridi who hopefully will be representative of Liberal Party from Richmond Hill in Queens Park, Dr. Moridi {keep up the good work} we wish you success and all the best.”
On August 02nd, 2007 Naresh Raghubeer and David Harris from Canadian Coalition for Democracy reported this article that “Last week, Ontario Auditor-General Jim McCarter reported that the province's Immigration and Citizenship Ministry has been dispensing millions of dollars in grants to ethnic groups under a process that is "not open, transparent or accountable." In many cases, groups got money simply because their members were chummy with ministry insiders. "In essence, the decisions behind 'who got what' were often based on conversations, not applications," Mr. McCarter concluded. But Mr. McCarter's report does not merely highlight a failure of process in an otherwise sound government disbursement program. What the Auditor-General documents is nothing less than a taxpayer-funded political black market based on "ethnic" and religious vote-buying. The Iranian-Canadian Community Centre's $200,000 grant was disbursed despite there being "no written request for funding.”
On July 28th, 2007 York Region reported “Richmond Hill Liberal candidate Reza Moridi doesn’t think money awarded to a local charity group by the Dalton McGuinty government needs to be given back, despite findings that no formal process was followed to receive the money. His comments come in the wake of a scathing report from Auditor General Jim McCarter on how charity groups received millions in questionable provincial grants. The report led to the resignation Thursday of Citizenship and Immigration Minister Mike Colle. The grant money has been described as a slush fund by Opposition parties. Mr. McCarter concluded the granting process was not open, transparent or accountable. His report paints a damning picture of the process under which the Iranian-Canadian Community Centre (ICCC) and other groups received money, even though it falls short of saying groups got preference because of ties to the provincial Liberals.”
Criminal Code of Canada:
Terrorist Financing Offences: “83.03 Every one who, directly or indirectly, collects property, provides or invites a person to provide, or makes available property or financial or other related services
(a) intending that they be used, or knowing that they will be used, in whole or in part, for the purpose of facilitating or carrying out any terrorist activity, or for the purpose of benefiting any person who is facilitating or carrying out such an activity, or
(b) knowing that, in whole or part, they will be used by or will benefit a terrorist group, is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years.
Theft: “322. (1) Every one commits theft who fraudulently and without colour of right takes, or fraudulently and without colour of right converts to his use or to the use of another person, anything, whether animate or inanimate, with intent
(a) to deprive, temporarily or absolutely, the owner of it, or a person who has a special property or interest in it, of the thing or of his property or interest in it;
(b) to pledge it or deposit it as security;
(c) to part with it under a condition with respect to its return that the person who parts with it may be unable to perform; or
(d) to deal with it in such a manner that it cannot be restored in the condition in which it was at the time it was taken or converted.
(2) A person commits theft when, with intent to steal anything, he moves it or causes it to move or to be moved, or begins to cause it to become movable.
(3) A taking or conversion of anything may be fraudulent notwithstanding that it is effected without secrecy or attempt at concealment.
(4)For the purposes of this Act, the question whether anything that is converted is taken for the purpose of conversion, or whether it is, at the time it is converted, in the lawful possession of the person who converts it is not material.
Special Interest Persons:
1.Iran Canada Business Council
2.Ahmad Reza TABRIZI
3.Member of Ontario Provincial Parliament of Ontario Reza MORIDI {Liberal Party}
4.Mayor of Toronto David MILLER
5.Dr. Oskar SIGVALDASON
6.Mr. Samir ZALZAL
7.Mr. Joseph TAVANA
8.Mr. Farrokh KHAKLILI
9.Mr. Ken HAVES
10.Mr. Masoud (Massey) GHATAVI
11.Mr. Hussein K. AMAD
12.Mr. Erick BLANCHETTE

i) Corporates:
1.Acres International Limited
2.Agra International
3.Aquarius Shipping Inc.
4.BTI Services Inc.
5.Canadian Bearings Ltd.
6.Charles Tennant & Co. (Canada) Limited
7.CTI Datacom Inc.
8.David Nairne & Associates Ltd.
9.Dreco Energy Services Ltd.
10.Eriez of Canada Limited
11.Export Development Corporation
12.General Electric Canada Ltd.
13.General Motors of Canada Ltd - Diesel Division
14.Ingersoll-Rand Canada Inc.
15.Newsco Directional & Horizontal Services Inc.
16.Ontario Exports Inc.
17.Pacific Industries International Inc. (Pii)
18.Petro-Techna International Ltd.
19.Renaissance Energy Ltd.
20.S.A. Global International Inc.
21.SGS Canada Inc.
22.Simons International Corporation
23.SNC-Lavalin International Inc.
24.TAIM Canada Inc.
25.Tavana & Co. Chartered Accountants
26.Scotiabank.

Detrimental Effect of Kleptocracy for Iran and Canada:
According to Transparency International

a) In case of Iran
i)London, 25 March 2004 --- “Political corruption undermines the hopes for prosperity and stability of developing countries, and damages the global economy,” said Peter Eigen, Chairman of Transparency International (TI), launching the TI Global Corruption Report 2004 (GCR 2004) today. “The abuse of political power for private gain deprives the most needy of vital public services, creating a level of despair that breeds conflict and violence. It also hits the pockets of taxpayers and shareholders worldwide. The problem must be tackled at the national and international level,” he said. “The GCR 2004, with a special focus on political corruption,” said Eigen, “is a call to action to bring integrity and accountability into governance, to stop bribery by multinational companies, and to curb the flow of stolen assets into secret bank accounts in the west.” TI is the leading international non - governmental organisation combating corruption worldwide. “Democracies can no longer tolerate bribery, fraud and dishonesty,” states former US President Jimmy Carter in a foreword to the GCR 2004, “especially as such practices disproportionately hurt the poor.”
ii)“Political corruption deprives millions of health care, education and the prospects of a sustainable future,” said TI-Zimbabwe Chair John Makumbe at the launch of TI’s GCR 2004 in London today.

b) In case of Canada

i)Canada's political approach to the normative control model of Islamic Republic of Iran has short term gain for Canada. However, in long run, it would create murky water between Canada and Iran.
ii)Canadian politicians deceived their own citizens by claiming that they were at war on terror while Canadian politicians were in payroll of the theocratic regime in Iran. The theocratic regime in Iran had been supplying insurgents in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq with arsenal. Hence, Canada was at proxy war with Iran.

Enforcement:
According to Transparency International
1.Donations to political parties and candidates to elected office must not be a means to gain personal or policy favours. Parties and candidates must practise transparency. Governments must implement adequate conflict -of-interest legislation.
2.Political parties, candidates and politicians should disclose detailed information about assets, donations, inkind donations, loans and expenditure, on an annual basis as well as before and after elections, to an independent agency.
3.Independent public oversight bodies endowed with the necessary resources must effectively supervise the observance of regulatory laws and measures. Together with independent courts, they must ensure that offenders are held accountable and duly sanctioned.
4.Diversified funding should be sought through: state funding and subsidised access to the media; the encouragement of small donations and membership fees; and controls on corporate, foreign and large individual donations. Spending limits should be considered.
5.Candidates and parties must be given fair access to the media. The media should play an independent role, free from political interference, both in election campaigns and in the broader political process.
6.Civil society should have the opportunity to actively participate in promoting adequate legislation in the field of political finance and in the monitoring of political finance and its impact on political representation.
Method of Filing:
1.E-mails
2.Several regular mails in order to avoid interception of mails
3.Registered mails

Recipients of This Petition:
International Court of Justice
Peace Palace
Carnegieplein 2
2517 KJ The Hague
The Netherlands via registered mail

Ban Ki-moon
Secretary General
United Nations
1st ave. and 46th Street
New York, NY 10017 USA via registered mail

Transparency International Secretariat
Alt-Moabit 96
10559 Berlin, Germany via registered mail

Method of Serving:
1.Prime Minister of Canada Right Honorable Stephen HARPER via registered mail
2.Liberal Party of Canada {Federal level} via regular mail
3.New Democrat Party {Federal level} via regular mail
4.E-mailed to three level of governments in Canada
5.Posting on http://iranzamin2529.blogspot.com

Goal to Achieve:
1.This petition is constituted as a legal document which will be used during legal proceeding or any form of preceding against any individuals or body of governments whom are collaborating with theocratic regime elements directly or indirectly to transfer assets from Iran to Canada.
2.All individuals shall be held accountable and responsible for taking part in kleptocracy of Iran and Iranian.
3.Alternative Service Der livery shall not apply to these assets.
4.All assets are none negotiable and none transferable.
5.All assets are properties of Iran and Iranian.
6.All assets shall be return to Iran and Iranian plus interest shall be reimbursed to Iran and Iranian.
7.All three levels of Canadian Governments {municipalities, provincial, and federal} from each provinces {East Coast to West Coast} must disclose all assets of Islamic Republic of Iran in Canada in great details.
8.International Court of Justice does not allow Canadian politicians, as well as, element of Islamic Republic of Iran to continue kleptocracy of Iran, directly or indirectly, because Canadian politicians are contributing to human rights violation in Iran directly and indirectly.
9.Transparency International involves itself in this matter and would identify all assets of theocratic regime in Canada in order to safeguard interest of Iran, Iranian, and Canadian.

Life Cycle of This Petition:
1.Commenced: Friday May 22nd, 2009.
2.Expired: Friday October 02nd, 2009.
3.Requirement: 100 Signatures.
4.Petition would remain on line.
5.This petition effects remain perpetual, until the goals of this legal document is achieved.

Author of This Petition:
1.Petitioner of this paper acted in good faith at all times.
2.Petitioner of this paper acted in the name of justice for all.
Thank you

Kind regards



Peyman DOUSTI
Pawn

Sincerely,

The Undersigned

Fanatic Mulism-West-Harem

Coolio - Gangsta's Paradise (HD) with English subtitles

2pac - changes

Enrique Iglesias - Push

A Counterintelligence Approach to Controlling Cartel Corruption

By Scott Stewart and Fred Burton

Rey Guerra, the former sheriff of Starr County, Texas, pleaded guilty May 1 to a narcotics conspiracy charge in federal district court in McAllen, Texas. Guerra admitted to using information obtained in his official capacity to help a friend (a Mexican drug trafficker allegedly associated with Los Zetas) evade U.S. counternarcotics efforts. On at least one occasion, Guerra also attempted to learn the identity of a confidential informant who had provided authorities with information regarding cartel operations so he could pass it to his cartel contact.

In addition to providing intelligence to Los Zetas, Guerra also reportedly helped steer investigations away from people and facilities associated with Los Zetas. He also sought to block progress on investigations into arrested individuals associated with Los Zetas to protect other members associated with the organization. Guerra is scheduled for sentencing July 29; he faces 10 years to life imprisonment, fines of up to $4 million and five years of supervised release.

Guerra is just one of a growing number of officials on the U.S. side of the border who have been recruited as agents for Mexico’s powerful and sophisticated drug cartels. Indeed, when one examines the reach and scope of the Mexican cartels’ efforts to recruit agents inside the United States to provide intelligence and act on the cartels’ behalf, it becomes apparent that the cartels have demonstrated the ability to operate more like a foreign intelligence service than a traditional criminal organization.

Fluidity and Flexibility

For many years now, STRATFOR has followed developments along the U.S.-Mexican border and has studied the dynamics of the cross-border illicit flow of people, drugs, weapons and cash.

One of the most notable characteristics about this flow of contraband is its flexibility. When smugglers encounter an obstacle to the flow of their product, they find ways to avoid it. For example, as we’ve previously discussed in the case of the extensive border fence in the San Diego sector, drug traffickers and human smugglers diverted a good portion of their volume around the wall to the Tucson sector; they even created an extensive network of tunnels under the fence to keep their contraband (and profits) flowing.

Likewise, as maritime and air interdiction efforts between South America and Mexico have become more successful, Central America has become increasingly important to the flow of narcotics from South America to the United States. This reflects how the drug-trafficking organizations have adjusted their method of shipment and their trafficking routes to avoid interdiction efforts and maintain the northward flow of narcotics.

Over the past few years, a great deal of public and government attention has focused on the U.S.-Mexican border. In response to this attention, the federal and border state governments in the United States have erected more barriers, installed an array of cameras and sensors and increased the manpower committed to securing the border. While these efforts certainly have not hermetically sealed the border, they do appear to be having some impact — an impact magnified by the effectiveness of interdiction efforts elsewhere along the narcotics supply chain.

According to the most recent statistics from the Drug Enforcement Administration, from January 2007 through September 2008 the price per pure gram of cocaine increased 89.1 percent, or from $96.61 to $182.73, while the purity of cocaine seized on the street decreased 31.3 percent, dropping from 67 percent pure cocaine to 46 percent pure cocaine. Recent anecdotal reports from law enforcement sources indicate that cocaine prices have remained high, and that the purity of cocaine on the street has remained poor.

Overcoming Human Obstacles

In another interesting trend that has emerged over the past few years, as border security has tightened and as the flow of narcotics has been impeded, the number of U.S. border enforcement officers arrested on charges of corruption has increased notably. This increased corruption represents a logical outcome of the fluidity of the flow of contraband. As the obstacles posed by border enforcement have become more daunting, people have become the weak link in the enforcement system. In some ways, people are like tunnels under the border wall — i.e., channels employed by the traffickers to help their goods get to market.

From the Mexican cartels’ point of view, it is cheaper to pay an official several thousand dollars to allow a load of narcotics to pass by than it is to risk having the shipment seized. Such bribes are simply part of the cost of doing business — and in the big picture, even a low-level local agent can be an incredible bargain.

According to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), 21 CBP officers were arrested on corruption charges during the fiscal year that ended in September 2008, as opposed to only 4 in the preceding fiscal year. In the current fiscal year (since Oct. 1), 14 have been arrested. And the problem with corruption extends further than just customs or border patrol officers. In recent years, police officers, state troopers, county sheriffs, National Guard members, judges, prosecutors, deputy U.S. marshals and even the FBI special agent in charge of the El Paso office have been linked to Mexican drug-trafficking organizations. Significantly, the cases being prosecuted against these public officials of all stripes are just the tip of the iceberg. The underlying problem of corruption is much greater.

A major challenge to addressing the issue of border corruption is the large number of jurisdictions along the border, along with the reality that corruption occurs at the local, state and federal levels across those jurisdictions. Though this makes it very difficult to gather data relating to the total number of corruption investigations conducted, sources tell us that while corruption has always been a problem along the border, the problem has ballooned in recent years — and the number of corruption cases has increased dramatically.

In addition to the complexity brought about by the multiple jurisdictions, agencies and levels of government involved, there simply is not one single agency that can be tasked with taking care of the corruption problem. It is just too big and too wide. Even the FBI, which has national jurisdiction and a mandate to investigate public corruption cases, cannot step in and clean up all the corruption. The FBI already is being stretched thin with its other responsibilities, like counterterrorism, foreign counterintelligence, financial fraud and bank robbery. The FBI thus does not even have the capacity to investigate every allegation of corruption at the federal level, much less at the state and local levels. Limited resources require the agency to be very selective about the cases it decides to investigate. Given that there is no real central clearinghouse for corruption cases, most allegations of corruption are investigated by a wide array of internal affairs units and other agencies at the federal, state and local levels.

Any time there is such a mixture of agencies involved in the investigation of a specific type of crime, there is often bureaucratic friction, and there are almost always problems with information sharing. This means that pieces of information and investigative leads developed in the investigation of some of these cases are not shared with the appropriate agencies. To overcome this information sharing problem, the FBI has established six Border Corruption Task Forces designed to bring local, state and federal officers together to focus on corruption tied to the U.S.-Mexican border, but these task forces have not yet been able to solve the complex problem of coordination.

Sophisticated Spotting

Efforts to corrupt officials along the U.S.-Mexican border are very organized and very focused, something that is critical to understanding the public corruption issue along the border. Some of the Mexican cartels have a long history of successfully corrupting public officials on both sides of the border. Groups like the Beltran Leyva Organization (BLO) have successfully recruited scores of intelligence assets and agents of influence at the local, state and even federal levels of the Mexican government. They even have enjoyed significant success in recruiting agents in elite units such as the anti-organized crime unit (SIEDO) of the Office of the Mexican Attorney General (PGR). The BLO also has recruited Mexican employees working for the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, and even allegedly owned Mexico’s former drug czar, Noe Ramirez Mandujano, who reportedly was receiving $450,00 a month from the organization.

In fact, the sophistication of these groups means they use methods more akin to the intelligence recruitment processes used by foreign intelligence services than those normally associated with a criminal organization. The cartels are known to conduct extensive surveillance and background checks on potential targets to determine how to best pitch to them. Like the spotting methods used by intelligence agencies, the surveillance conducted by the cartels on potential targets is designed to glean as many details about the target as possible, including where they live, what vehicles they drive, who their family members are, their financial needs and their peccadilloes.

Historically, many foreign intelligence services are known to use ethnicity in their favor, heavily targeting persons sharing an ethnic background found in the foreign country. Foreign services also are known to use relatives of the target living in the foreign country to their advantage. Mexican cartels use these same tools. They tend to target Hispanic officers and often use family members living in Mexico as recruiting levers. For example, Luis Francisco Alarid, who had been a CBP officer at the Otay Mesa, Calif., port of entry, was sentenced to 84 months in federal prison in February for his participation in a conspiracy to smuggle illegal aliens and marijuana into the United States. One of the people Alarid admitted to conspiring with was his uncle, who drove a van loaded with marijuana and illegal aliens through a border checkpoint manned by Alarid.

Like family spy rings (such as the Cold War spy ring run by John Walker), there also have been family border corruption rings. Raul Villarreal and his brother, Fidel, both former CBP agents in San Diego, were arraigned March 16 after fleeing the United States in 2006 after learning they were being investigated for corruption. The pair was captured in Mexico in October 2008 and extradited back to the United States.

‘Plata o Sexo’

When discussing human intelligence recruiting, it is not uncommon to refer to the old cold war acronym MICE (money, ideology, compromise and ego) to explain the approach used to recruit an agent. When discussing corruption in Mexico, people often repeat the phrase “plata o plomo,” Spanish for “money or lead” — meaning “take the money or we’ll kill you.” However, in most border corruption cases involving American officials, the threat of plomo is not as powerful as it is inside Mexico. Although some officials charged with corruption have claimed as a defense that they were intimidated into behaving corruptly, juries have rejected these arguments. This dynamic could change if the Mexican cartels begin to target officers in the United States for assassination as they have in Mexico.

With plomo an empty threat north of the border, plata has become the primary motivation for corruption along the Mexican border. In fact, good old greed — the M in MICE — has always been the most common motivation for Americans recruited by foreign intelligence services. The runner-up, which supplants plomo in the recruitment equation inside the United Sates, is “sexo,” aka “sex.” Sex, an age-old espionage recruitment tool that fits under the compromise section of MICE, has been seen in high-profile espionage cases, including the one involving the Marine security guards at the U.S Embassy in Moscow. Using sex to recruit an agent is often referred to as setting a “honey trap.” Sex can be used in two ways. First, it can be used as a simple payment for services rendered. Second, it can be used as a means to blackmail the agent. (The two techniques can be used in tandem.)

It is not at all uncommon for border officials to be offered sex in return for allowing illegal aliens or drugs to enter the country, or for drug-trafficking organizations to use attractive agents to seduce and then recruit officers. Several officials have been convicted in such cases. For example, in March 2007, CBP inspection officer Richard Elizalda, who had worked at the San Ysidro, Calif., port of entry, was sentenced to 57 months in prison for conspiring with his lover, alien smuggler Raquel Arin, to let the organization she worked for bring illegal aliens through his inspection lane. Elizalda also accepted cash for his efforts — much of which he allegedly spent on gifts for Arin — so in reality, Elizalda was a case of “plata y sexo” rather than an either-or deal.

Corruption Cases Handled Differently

When the U.S. government hires an employee who has family members living in a place like Beijing or Moscow, the background investigation for that employee is pursued with far more interest than if the employee has relatives in Ciudad Juarez or Tijuana. Mexico traditionally has not been seen as a foreign counterintelligence threat, even though it has long been recognized that many countries, like Russia, are very active in their efforts to target the United States from Mexico. Indeed, during the Cold War, the KGB’s largest rezidentura (the equivalent of a CIA station) was located in Mexico City.

Employees with connections to Mexico frequently have not been that well vetted, period. In one well-publicized incident, the Border Patrol hired an illegal immigrant who was later arrested for alien smuggling. In July 2006, U.S. Border Patrol agent Oscar Ortiz was sentenced to 60 months in prison after admitting to smuggling more than 100 illegal immigrants into the United States. After his arrest, investigators learned that Ortiz was an illegal immigrant himself who had used a counterfeit birth certificate when he was hired. Ironically, Ortiz also had been arrested for attempting to smuggle two illegal immigrants into the United States shortly before being hired by the Border Patrol. (He was never charged for that attempt.)

From an investigative perspective, corruption cases tend to be handled more as one-off cases, and they do not normally receive the same sort of extensive investigation into the suspect’s friends and associates that would be conducted in a foreign counterintelligence case. In other words, if a U.S. government employee is recruited by the Chinese or Russian intelligence service, the investigation receives far more energy — and the suspect’s circle of friends, relatives and associates receives far more scrutiny — than if he is recruited by a Mexican cartel.

In espionage cases, there is also an extensive damage assessment investigation conducted to ensure that all the information the suspect could have divulged is identified, along with the identities of any other people the suspect could have helped his handler recruit. Additionally, after-action reviews are conducted to determine how the suspect was recruited, how he was handled and how he could have been uncovered earlier. The results of these reviews are then used to help shape future counterintelligence investigative efforts. They are also used in the preparation of defensive counterintelligence briefings to educate other employees and help protect them from being recruited.

This differences in urgency and scope between the two types of investigations is driven by the perception that the damage to national security is greater if an official is recruited by a foreign intelligence agency than if he is recruited by a criminal organization. That assessment may need to be re-examined, given that the Mexican cartels are criminal organizations with the proven sophistication to recruit U.S. officials at all levels of government — and that this has allowed them to move whomever and whatever they wish into the United States.

The problem of public corruption is very widespread, and to approach corruption cases in a manner similar to foreign counterintelligence cases would require a large commitment of investigative, prosecutorial and defensive resources. But the threat posed by the Mexican cartels is different than that posed by traditional criminal organizations, meaning that countering it will require a nontraditional approach.