Shabe Sher ba Hila

The Pandora Box of Islamic Republic of Iran's Nuclear Program

The Pandora Box of Islamic Republic of Iran's Nuclear Program

The Pandora Box of nuclear program of Islamic Republic of Iran is “a highly controversial issue in international politics since the August 2002 unveiling of the secrecy builds uranium enrichment facility in Natanz and the heavy-water production plant in Arak. American officials and expert assert that Iran has secret plans to use its nuclear capabilities to develop nuclear weapons. Iranian officials, however, deny such allegations and claim that they will use their capabilities exclusively for peaceful purposes.”ⁱ

Iran's nuclear program dated back to 1957, when former US President Dwight Eisenhower, during Cold War period, provided nuclear aid to the Pahlavi Regime to build nuclear programs.ⁱⁱ It was part of Atoms for Peace Program.ⁱⁱⁱ In 1974, King (Shah) Mohammad Reza PAHLAVI announced to have 23 nuclear power plants, and it would be operational by 1994 to generate 23, 000 megawatts of electricity from nuclear power stations.^iv In 1979, Iran's political system shifted from a secular state and pro-western to a theocracy state. Current regime in Iran poses a threat to the West's safety and security. The US and other Western nations canceled their contracts with Iran and did not fulfill their agreements.^v After revolution, France base consortium Eurodif was interested to build Iran's nuclear stations.^vi However, the US convinced the Eurodif to cancel its contract with the Islamic Republic of Iran.^vii It was during Iran-Iraq War, the regime in Iran came to release that it needed to possess weapon of mass destruction to defeat Iraqi forces.^viii Elements of the regime began to contact Russia to build nuclear facilities in Iran, and it was halted due to Russia political instability.^ix The regime in Iran used other sources to build its nuclear facilities.^x

On August 14^th, 2002 the National Council of Resistance of Iran or MEK appeared before the US Representative and disclosed secret dossier to the US Representative that the regime in Iran was building clandestine nuclear facilities in Natanz, Arak, and Parchin with intention of obtaining nuclear weapons.^xi Consequently, the regime in Iran was in direct violation of Article II of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).^xii The US requested the files at the Boards of Governors of the IAEA to be transferred to the United Nations Security Council.^xiii On October 31^st, 2003 the IAEA asked the regime in Iran to sign a protocol that it Safeguard Agreement, and would be transparent about its nuclear programs.^xiv On August 01^st, 2005, the regime in Iran renegade from its obligation and removed the seals “on the process lines at the facility.”^xv The regime in Iran has contributed to inherit insecurity of international relations and caused the Middle East nations as well as the US interests to be at state of alert for their safety. The aim of this paper is to give a brief background about how people of Iran began to move toward nuclear program, discussing the reason for the regime in Iran for not having nuclear program, and examining the nature of the regime in Iran.

This portion of the paper is giving a brief background about how people of Iran began to move toward nuclear program. The nuclear program in Iran goes back to time of Pahlavi Dynasty which was a pro-American regime. It was during Cold-War era that the US decided to provide economic, military and technology fields to the regime in Iran.^xvi In 1955, the US began to negotiate nuclear terms with Iran and in 1957 the US and Iran signed the Agreement for Cooperation Civil Uses of Atoms.^xvii In May 1972, former US President Richard Nixon visited Iran, and the Monarchy regime in Iran was able to pursue Mr. Nixon to include Iran in “Nixon Doctrine”.^xviii It means that Iran would become regional power and would have strong presence in the Persian Gulf.^xix Plus, Iran would receive more military strength to deter former Soviet Union from invading Iran.^xx In 1973, Arab-Israel War broke out and oil price became skyrocket.^xxi It provided a golden opportunity for the regime in Iran to have strong purchase power to buy nuclear powers in Iran. In March 1974, the Monarchy regime announced it was planning to build 23, 000 MW(e) of nuclear power capacity.^xxii In May 1974, the Chairman of the US Atomic Energy Commission talked with Iranian officials and proposed for multinational uranium enrichment.^xxiii The officials in Iran accepted the above offer of the US. On March 03^rd, 1975, the US signed a $15 billion contract for the construction of eight nuclear reactors.^xxiv On April 12^th, 1977, the US signed an agreement with Iran to exchange nuclear technology and cooperate in nuclear safety.^xxv On January 01^st, 1978, former US President Jimmy Carter granted Iran “most favored nation” status for spent fuel processing.^xxvi “On July 10^th, 1978 in Tehran the US-Iran Nuclear Energy Agreement was signed; this agreement was to facilitate cooperation in the field of nuclear energy and to govern the export and transfer of equipment and material to Iran.”^xxvii Furthermore, France and Germany were also major players in shaping Iran's nuclear program.^xxviii France and German trained Iranian professionals in field of nuclear programs.^xxix In 1976, Germany and Iran reached an agreement for six nuclear power reactors.^xxx

The nuclear programs in Iran came to halt after 1979 Revolution. The theocracy regime in Iran began to pursue policy of self-reliance and rejecting all Western policies that they were signed by the previous regime.^xxxi It was during Iran and Iraq War that the regime in Iran reached to a final conclusion that it needed to possess bigger gun to defeat its enemy. In this case, the bigger gun was the nuclear weapon. In 1984, the regime in Iran talked with Chinese to assist the regime in Iran to develop “Esfahan Nuclear Research Center”.^xxxii In 1991, China announced that it would supply Iran with a 20 MW research reactor from China.^xxxiii In September 1992, former Iranian president Hashemi Rafsanjani reached a tentative agreement with Chinese President Jiang Zemin to purchase one or two 330 MW (e) reactors.^xxxiv Furthermore, the regime was seeking other sources to build Iran’s nuclear programs. In 1987, the regime in Iran signed a nuclear cooperation with Pakistan to train 39 Iranian nuclear scientists.^xxxv In May 1987, Iran signed an agreement with Argentina for amount of $5.5 million to supply Iran with uranium enriched to 20%.^xxxvi However, the above agreement did not follow through as it was expected.^xxxvii The last source for the regime in Iran to build its nuclear power was Russia. Former President Rafsanjani talked with former Russian president Gorbachev about completion of Busher power plant.^xxxviii Russia claimed that it would complete the nuclear program within six years. On January 08^th, 1995, Russia and Iran signed an agreement to build nuclear power plants in Busher as well as 10 to 20 graduate students at cost of $1 billion.^xxxix Russia failed to deliver its promise due to collapsed of communism in Russia. Despite all challenges that the regime in Iran face, it did not stop its ambition to posses’ nuclear powers.

This portion of the paper is discussing the reason for the regime in Iran cannot acquire nuclear program. The rogue state in Iran is contributing to chaotic climate of international relations. This body of this essay is divided on two sections. The first section explains why the regime in Iran has right to have nuclear power, and last stage is covering the nuclear saga development of the regime in Iran which is the reason for the regime for not having nuclear power. It is also true that “objective of all states are to remain free from coercive measures to maintain their sovereignty.”^xl Particularly, the political climate of Middle East is realism, and scholar like Kenneth Waltz argues that nature of international relation is in state of anarchy and puts states into a condition of self-help.^xli The above theory of self-help motivates states to pursue unilateral competitive measures to protect their interest against other nations.^xlii The regime in Iran has all the rights to pursue nuclear programs and feeling secure about its sovereignty. Particularly, George Bush speeches for regime change in Iran and the regime in Iran was added part of “Axis of Evil”. The US poses serious threat to the sovereignty of Islamic Republic of Iran. The US's foreign policy of regime change motives the regime in Iran to seek venues to build its army in order to survive military strike as it happened in Afghanistan and Iraq. Furthermore, in the realist political environment, Mr. Waltz argues that states have two options to gain power and capable of defending themselves. The first is external balancing by forcing alliances with other states which is allowing states to share their resources with one another. Last option would be internal balancing to build itself within by developing a vibrant economy system in order to improve quality of its army.^xliii There is also an issue of population that a state would acquire power by increasing its population.^xliv The regime in Iran is facing economic sanction which goes back to 2006.^xlv There is one clause in the UN which is hurting Iran’s economy, it is “a prohibition on making available to any person in Iran any property, financial assistance or investment, related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture or use of any of the products subject to the export ban.”^xlvi In year 2011, the inflation rate was 20.6% and in year 2012 the inflation rate was 23.6%.^xlvii In year 2011, the unemployment rate in Iran was 15.3% and in year 2012 the unemployment rate was 15.5%^xlviii from population of 79 million as of 2012.^xlix

The regime in Iran claims that it has support of people to build its nuclear programs like Dr. Saeed Khatipzadeh from Iranian Journal of International Affairs expressed his view on the nuclear programs in Iran. He associated the nuclear program of Iran with Iranian national pride and prestige.^l Iranian technocrats define their situation in three terms. The regime in Iran sees itself in light of being victimized by the Western powers during Iran and Iraq War.^li Two, the nuclear program defines Iran as a nation.^lii Last, there is a mind set that Iran is a big country and a leading country; it needs to set an example to other nations.^liii

Dr. Nasser Saghafi-Ameri brought two issues on surface with regard to nuclear program in Iran. One, it was after end of the Cold-War era, nuclear weapons proliferation became legitimized by treaty like NPT.^liv Last, Dr. Saghafi-Ameri alleged that “the US has hidden 480 nuclear weapons in six European nations as well as Turkey.^lv

Dr. Nasser Hadian claimed that Iranians are divided on nature of having nuclear programs. The first group is consisted of 2 to 3% of population that Iran does not need nuclear program due to environmental reason.^lvi The second group support nuclear programs for Iran with intention of being used for civilian purpose. ^lvii The third group would like Iran to have knowledge of building nuclear bombs. However, it would not have nuclear bombs.^lviii The last group would be the hardliners that this group would like Iran to withdraw from NPT and build its nuclear bombs.^lix The hardliners like cleric Mesbah-Yazdi steadfast supporter of president Ahmadinejad calls for obliteration of Israel and the US.^lx

Dr. Kayhan Barzegar claims that 90% of Iranian population favor of nuclear power, and taking a step backward from nuclear projects, it would be economic loss and it would hurt Iran's science.^lxi

This portion of the paper is explaining why the regime in Iran cannot acquire nuclear power. The regime in Iran is facing insecurity dilemma which is due to nature of international relation that it is in state of anarchy and future becomes uncertain that how nations are aligning their foreign policies. There is a perceived concept that if a state is seeking security to defend itself against aggression of another nation.^lxii There is a second possibility in realm of insecurity that there is an insecure state due to not knowing about motives of other states, it creates a window of Pandora Box.^lxiii Recently, the Obama administration has decided to distance itself from policy of regime change for Iran, and it is exploring option of containment for Iran.^lxiv Vic president Joseph Biden claimed on the record that the US would not allow the regime in Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. However, Mr. Biden off the record has another approach toward nuclear Iran, it is an idea of coexistence with nuclear Iran.^lxv Historian Bernard Lewis and Michael Ledeen encourage the US not to engage in preemptive military strike on nuclear facilities of Iran.^lxvi It would not push backward Iran's nuclear programs.^lxvii Plus, the US military strike on full scale against the regime in Iran, it would bring Iranian masses together to confront the US invasion of Iran.^lxviii

Those individuals are advocating containment policy for the regime Iran's nuclear program. It is assumed that by allowing the regime in Iran to have nuclear capability, it would allow the regime in Iran to improve its relation with Saudi Arabia, and more favorable conditions for an Israeli-Palestinian accord.^lxix This policy of containment provides a window of opportunity for the regime in Iran become predictable as long as it is following within guideline of protocol.^lxx In addition, the regime in Iran would have first hand experience that the nuclear arsenal is more of insurance policy than a military capability.^lxxi There is a counter argument to the above theory that the containment policy worked for Russia, but it may not be working for the regime in Iran. The US did not have regime change policy for Russia; the US does have regime change policy for the regime in Iran.^lxxii The former Soviet Union used ideology as an instrument to oppose capitalism. In case of Iran, the establishment manipulates a public emotion which is enabling the establishment in Iran to recruit martyrs.^lxxiii Therefore, the policy of containment may not be successful.

There is one case scenario for the regime in Iran that it may want to engage in arms control, and unilateral restraint. The idea behind arms control is to reduce or limit the number of destructive forces that the parties accumulated throughout times.^lxxiv It would provide a comfort zone for both parties to gain each others trust and working on security with one another.^lxxv The unilateral restraint is limiting the size of deploying forces that it has direct impact on losing an arm race.^lxxvi

The alternative option of containment is military strikes on the regime in Iran. There is a reason to be cautious to launch military strikes on the nuclear facilities in Iran. If “the US should attack Iran and attempt to eliminate its nuclear facilities, proponents of a strike have argued that the only thing worse than military action against Iran would be an Iran armed with nuclear weapons. Critic, meanwhile, have warned that such a raid would likely fail and, even if it succeed, would spark a full-fledged war and a global economic crisis. They have urged the United States to rely on nonmilitary options, such as diplomacy, sanctions, and covert operations, to prevent Iran from acquiring a bomb. Fearing the costs of a bombing campaign, most critics maintain that if these other tactics fail to impede Tehran's progress, the United States should simply learn to live with a nuclear Iran.”^lxxvii However, there is another reality shining behind mushroom clouds, if the regime in Iran acquires nuclear weapons. The idea of coexisting with nuclear Iran is out of question.^lxxviii The nuclear armed Iran would pose a threat to the US interests in the Middle East and beyond.^lxxix Kroenig Mathew argues that international pressure to curb Iran's nuclear program was fruitless.^lxxx The Stuxnet computer warm attacked the Iranian nuclear facilities and caused temporary disruption in Tehran's enrichment effort.^lxxxi The regime in Iran is facing sanction and it is not deter to give-up on its goal to posses nuclear capability.^lxxxii There is alleged evidence that the regime in Iran is developing nuclear bombs.^lxxxiii The Institute for Science and International Security claims that the regime in Iran is capable of acquiring nuclear bombs.^lxxxiv There is wisdom that the regime in Iran is relocating its nuclear facilities in a new location which is secure from any possible military strike on the nuclear facilities.^lxxxv It is expected the regime in Iran to expel IAEA from Iran so that the regime in Iran can enrich uranium to weapon-grade levels of 90%.^lxxxvi The problem appears that if the regime in Iran acquires the nuclear bombs, it creates insecurity in the region for the US.^lxxxvii The US no longer would be able to play a dominate role in the Middle East.^lxxxviii The Saudi Arabia may pursue policy of acquiring nuclear capability, and triggers geopolitics rivals.^lxxxix Moreover, the regime in Iran may transfer nuclear knowledge to the undesirable entities that they share same sentiment as the regime in Iran has and these entities would wage war against the US and its interests in the Middle East.^xc Kroenig Mathew argues that current situation cannot be weighed in same circumstance as it was during Cold-War era. At the time of Cold-War, Russia and the US had clear lines of communication; they waged their wars by means of proxies, and managed their nuclear arsenals.^xci Mathew argues that the regime in Iran would use its nuclear arsenal against Israel.^xcii Consequently, the Israel would retaliate against the regime in Iran.^xciii In addition, Mathew explore the theory of containment for Iran that it would require the US to deploy massive naval in the Persian Gulf, monitoring Iran's activity to ensure the regime in Iran is not transferring nuclear knowledge to terrorist entities, assisting allied nations with developing nuclear capability, and Israel would have submarines to launch missiles at Iran.^xciv The bottom line, “the United States would need to make a substantial investment of political and military capital to the Middle East in the midst of an economic crisis and at a time when it is attempting to shift its force out of the region. Deterrence would come with enormous economic and geopolitical costs and would have to remain in place as long as Iran remained hostile to US interests, which could mean decades or longer.”^xcv Kroenig Mathew states that a military strike on the nuclear facilities in Iran requires savvy thinking and not a quick military action.^xcvi The regime in Iran had secret nuclear stations in Natanz and Qom.^xcvii It is possible for the regime in Iran to have other undisclosed nuclear facilities.^xcviii It is advisable to take precaution that the regime has hidden nuclear facilities.^xcix The regime in Iran has spread its nuclear facilities around Iran and is not concentrated in one area.^c All these nuclear facilities are constructed underground, and it would be difficult to destroy these underground nuclear facilities with air strikes.^ci These nuclear facilities are located by civilian areas, and air strikes would lead to collateral damages.^cii There are other nuclear facilities that they are vulnerable to air strikes in city of Tehran, Arak, Esfehan, and Natanz.^ciii The US has 30,000-pound “Massive Ordance Penetrator” which is capable of penetrating 200 feet of reinforcement concert.^civ It is an ideal for Qom's nuclear facility which is build into mountain.^cv However, the facility is not operational at this time.^cvi

There are consequences of attacking the regime in Iran. There is one possibility which has not been mentioned by other researchers. Kroenig Mathew claims that a military strike on the regime in Iran, it may encourage China and Russia to halt their economic trades with the US and take side with the regime in Iran.^cvii Plus, there were three important issues that Mathew brought to light. One, this war would be long lasting and it would damage the US image in the Muslim world.^cviii Two, the regime in Iran would block the Strait of Hormuz, which is a narrow point in the Persian Gulf, to prevent 20% of oil supply for world to be used.^cix Last, the Arab Spring may not reach to Iran.^cx Kroenig Mathew states that the military options should be intended to destroy the nuclear facilities in Iran and not destroying the military and not causing unrest in Iran so the regime in Iran would collapse.^cxi

The regime in Iran is posing threat to global insecurity is base on fact and it is not base on false information. The IAEA has confirmed the regime in Iran possess heavy water reactors.^cxii These heavy water reactors are designed to enrich uranium for nuclear weapon purpose. The designs and original components for which Iran illicitly acquired via the A.Q. Khan proliferation network. On the basis of IAEA verification up to October 2010, and Iranian estimates since then, it is calculated that some 4, 105 kg of LEU has now produced at the FEP.”^cxiii The regime in Iran does not have “civil rationale for this enrichment work. The Bushehr NPP, constructed with Russian assistance, uses Russian fuel.”^cxiv The regime in Iran is planning to to build another NPP at Darkovin.^cxv “The lack of a plausible civil rationale for the production of LEU, and the fact that the current stockpile is more than sufficient to produce two nuclear weapons, if further enriched to around 90 percent, is a major concern.”^cxvi In addition, the regime in Iran commenced to feed UF6 into pilot fuel enrichment plant (PFEP) at Natanz in February 2010 for the 'stated purpose of producing UF6enriched up to 20% U-235 for use in the manufacture of fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), which is used to produced medical isotopes and the fuel for which has been previously supplied from abroad.”^cxvii In September 2009, the regime in Iran sent a letter to the IAEA, and informed the IAEA that it was building a new Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant,^cxviii and it was “the production of UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235, with 3, 000 centrifuges envisioned in 16 cascades.”^cxix There are serious concerning issue with regard to nuclear proliferation of the regime in Iran. These defacto evidences prove that the regime in Iran is pursuing nuclear bombs. First, the regime in Iran works on uranium metal.^cxx The regime in Iran knows how to convert UF6 into uranium metal and machine metal enriched uranium metal into hemispheres.^cxxi The regime in Iran has knowledge of producing uranium metal from fluoride compounds, ^cxxii and “its manufactures into components relevant to a nuclear device.”^cxxiii The IAEA has confirmed that the regime in Iran “works of direct relevance to the detonation and testing of a nuclear weapon, including the test of 'at least one full scale hemispherical, converging, explosively driven shock system that could be applicable to an implosion – type nuclear device.”^cxxiv Third, the regime in Iran is working on “missile re – entry vehicles. Iran has allegedly conducted engineering work on a new payload chamber for a new re – entry vehicle for its Shahab – 3 missiles.”^cxxv Fourth, the regime in Iran is working on uranium tetra fluoride (UF4).^cxxvi The IAEA confirms that the regime is working on converting uranium dioxide into UF4.^cxxvii There is Project 5/13 which is indicating it is in connection with other projects; such as, re – entry vehicle.^cxxviii Last, there is an issue of connection between military and the nuclear program.^cxxix There are suspicious circumstances which make to believe that the regime in Iran is using its nuclear facilities for military reason.^cxxx

In September 2012, Prime Minister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu appeared at the United Nations General Assembly and claimed that the regime in Iran would cross threshold of nuclear proliferation to produce nuclear bombs by 2013. It appears that there is an accuracy report about uranium enrichment of the regime in Iran. “The IAEA concluded in August that Iran had more than ninety kilograms of twenty-percent enriched uranium, and was producing fifteen kilos of the same each month (you need two hundred and twenty – five kilos, give or take, to produce twenty – five kilos of high – enriched uranium – enough for one bomb). As more centrifuges are being installed, the red line Netanyahu drew on his cartoon will be reached by spring or summer 2013.”^cxxxi

The IAEA is an international body which is monitoring nuclear activities around the world.^cxxxii Today, Britain, China, France, Russia, and the US are possessing nuclear weapons, and ratified Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that the above nations would provide nuclear assistance to no nuclear weapon states base on nonmilitary applications.^cxxxiii In the long run, the above nations would not possess any kind of nuclear weapons.^cxxxiv

The regime in Iran would not give-up on its goal to develop nuclear bombs. “The Libyan experience demonstrated that collective pressure and sanctions can help induce a state violating its NPT obligations to alter its policies so as to come into compliance. Unfortunately, the Libyan case has been a rare success and, given Qaddafi's current fate, unlikely to repeat.”^cxxxv

There is social constructive school of thought that it deems “anarchy is not given feature of the international system; it is an idea that states buy into, and, because they buy into it and understand the world as 'anarchy', they act accordingly.”^cxxxvi It appears in this case that the regime in Iran is looking at the world in chaotic terms and not in peaceful terms. The regime in Iran is working with terrorist entities to deter Western powers from waging military strike on its nuclear facilities in Iran. There was one incident in Burgas, Bulgaria that a suspected suicide bomber killed six Israeli tourists.^cxxxvii It is also true that the US is sharing political culture with the European nations and it is falling under concept of intersubjective it means that “ideas and concepts that are shared and held in common, and from these we can understand action and behavior.”^cxxxviii However, China does not share political culture with the West, and it has nuclear bombs. China does not threatening to committee genocide against any ethnic groups or wiping a nation from the map.

This portion of the paper is examining the nature of the regime in Iran. The regime in Iran was installed by the US, France, and England because King (Shah) Mohammad Reza PAHLAVI did not want to sell crude oil below market value. Former US President Jimmy Carter besmirched the Pahlavi Regime for human rights violation, France provided shelter for Khomeini to remain secure from any kind of harm, and England provided BBC as a medium for Khomeini to foment revolution in Iran with promise of a free ride society for everyone. As Machiavelli says people change their master easily in promise of better life which was the case in 1979 revolution of Iran. The regime changed in Iran. Amazingly, the revolution of Iran had been foretold by Aristotle, who defines democracy as a form of corrupt system that people would take property recklessly for their own self-interest, and accumulate wealth and power with no regard for the peace and stability of a nation as a whole.^cxxxix Demagogue would convince public that their democracy is in a grave danger from a real or an imaginary enemy.^cxl This enemy can be domestic or foreign.^cxli This demagogue would represent himself to others as friend and savior of people.^cxlii “This war serves to distract the people, preventing them from paying attention to what the demagogue – turned – tyrant is doing domestically, including undermining the constitution, making his conies and hangers – on wealth at public expense, and expanding his powers into areas that were previously constitutionally off – limits.”^cxliii This leader begins to foster black-holes by not allowing public become educated about affairs of their nations.^cxliv This leader begins to sow dissensions and creates quarrels over real or imaginary issues.^cxlv The tyrant begins to implicate as many people in his crimes so that they too are guilty.^cxlvi This tyrant maintains a pleasant appearance to public and pretends to be guardian of the public treasure as this tyrant plunders wealth of the nations.^cxlvii Most of all, he pretends to be a man of God.^cxlviii The above view of Aristotle defines how the regime in Iran came to power and how it is holding on power in Iran.

The regime in Iran does not have consent of people to rule because it is not base on consent of people. The election system is fraud, it is a system that there is only one political party to choose from.^cxlix There are political parties that they are chosen by head of state Ali Khamenie and these political parties are supporting vision of the state and not diversity of ideas in Iran. As a result, the political system of the regime in Iran is illegitimate, and does not represent will and consent of Iranians. It is a system which is representing authority of the state. The regime in Iran is a weak state that it is facing internal threat because there is no transition of power from one segment of the society to another segment of the society.^cl The power is monopolized in hands of power elite in Iran. The regime in Iran does not have state strength for three reasons. (1) there is no proper “infrastructural capacity in terms of the ability of the state institutions to perform essential tasks and enact policy; (2) coercive capacity in terms of the state's ability and willingness to employ force against challenges to its authority; and (3) national identity and social cohesion in terms of the degree to which the population identifies with nation state and accepts its legitimate role in their lives.”^cli The regime in Iran does not have institutions in terms that exist in the West. The institutions in Iran are subject to corruption, and rules are not will of people because the rules are formulated by elite individuals which are reflecting their interests.

All in all, this paper gives a brief background about how people of Iran began to move toward nuclear program, discussing the reason for the regime in Iran cannot posses nuclear program, and examining the nature of the regime in Iran. It was in 1957, which was during Cold-War era, the US decided to provide nuclear knowledge to the Pahlavi Regime as an instrument to deter Russia from invading Iran. It also brought the US and Iran relation closer. In 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran was established, and the US and Iran relation came to an end. In 1980, Iraq invaded Iran, and Iran could not defend itself against Iraq’s invasion. It took several years to push back Iraqi forces from Iranian territories. It was during this time that the regime began to realize that it would be an ideal to acquire weapon of mass destruction. The regime in Iran began to seek different venues to rebuild Iran's nuclear power. The regime in Iran did not disclose its documents to the IAEA that it was building nuclear powers. The MEK which is a militant dissident group and has branches in Iran and outside of Iran, it informed the US Representative about secret locations of the nuclear power stations in Iran. The IAEA also confirmed that the regime in Iran was pursuing nuclear bombs. The regime in Iran is a rogue state which is seeking regional power by wiping Israel from the map, and is posing threat to sovereignty of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and other nations in the Middle East as well as the US interests around the world and it is contributing to insecurity dilemma. The US is interested to use preemptive military strikes at the nuclear facilities in Iran. However, there is a problem with military strike at the nuclear facilities in Iran. The regime in Iran would retaliate against the US and the US interests around the world. The last option is containing Iran. It would not be possible to contain Iran because it is not playing with same role as the Russian did during Cold-War period. The regime in Iran is spearheaded to acquire nuclear weapons not to gain prestige among nations, but it has a goal to dominate its supremacy in the region. The Obama administration thought of co-existing with nuclear Iran. However, it would not be possible due to weak economy of the US. It would cost the US billion of dollars to maintain strong presence in the Middle East. There is only one option left on the table which is to overthrow the regime in Iran not by means of military strike, but Iranians overthrow the regime in Iran, and form their own state, Republic of Monarchy, and to have different political parties which serves their interests and form governments which are representing their wills, and bring back peace and security to the region.

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viiiArms Control Org Hossein Mousavian. July/August 2012 <http://www.armscontrol.org/2012_07-08/The_Iranian_Nuclear_Dispute_Origins_and_Current_Options> 01 April 2013

ixMiddle East Journal. Mustafa Kibaroglu. 15 April 2006 <http://ehis.ebscohost.com.proxy.ufv.ca:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=fff148a6-6928-4424-8185-1b265d77e24d%40sessionmgr198&hid=7> 01 April 2013

xMiddle East Journal. Mustafa Kibaroglu. 15 April 2006 <http://ehis.ebscohost.com.proxy.ufv.ca:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=fff148a6-6928-4424-8185-1b265d77e24d%40sessionmgr198&hid=7> 01 April 2013

xiMiddle East Journal. Mustafa Kibaroglu. 15 April 2006 <http://ehis.ebscohost.com.proxy.ufv.ca:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=fff148a6-6928-4424-8185-1b265d77e24d%40sessionmgr198&hid=7> 01 April 2013

xiiMiddle East Journal. Mustafa Kibaroglu. 15 April 2006 <http://ehis.ebscohost.com.proxy.ufv.ca:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=fff148a6-6928-4424-8185-1b265d77e24d%40sessionmgr198&hid=7> 01 April 2013

xiiiMiddle East Journal. Mustafa Kibaroglu. 15 April 2006 <http://ehis.ebscohost.com.proxy.ufv.ca:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=fff148a6-6928-4424-8185-1b265d77e24d%40sessionmgr198&hid=7> 01 April 2013

xivMiddle East Journal. Mustafa Kibaroglu. 15 April 2006 <http://ehis.ebscohost.com.proxy.ufv.ca:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=fff148a6-6928-4424-8185-1b265d77e24d%40sessionmgr198&hid=7> 01 April 2013

xvMiddle East Journal. Mustafa Kibaroglu. 15 April 2006 <http://ehis.ebscohost.com.proxy.ufv.ca:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=fff148a6-6928-4424-8185-1b265d77e24d%40sessionmgr198&hid=7> 01 April 2013

xviMiddle East Journal. Mustafa Kibaroglu. 15 April 2006 <http://ehis.ebscohost.com.proxy.ufv.ca:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=fff148a6-6928-4424-8185-1b265d77e24d%40sessionmgr198&hid=7> 01 April 2013

xviiMiddle East Journal. Mustafa Kibaroglu. 15 April 2006 <http://ehis.ebscohost.com.proxy.ufv.ca:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=fff148a6-6928-4424-8185-1b265d77e24d%40sessionmgr198&hid=7> 01 April 2013

xviiiMiddle East Journal. Mustafa Kibaroglu. 15 April 2006 <http://ehis.ebscohost.com.proxy.ufv.ca:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=fff148a6-6928-4424-8185-1b265d77e24d%40sessionmgr198&hid=7> 01 April 2013

xixMiddle East Journal. Mustafa Kibaroglu. 15 April 2006 <http://ehis.ebscohost.com.proxy.ufv.ca:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=fff148a6-6928-4424-8185-1b265d77e24d%40sessionmgr198&hid=7> 01 April 2013

xxMiddle East Journal. Mustafa Kibaroglu. 15 April 2006 <http://ehis.ebscohost.com.proxy.ufv.ca:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=fff148a6-6928-4424-8185-1b265d77e24d%40sessionmgr198&hid=7> 01 April 2013

xxiMiddle East Journal. Mustafa Kibaroglu. 15 April 2006 <http://ehis.ebscohost.com.proxy.ufv.ca:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=fff148a6-6928-4424-8185-1b265d77e24d%40sessionmgr198&hid=7> 01 April 2013

xxiiMiddle East Journal. Mustafa Kibaroglu. 15 April 2006 <http://ehis.ebscohost.com.proxy.ufv.ca:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=fff148a6-6928-4424-8185-1b265d77e24d%40sessionmgr198&hid=7> 01 April 2013

xxiiiMiddle East Journal. Mustafa Kibaroglu. 15 April 2006 <http://ehis.ebscohost.com.proxy.ufv.ca:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=fff148a6-6928-4424-8185-1b265d77e24d%40sessionmgr198&hid=7> 01 April 2013

xxivMiddle East Journal. Mustafa Kibaroglu. 15 April 2006 <http://ehis.ebscohost.com.proxy.ufv.ca:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=fff148a6-6928-4424-8185-1b265d77e24d%40sessionmgr198&hid=7> 01 April 2013

xxvMiddle East Journal. Mustafa Kibaroglu. 15 April 2006 <http://ehis.ebscohost.com.proxy.ufv.ca:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=fff148a6-6928-4424-8185-1b265d77e24d%40sessionmgr198&hid=7> 01 April 2013

xxviMiddle East Journal. Mustafa Kibaroglu. 15 April 2006 <http://ehis.ebscohost.com.proxy.ufv.ca:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=fff148a6-6928-4424-8185-1b265d77e24d%40sessionmgr198&hid=7> 01 April 2013

xxviiMiddle East Journal. Mustafa Kibaroglu. 15 April 2006 <http://ehis.ebscohost.com.proxy.ufv.ca:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=fff148a6-6928-4424-8185-1b265d77e24d%40sessionmgr198&hid=7> 01 April 2013

xxviiiMiddle East Journal. Mustafa Kibaroglu. 15 April 2006 <http://ehis.ebscohost.com.proxy.ufv.ca:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=fff148a6-6928-4424-8185-1b265d77e24d%40sessionmgr198&hid=7> 01 April 2013

xxixMiddle East Journal. Mustafa Kibaroglu. 15 April 2006 <http://ehis.ebscohost.com.proxy.ufv.ca:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=fff148a6-6928-4424-8185-1b265d77e24d%40sessionmgr198&hid=7> 01 April 2013

xxxMiddle East Journal. Mustafa Kibaroglu. 15 April 2006 <http://ehis.ebscohost.com.proxy.ufv.ca:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=fff148a6-6928-4424-8185-1b265d77e24d%40sessionmgr198&hid=7> 01 April 2013

xxxiMiddle East Journal. Mustafa Kibaroglu. 15 April 2006 <http://ehis.ebscohost.com.proxy.ufv.ca:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=fff148a6-6928-4424-8185-1b265d77e24d%40sessionmgr198&hid=7> 01 April 2013

xxxiiMiddle East Journal. Mustafa Kibaroglu. 15 April 2006 <http://ehis.ebscohost.com.proxy.ufv.ca:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=fff148a6-6928-4424-8185-1b265d77e24d%40sessionmgr198&hid=7> 01 April 2013

xxxiiiMiddle East Journal. Mustafa Kibaroglu. 15 April 2006 <http://ehis.ebscohost.com.proxy.ufv.ca:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=fff148a6-6928-4424-8185-1b265d77e24d%40sessionmgr198&hid=7> 01 April 2013

xxxivMiddle East Journal. Mustafa Kibaroglu. 15 April 2006 <http://ehis.ebscohost.com.proxy.ufv.ca:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=fff148a6-6928-4424-8185-1b265d77e24d%40sessionmgr198&hid=7> 01 April 2013

xxxvMiddle East Journal. Mustafa Kibaroglu. 15 April 2006 <http://ehis.ebscohost.com.proxy.ufv.ca:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=fff148a6-6928-4424-8185-1b265d77e24d%40sessionmgr198&hid=7> 01 April 2013

xxxviMiddle East Journal. Mustafa Kibaroglu. 15 April 2006 <http://ehis.ebscohost.com.proxy.ufv.ca:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=fff148a6-6928-4424-8185-1b265d77e24d%40sessionmgr198&hid=7> 01 April 2013

xxxviiMiddle East Journal. Mustafa Kibaroglu. 15 April 2006 <http://ehis.ebscohost.com.proxy.ufv.ca:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=fff148a6-6928-4424-8185-1b265d77e24d%40sessionmgr198&hid=7> 01 April 2013

xxxviiiMiddle East Journal. Mustafa Kibaroglu. 15 April 2006 <http://ehis.ebscohost.com.proxy.ufv.ca:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=fff148a6-6928-4424-8185-1b265d77e24d%40sessionmgr198&hid=7> 01 April 2013

xxxixMiddle East Journal. Mustafa Kibaroglu. 15 April 2006 <http://ehis.ebscohost.com.proxy.ufv.ca:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=fff148a6-6928-4424-8185-1b265d77e24d%40sessionmgr198&hid=7> 01 April 2013

xlAlan, Collins. Contemporary Security Studies (Second Edition). New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. PG 16

xliAlan, Collins. Contemporary Security Studies (Second Edition). New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. PG 20

xliiAlan, Collins. Contemporary Security Studies (Second Edition). New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. PG 20

xliiiAlan, Collins. Contemporary Security Studies(Second Edition). New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. PG 21

xlivAlan, Collins. Contemporary Security Studies(Second Edition). New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. PG 21

xlvForeign Affairs and International Trade Canada <http://www.international.gc.ca/sanctions/iran.aspx?view=d> 02 April 2013

xlviForeign Affairs and International Trade Canada <http://www.international.gc.ca/sanctions/iran.aspx?view=d> 02 April 2013

xlviiIndex Mundi <http://www.indexmundi.com/iran/inflation_rate_%28consumer_prices%29.html> 02 April 2013

xlviiiIndex Mundi <http://www.indexmundi.com/iran/unemployment_rate.html> 02 April 2013

xlixIndex Mundi <http://www.indexmundi.com/iran/population.html> 02 April 2013

lMiddle East Journal. Mustafa Kibaroglu. 15 April 2006 <http://ehis.ebscohost.com.proxy.ufv.ca:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=fff148a6-6928-4424-8185-1b265d77e24d%40sessionmgr198&hid=7> 01 April 2013

liMiddle East Journal. Mustafa Kibaroglu. 15 April 2006 <http://ehis.ebscohost.com.proxy.ufv.ca:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=fff148a6-6928-4424-8185-1b265d77e24d%40sessionmgr198&hid=7> 01 April 2013

liiMiddle East Journal. Mustafa Kibaroglu. 15 April 2006 <http://ehis.ebscohost.com.proxy.ufv.ca:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=fff148a6-6928-4424-8185-1b265d77e24d%40sessionmgr198&hid=7> 01 April 2013

liiiMiddle East Journal. Mustafa Kibaroglu. 15 April 2006 <http://ehis.ebscohost.com.proxy.ufv.ca:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=fff148a6-6928-4424-8185-1b265d77e24d%40sessionmgr198&hid=7> 01 April 2013

livMiddle East Journal. Mustafa Kibaroglu. 15 April 2006 <http://ehis.ebscohost.com.proxy.ufv.ca:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=fff148a6-6928-4424-8185-1b265d77e24d%40sessionmgr198&hid=7> 01 April 2013

lvMiddle East Journal. Mustafa Kibaroglu. 15 April 2006 <http://ehis.ebscohost.com.proxy.ufv.ca:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=fff148a6-6928-4424-8185-1b265d77e24d%40sessionmgr198&hid=7> 01 April 2013

lviMiddle East Journal. Mustafa Kibaroglu. 15 April 2006 <http://ehis.ebscohost.com.proxy.ufv.ca:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=fff148a6-6928-4424-8185-1b265d77e24d%40sessionmgr198&hid=7> 01 April 2013

lviiMiddle East Journal. Mustafa Kibaroglu. 15 April 2006 <http://ehis.ebscohost.com.proxy.ufv.ca:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=fff148a6-6928-4424-8185-1b265d77e24d%40sessionmgr198&hid=7> 01 April 2013

lviiiMiddle East Journal. Mustafa Kibaroglu. 15 April 2006 <http://ehis.ebscohost.com.proxy.ufv.ca:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=fff148a6-6928-4424-8185-1b265d77e24d%40sessionmgr198&hid=7> 01 April 2013

lixMiddle East Journal. Mustafa Kibaroglu. 15 April 2006 <http://ehis.ebscohost.com.proxy.ufv.ca:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=fff148a6-6928-4424-8185-1b265d77e24d%40sessionmgr198&hid=7> 01 April 2013

lxCover story By: Stephens, Bret. Commentary, July/August 2010, Vol. 130 Issue 1, p61-70, 10p

lxiMiddle East Journal. Mustafa Kibaroglu. 15 April 2006 <http://ehis.ebscohost.com.proxy.ufv.ca:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=fff148a6-6928-4424-8185-1b265d77e24d%40sessionmgr198&hid=7> 01 April 2013

lxiiAlan, Collins. Contemporary Security Studies (Second Edition). New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. PG 25

lxiiiAlan, Collins. Contemporary Security Studies (Second Edition). New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. PG 25

lxivCover story By: Stephens, Bret. Commentary, July/August 2010, Vol. 130 Issue 1, p61-70, 10p

lxvCover story By: Stephens, Bret. Commentary, July/August 2010, Vol. 130 Issue 1, p61-70, 10p

lxviCover story By: Stephens, Bret. Commentary, July/August 2010, Vol. 130 Issue 1, p61-70, 10p

lxviiCover story By: Stephens, Bret. Commentary, July/August 2010, Vol. 130 Issue 1, p61-70, 10p

lxviiiCover story By: Stephens, Bret. Commentary, July/August 2010, Vol. 130 Issue 1, p61-70, 10p

lxixCover story By: Stephens, Bret. Commentary, July/August 2010, Vol. 130 Issue 1, p61-70, 10p

lxxCover story By: Stephens, Bret. Commentary, July/August 2010, Vol. 130 Issue 1, p61-70, 10p

lxxiCover story By: Stephens, Bret. Commentary, July/August 2010, Vol. 130 Issue 1, p61-70, 10p

lxxiiCover story By: Stephens, Bret. Commentary, July/August 2010, Vol. 130 Issue 1, p61-70, 10p

lxxiiiCover story By: Stephens, Bret. Commentary, July/August 2010, Vol. 130 Issue 1, p61-70, 10p

lxxivAlan, Collins. Contemporary Security Studies (Second Edition). New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. PG 25

lxxvAlan, Collins. Contemporary Security Studies (Second Edition). New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. PG 25

lxxviAlan, Collins. Contemporary Security Studies (Second Edition). New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. PG 25

lxxviiKroenig, Mathew1. “Time To Attack Iran.” Foreign Affairs 91.1 (2012):76-86. Social Science Abstracts (H.W. Wilson). Web. 1 April 2013.

lxxviiiKroenig, Mathew1. “Time To Attack Iran.” Foreign Affairs 91.1 (2012):76-86. Social Science Abstracts (H.W. Wilson). Web. 1 April 2013.

lxxixKroenig, Mathew1. “Time To Attack Iran.” Foreign Affairs 91.1 (2012):76-86. Social Science Abstracts (H.W. Wilson). Web. 1 April 2013.

lxxxKroenig, Mathew1. “Time To Attack Iran.” Foreign Affairs 91.1 (2012):76-86. Social Science Abstracts (H.W. Wilson). Web. 1 April 2013.

lxxxiKroenig, Mathew1. “Time To Attack Iran.” Foreign Affairs 91.1 (2012):76-86. Social Science Abstracts (H.W. Wilson). Web. 1 April 2013.

lxxxiiKroenig, Mathew1. “Time To Attack Iran.” Foreign Affairs 91.1 (2012):76-86. Social Science Abstracts (H.W. Wilson). Web. 1 April 2013.

lxxxiiiKroenig, Mathew1. “Time To Attack Iran.” Foreign Affairs 91.1 (2012):76-86. Social Science Abstracts (H.W. Wilson). Web. 1 April 2013.

lxxxivKroenig, Mathew1. “Time To Attack Iran.” Foreign Affairs 91.1 (2012):76-86. Social Science Abstracts (H.W. Wilson). Web. 1 April 2013.

lxxxvKroenig, Mathew1. “Time To Attack Iran.” Foreign Affairs 91.1 (2012):76-86. Social Science Abstracts (H.W. Wilson). Web. 1 April 2013.

lxxxviKroenig, Mathew1. “Time To Attack Iran.” Foreign Affairs 91.1 (2012):76-86. Social Science Abstracts (H.W. Wilson). Web. 1 April 2013.

lxxxviiKroenig, Mathew1. “Time To Attack Iran.” Foreign Affairs 91.1 (2012):76-86. Social Science Abstracts (H.W. Wilson). Web. 1 April 2013.

lxxxviiiKroenig, Mathew1. “Time To Attack Iran.” Foreign Affairs 91.1 (2012):76-86. Social Science Abstracts (H.W. Wilson). Web. 1 April 2013.

lxxxixKroenig, Mathew1. “Time To Attack Iran.” Foreign Affairs 91.1 (2012):76-86. Social Science Abstracts (H.W. Wilson). Web. 1 April 2013.

xcKroenig, Mathew1. “Time To Attack Iran.” Foreign Affairs 91.1 (2012):76-86. Social Science Abstracts (H.W. Wilson). Web. 1 April 2013.

xciKroenig, Mathew1. “Time To Attack Iran.” Foreign Affairs 91.1 (2012):76-86. Social Science Abstracts (H.W. Wilson). Web. 1 April 2013.

xciiKroenig, Mathew1. “Time To Attack Iran.” Foreign Affairs 91.1 (2012):76-86. Social Science Abstracts (H.W. Wilson). Web. 1 April 2013.

xciiiKroenig, Mathew1. “Time To Attack Iran.” Foreign Affairs 91.1 (2012):76-86. Social Science Abstracts (H.W. Wilson). Web. 1 April 2013.

xcivKroenig, Mathew1. “Time To Attack Iran.” Foreign Affairs 91.1 (2012):76-86. Social Science Abstracts (H.W. Wilson). Web. 1 April 2013.

xcvKroenig, Mathew1. “Time To Attack Iran.” Foreign Affairs 91.1 (2012):76-86. Social Science Abstracts (H.W. Wilson). Web. 1 April 2013.

xcviKroenig, Mathew1. “Time To Attack Iran.” Foreign Affairs 91.1 (2012):76-86. Social Science Abstracts (H.W. Wilson). Web. 1 April 2013.

xcviiKroenig, Mathew1. “Time To Attack Iran.” Foreign Affairs 91.1 (2012):76-86. Social Science Abstracts (H.W. Wilson). Web. 1 April 2013.

xcviiiKroenig, Mathew1. “Time To Attack Iran.” Foreign Affairs 91.1 (2012):76-86. Social Science Abstracts (H.W. Wilson). Web. 1 April 2013.

xcixKroenig, Mathew1. “Time To Attack Iran.” Foreign Affairs 91.1 (2012):76-86. Social Science Abstracts (H.W. Wilson). Web. 1 April 2013.

cKroenig, Mathew1. “Time To Attack Iran.” Foreign Affairs 91.1 (2012):76-86. Social Science Abstracts (H.W. Wilson). Web. 1 April 2013.

ciKroenig, Mathew1. “Time To Attack Iran.” Foreign Affairs 91.1 (2012):76-86. Social Science Abstracts (H.W. Wilson). Web. 1 April 2013.

ciiKroenig, Mathew1. “Time To Attack Iran.” Foreign Affairs 91.1 (2012):76-86. Social Science Abstracts (H.W. Wilson). Web. 1 April 2013.

ciiiKroenig, Mathew1. “Time To Attack Iran.” Foreign Affairs 91.1 (2012):76-86. Social Science Abstracts (H.W. Wilson). Web. 1 April 2013.

civKroenig, Mathew1. “Time To Attack Iran.” Foreign Affairs 91.1 (2012):76-86. Social Science Abstracts (H.W. Wilson). Web. 1 April 2013.

cvKroenig, Mathew1. “Time To Attack Iran.” Foreign Affairs 91.1 (2012):76-86. Social Science Abstracts (H.W. Wilson). Web. 1 April 2013.

cviKroenig, Mathew1. “Time To Attack Iran.” Foreign Affairs 91.1 (2012):76-86. Social Science Abstracts (H.W. Wilson). Web. 1 April 2013.

cviiKroenig, Mathew1. “Time To Attack Iran.” Foreign Affairs 91.1 (2012):76-86. Social Science Abstracts (H.W. Wilson). Web. 1 April 2013.

cviiiKroenig, Mathew1. “Time To Attack Iran.” Foreign Affairs 91.1 (2012):76-86. Social Science Abstracts (H.W. Wilson). Web. 1 April 2013.

cixKroenig, Mathew1. “Time To Attack Iran.” Foreign Affairs 91.1 (2012):76-86. Social Science Abstracts (H.W. Wilson). Web. 1 April 2013.

cxKroenig, Mathew1. “Time To Attack Iran.” Foreign Affairs 91.1 (2012):76-86. Social Science Abstracts (H.W. Wilson). Web. 1 April 2013.

cxiKroenig, Mathew1. “Time To Attack Iran.” Foreign Affairs 91.1 (2012):76-86. Social Science Abstracts (H.W. Wilson). Web. 1 April 2013.

cxiiBowen, Wyn Q.; Brewer, Jonathan. International Affairs, July 2011, Vol. 87 Issue 4, p923-943, 21p; DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.01011.x

cxiiiBowen, Wyn Q.; Brewer, Jonathan. International Affairs, July 2011, Vol. 87 Issue 4, p923-943, 21p; DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.01011.x

cxivBowen, Wyn Q.; Brewer, Jonathan. International Affairs, July 2011, Vol. 87 Issue 4, p923-943, 21p; DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.01011.x

cxvBowen, Wyn Q.; Brewer, Jonathan. International Affairs, July 2011, Vol. 87 Issue 4, p923-943, 21p; DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.01011.x

cxviBowen, Wyn Q.; Brewer, Jonathan. International Affairs, July 2011, Vol. 87 Issue 4, p923-943, 21p; DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.01011.x

cxviiBowen, Wyn Q.; Brewer, Jonathan. International Affairs, July 2011, Vol. 87 Issue 4, p923-943, 21p; DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.01011.x

cxviiiBowen, Wyn Q.; Brewer, Jonathan. International Affairs, July 2011, Vol. 87 Issue 4, p923-943, 21p; DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.01011.x

cxixBowen, Wyn Q.; Brewer, Jonathan. International Affairs, July 2011, Vol. 87 Issue 4, p923-943, 21p; DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.01011.x

cxxBowen, Wyn Q.; Brewer, Jonathan. International Affairs, July 2011, Vol. 87 Issue 4, p923-943, 21p; DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.01011.x

cxxiBowen, Wyn Q.; Brewer, Jonathan. International Affairs, July 2011, Vol. 87 Issue 4, p923-943, 21p; DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.01011.x

cxxiiBowen, Wyn Q.; Brewer, Jonathan. International Affairs, July 2011, Vol. 87 Issue 4, p923-943, 21p; DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.01011.x

cxxiiiBowen, Wyn Q.; Brewer, Jonathan. International Affairs, July 2011, Vol. 87 Issue 4, p923-943, 21p; DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.01011.x

cxxivBowen, Wyn Q.; Brewer, Jonathan. International Affairs, July 2011, Vol. 87 Issue 4, p923-943, 21p; DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.01011.x

cxxvBowen, Wyn Q.; Brewer, Jonathan. International Affairs, July 2011, Vol. 87 Issue 4, p923-943, 21p; DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.01011.x

cxxviBowen, Wyn Q.; Brewer, Jonathan. International Affairs, July 2011, Vol. 87 Issue 4, p923-943, 21p; DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.01011.x

cxxviiBowen, Wyn Q.; Brewer, Jonathan. International Affairs, July 2011, Vol. 87 Issue 4, p923-943, 21p; DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.01011.x

cxxviiiBowen, Wyn Q.; Brewer, Jonathan. International Affairs, July 2011, Vol. 87 Issue 4, p923-943, 21p; DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.01011.x

cxxixBowen, Wyn Q.; Brewer, Jonathan. International Affairs, July 2011, Vol. 87 Issue 4, p923-943, 21p; DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.01011.x

cxxxBowen, Wyn Q.; Brewer, Jonathan. International Affairs, July 2011, Vol. 87 Issue 4, p923-943, 21p; DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.01011.x

cxxxiJohnson, Alan. World Affairs, Jan/Feb2013, Vol. 175 Issue 5, p67-74, 8p

cxxxiiWeitz, Richard. World Affairs, Nov/Dec2011, Vol. 174 Issue 4, p56-66, 11p

cxxxiiiWeitz, Richard. World Affairs, Nov/Dec2011, Vol. 174 Issue 4, p56-66, 11p

cxxxivWeitz, Richard. World Affairs, Nov/Dec2011, Vol. 174 Issue 4, p56-66, 11p

cxxxvWeitz, Richard. World Affairs, Nov/Dec2011, Vol. 174 Issue 4, p56-66, 11p

cxxxviAlan, Collins. Contemporary Security Studies (Second Edition). New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. PG 51

cxxxviiBardos, Gordon N.. World Affairs, Jan/Feb2013, Vol. 175 Issue 5, p59-66, 8p

cxxxviiiAlan, Collins. Contemporary Security Studies (Second Edition). New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. PG 53

cxxxixTerrence, Ball. Political Ideologies and the Democratic Ideal (Third Edition). T.O, ON: Pearson Canada, 2013. PG 19

cxlTerrence, Ball. Political Ideologies and the Democratic Ideal (Third Edition). T.O, ON: Pearson Canada, 2013. PG 19

cxliTerrence, Ball. Political Ideologies and the Democratic Ideal (Third Edition). T.O, ON: Pearson Canada, 2013. PG 19

cxliiTerrence, Ball. Political Ideologies and the Democratic Ideal (Third Edition). T.O, ON: Pearson Canada, 2013. PG 19

cxliiiTerrence, Ball. Political Ideologies and the Democratic Ideal (Third Edition). T.O, ON: Pearson Canada, 2013. PG 19

cxlivTerrence, Ball. Political Ideologies and the Democratic Ideal (Third Edition). T.O, ON: Pearson Canada, 2013. PG 19

cxlvTerrence, Ball. Political Ideologies and the Democratic Ideal (Third Edition). T.O, ON: Pearson Canada, 2013. PG 19

cxlviTerrence, Ball. Political Ideologies and the Democratic Ideal (Third Edition). T.O, ON: Pearson Canada, 2013. PG 19

cxlviiTerrence, Ball. Political Ideologies and the Democratic Ideal (Third Edition). T.O, ON: Pearson Canada, 2013. PG 19

cxlviiiTerrence, Ball. Political Ideologies and the Democratic Ideal (Third Edition). T.O, ON: Pearson Canada, 2013. PG 19

cxlixJackson, Robert and Doreen, Jackson. Canadian Government in Transition. Fifth Edition. Pearson Canada Toronto: TO ON. 2010. PG 9

clAlan, Collins. Contemporary Security Studies (Second Edition). New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. PG 187

cliAlan, Collins. Contemporary Security Studies (Second Edition). New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. PG 188