Al-Qaeda's PR Machine

By Ben JohnsonFrontPageMagazine.com 4/28/2009
IF HISTORY IS ANY GUIDE, A PICTURE IS WORTH A THOUSAND JIHADISTS. In 2004, after the media published photos of Abu Ghraib and leftist politicians blamed America, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi prefaced his beheading of Nicholas Berg with these words: “we tell you that the dignity of the Muslim men and women in Abu Ghraib and others is not redeemed except by blood and souls. You will not receive anything from us but coffins after coffins...slaughtered in this way.” Yet those images had a more lasting impact on the War on Terror. John McCain revealed four months ago that “a former high-ranking member of al-Qaeda” told him “‘the greatest recruiting tool we had – we were able to recruit thousands of young men,’ he said – ‘was Abu Ghraib.’”

Yet America’s dark history of releasing compromising photos is not detaining President Obama from handing al-Qaeda a veritable public relations coup. The media have emphasized that he plans to release 44 photos of interrogators abusing detainees by May 28; however, sources report the administration will release a “substantial number” of other images, and up to 2,000 photos in all could be divulged.

The offense of Abu Ghraib was not that it revealed typical interrogation techniques; all the methods employed violated the Interrogation Rules of Engagement, and the military had already begun trying the guilty before the leak. The import was not even the acts themselves, lurid as they may have been. The importance was the photos, which shocked everyone who viewed them on the now-defunct 60 Minutes II – photos beamed around the Muslim world to confirm the darkest imaginations of the jihadist heart: this is how Americans treat innocent Arabs. It may have helped if leftist politicians had not taken pains to present Abu Ghraib as the official face of the American fighting man (as David Horowitz and I document in Party of Defeat, pp. 106-111).

For this reason, the Pentagon opposed releasing any additional photos. In 2005, then-chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Richard B. Myers warned, “It is probable that al-Qaeda and other groups will seize upon these images and videos as grist for their propaganda mill, which will result in, besides violent attacks, increased terrorist recruitment, continued financial support, and exacerbation of tensions between Iraqi and Afghani populaces and U.S. and Coalition forces.” Both Gen. John Abizaid and Gen. George W. Casey Jr., who led the ground war in Iraq, opposed the release.

But surely theirs were proxy partisan excuses on behalf of the Bush administration, right?

Sen. Carl Levin, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, told NPR’s “All Things Considered” last week, “we have top officers in our military who say the first and second cause of combat deaths in Iraq – our people – were the symbols of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo.” Nonetheless, Levin cited his committee’s flawed report on torture that Abu Ghraib embodied official U.S. policy.

What effect, then, will the release of new and damning photos have? The Chicago Tribune reported last week even Obama administration “Defense Department officials would not say exactly what is contained in the photos but said they are concerned the release could incite a Mideast backlash.”

Sen. John Kerry, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, admitted, “I do think it will be used as a propaganda tool and have some damaging impact.” Even The Huffington Post noted Kerry “did concede that the pictures ‘will be used as a tool... as were the other photos [from Abu Ghraib].’”

In other words, leftists understand and expect that this will harm America’s safety and increase jihadist activity – and they’re plowing ahead, anyway. But Teresa’s better half cited the Left’s all-important rationale: “But this didn't happen under Obama; it happened under Bush, and everyone understands that.”

Kerry – ever the champion of nuance – demonstrates why he could not be trusted with national security. The jihadist media will not rejoice that The One has inaugurated different interrogation methods (or rather, they will, but for different reasons). No one will notice the Pentagon took these photographs during the course of its 60 investigations into detainee abuse or that it has “taken more than 400 disciplinary actions against U.S. military personnel found to have been involved in such abuse,” including sentencing some uniformed offenders to jail time. Releasing these photos will incline a wider audience to behead innocent Americans on the grounds this abuse was widespread, condoned behavior.

The ACLU, which fought a multi-year battle for the photographs’ release, has already sounded their trumpet. “This shows that the abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib was not aberrational but was systemic and widespread,” said ACLU staff attorney Amrit Singh in a statement picked up by the Egyptian press. “This will underscore calls for accountability for that abuse.”

And that is the key to understanding this disclosure, which the Bush administration fought even after Obama’s election. The new administration could appeal this case to the Supreme Court – as former Assistant Director Dr. Mark Lowenthal advised. “They should have fought it all the way; if they lost, they lost,” he said. Instead, the administration is turning over potentially thousands of al-Qaeda recruitment posters on the grounds that they have no choice. ABC’s Jake Tapper confronted Robert Gibbs on the hypocrisy: “you’re acting as if you guys aren’t actors in this. You are releasing information when you could be fighting it.”

Gibbs defended his actions later in the press conference, saying, “I think the president took swift action to change our image in the world.”

That he has. Upon taking office, Barack Obama promptly signed three executive orders closing Guantanamo Bay within one year, shuttering rendition "black sites," and binding interrogators to the Army Field Manual for high value detainees. He stepped away from the maximum, and exceedingly rare, interrogation techniques his predecessor allowed. Instead, what Bush authorized, Obama publicized, releasing memos describing less-than-shocking “torture” tactics. In the process, he gave our enemies vital information, not only on how far we were willing to go, but how far we are no longer willing to go. He has opened the door to prosecuting legal advisers in the previous administration and led the CIA to believe they will no longer “get top cover if something goes wrong.” He has now refused to stand his ground in the U.S. court system against the Legal Left – the same forces fighting to invest Guantanamo Bay detainees with the rights of a jury trial and charge Bush administration officials with war crimes. Under President Bush, the United States enjoyed a reputation as a nation that vigorously prosecutes captured terrorists and defends those who stand on its front lines. In three months, President Obama has reversed that. Quite a 100-day accomplishment.

Taken together, it becomes clear Obama seeks to elevate his image by turning the Bush administration into a moral pariah. However, his decisions are undoing the edifice that protected this nation for seven years – and even his administration publicly fears his latest move alone will supercharge al-Qaeda recruitment. As a whole, his Homeland Security policy is either a stunning series of unmitigated naivete, megalomania, spite for President Bush, or hatred of his own country.

Whatever the answer, it is the citizens of the United States who will pay for it.

Afghan Politics: Let's Be Real

By Murray Dobbin
Published: April 22, 2009
TheTyee.ca
The outpouring of Western anger and shock earlier this month over a new Afghan law that legalizes marital rape and confines women to their homes demonstrates how out of touch Western countries are with the monster they have created in that benighted country.
Of course Hamid Karzai would support such a law. He wants to be re-elected president in August and to do so he must support his base: Islamic fundamentalists. Both sides of the conflict are fundamentalist Islamic. There is nothing else.
Indeed, while outrage caused Karzai to say he'd withdraw the law, many doubt he'll follow through.
Virtually everything that now plagues Afghanistan is "blowback" -- the CIA term for unintended consequences of previous policies -- from the U.S.-sponsored war against the Soviets in the 1990s. So far, there's no sign the Obama administration, or Stephen Harper's, gets that. Just yesterday, U.S. Central Command leader Gen. David Petraeus warned of "tough months ahead" as the U.S. ramps up its fight in Afghanistan, explaining (as if bad luck out of the blue) that the resurging Taliban insurgency is fueled by profits from the global illegal narcotics trade.
The supposed bulwark against them? A Karzai government that is corrupt because it could not possibly have been anything else. Karzai, after all, was handpicked by the U.S. to give a democratic sheen to their occupation, then assisted in his effort to get elected president. But now that the U.S. has given up completely on creating a Western-style democracy, Karzai has become the problem, not the solution. It's hard to get a reliable puppet these days. Once you put one in place, he wants to stay.
The hell that ideology built
The neo-con geniuses behind the invasion of Afghanistan were strong on ideology but utterly ignorant when it came to history and Afghan political culture. They really thought it would be easy and that's why Karzai seemed a good bet. A former consultant for U.S. oil giant Unocal, Karzai was part of the late 1990s negotiations between the Taliban and Unocal for a gas pipeline through Afghanistan to Pakistan and India. The U.S. was negotiating with the Taliban until four months before 9-11. They thought a quick victory would put the pipeline back on the agenda.
Karzai, however, had literally no political base amongst the competing tribes in the country. And it is the tribes that fill the "civil society'' vacuum in Afghanistan. His support was American money and military force, and Afghan opium producers. Now that the Americans want him out, political support comes almost exclusively from the warlords and opium producers.
But the root of corruption in Afghanistan is not Hamid Karzai. It is the determination of the U.S. to ensure that no future elected government will take democratic governance seriously. While fighting their so-called ''war on terror'' and its Islamic fundamentalist ideology, the Americans are even more determined to stop the establishment of a government that would stand for the national interests of the country. That sort of government was entrenched in the articles of the secular constitution established in 1964.
But the U.S. changed that constitution soon after the invasion, and it now states that Islam is supreme: no laws can violate "the sacred religion of Islam." The new Political Parties Law also states that parties cannot pursue policies that are "contrary to Islam," which meant that many secular parties were effectively excluded from the 2005 parliamentary elections.
The results were predictable: 133 of the 249 members elected to the House of the People had fought in the vicious internecine Mujahideen war which virtually destroyed Kabul, and fostered the creation of the Taliban. According to the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, "eighty per cent of winning candidates in the provinces and more than 60 per cent in... Kabul have links to armed groups."
Anti-communist jihad
Of course it is also the case that the U.S. sponsored Mujahideen war against the Soviets eliminated thousands of former communist government officials. Communist they may have been but they were also secularists and established a functioning national government with actual social programs, education budgets, human rights (including women's rights) and health care, as well as a professional army. Many of the secular figures involved ended up dead in the cold war fury unleashed by the U.S. through its proxy fanatics. Civil society was effectively destroyed. Any state that followed would, by definition, be radical Islamic.
Given the results of the 2005 election, the absence of any significant secular culture to draw on, and the need for some semblance of security, Karzai ended up appointing some of the most murderous warlords in the country to senior government posts. One of them was the delightfully named "Butcher of the North," Abdul Rashid Dostum, appointed to the post of army chief of staff. To call this a government at all is misleading.
Daan Everts, the former NATO special representative in Afghanistan, believes that the U.S. consciously sabotaged genuinely democratic government. The result, says Everts, "has been an extremely chaotic parliament. There are 248 talking heads with very little discipline and little organized deliberations that are meant to produce legislation which the country so badly needs. We deliberately did this."
When you set up government to fail, you get corruption because government is then seen as simply a way of accumulating personal wealth and power. The notion that 21,000 more U.S. troops, backed by social workers, community developers and police trainers, are going to change things is delusional. Corruption and Islamic authoritarianism are now effectively enshrined in the constitution and the culture, courtesy of U.S. foreign policy.
Related Tyee stories:
Afghanistan Transforms CanadaTo play junior partner to empire, we've militarized our identity.
Afghanistan's Coalition of the KillingGroup wants to topple Karzai, but has bloody hands. A Tyee special report from Kabul.
In Kabul, Obama Fans Ready to PartyFirst in a series of US '08 dispatches from around the world.
Murray Dobbin writes the State of the Nation column for The Tyee.

Rob SOBHANI Lover of Mullah

Justice for All
Logo
Address
E-mail: immortalguardofiran@yahoo.com
Freedom, Justice, Honor, Courage
******************************************************************

Monday April 27th, 2009

The below document was extracted from the book “The Rotted Garden of Paradise” by Iran Zamin which was forthcoming April 2009 and it would available for purchase at http://www.amazon.com/. Hoping readers would enjoy reading the below paper.

Rob SOBHANI Lover of Mullah

On April 11th, 2000 “from Caspian Energy Consulting: Dr. Rob Sobhani, President, Professor, Georgetown University and Expert on Caspian and Middle East Persian Gulf Issues,”i and appeared before “Members of the Committee present: Jean Augustine, Colleen Beaumier, Bill Graham, Francine Lalonde, Diane Marleau, Ted McWhinney, Denis Paradis, Bernard Patry, Yves Rocheleau,”ii and Dr. Rob SOBHANI was acting as a salesperson for the Islamic Republic in Iran so that Canada would invest in Iran, as well as, countries like Azerbaijan, Caucasus, and Central Asia, and when there was a question of security Dr. SOBHANI had this to say:

“Dr. Rob Sobhani: My parents are Iranian, so I speak with a little prejudice here, although I was born in the wheat fields of Kansas. So I come to the area from Kansas.

Iran is certainly going through a major fundamental transition. Iran has had a history of democracy. In the 1905 revolution they had—the constitutional revolution—the minutes of the parliamentary meetings talk about the rights of women, gun control, and the rights of the press to be present at the meetings of the parliament. This was in 1905.

Today what we're seeing is the culmination of this struggle between the traditional forces in Iran and the more secular-minded forces. So the future of Iran actually is brighter than what one sees today in the pictures on television.

It is a society that is driven by young people. Fifty percent of the population is below the age of 21, so they are desperately demanding more freedom, more openness, which by the way poses an enormous opportunity for Canadian companies, because my government brings baggage to the table. Canadian companies don't bring any baggage, but a plus, to the table.
The Chairman: They don't bring any money either.

Voices: Oh, oh!

Dr. Rob Sobhani: In terms of opportunities, I emphasize the oil industry because Iran's oil industry is in desperate need of modernization. Canada and Canadian companies have the technology and the management to do the exact same thing an American company can do. Iran is on its road to reform. There will be hiccups, no doubt about it, but it is well on its way to a more open and plural society.

Mr. Bernard Patry: What about the role of Iran in the other countries in Caucasus and Central Asia?

Dr. Rob Sobhani: In the early 1990s, Iran's role was very negative. They were trying to undermine some of these regimes, some of the weaker ones like Azerbaijan. With the election of President Khatami, ideology has been taken out of Iranian foreign policy and pragmatism has been injected into Iranian foreign policy.

What you see today is a more pragmatic approach to the whole region. Iran is interested in stability because war will create refugees, which means they're going to come into Iran, for example. What you find in Iran today is a more pragmatic foreign policy. With the exception of the Arab-Israeli conflict, you will see a pragmatism, which includes the Caspian, and cooperation with the other Persian Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia.

The Chairman: Do you believe the dialogue of civilization that President Khatami has proposed is fundamentally accepted by the rest of the regime? I was in Iran last year myself. We were very closely following this issue. It's clear that there's an internal struggle going on. What's your judgment as to who's winning the internal struggle? I think the young people are, but—
Dr. Rob Sobhani: Precisely. President Khatami is the catalyst. President Khatami is the face to the reform. You or I could have been the candidate and they would have elected us because it's a grassroots effort. It's an effort by the people to change the system. I'm not suggesting the Islamic Republic, but they want to change the system so that the socio-economic demands are met. Every year Iran needs to produce one million new jobs. That's a huge task.”iii

Thank you

Long Live Pure Divine Motherland of Iran

Pawn
In The Name of Ahura Mazda
The Fundamental Principle of This Book
Legal Rights:
1) Universal Declaration of Human Rights:
Article 19:
“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”iv
2) Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms:
“Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms
a) freedom of conscience and religion;
b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication;
c) freedom of peaceful assembly; and
d) freedom of association.”v
Legal Case:
Superior Court. In case of Wyeth-Ayerst Canada Inc., Petitioner v. Louise Phaneuf Respondent. Date: February 21, 2002. The HON. John H. GOMERY, J.S.C. Canada Province of Québec, District of Montreal.
…
“[6] Petitioner's Motion for slander and for the respect of privacy seeks an injunctive order to compel Respondent to cease and refrain from "expressing anything, directly or indirectly, in any manner whatsoever, concerning, naming, involving or in respect of the
Petitioner...its affiliates, subsidiaries, directors, officers, management and employees..." and specifically, to withdraw from her web-site "any declarations, allegations or references, concerning the Petitioner, its affiliates" etc. The Motion also asks the Court to condemn Respondent to pay Petitioner the sum of $100,000.00 for punitive and exemplary damages.
[7] The justification alleged for this massive assault upon Respondent's freedom of expression is the supposedly defamatory nature of the contents of Respondent's website, which, according to Petitioner, invades its privacy and damages its reputation. Petitioner also alleges that the privacy of its senior management is violated by the publication of their e-mail addresses on the web-site
[8] The Court is not seized with the merits of Petitioner's proceedings. The application now being made is for a safeguard order in accordance with article 766(4) C.C.P. which empowers the Court, at the time of presentation of a motion and before it has been heard, to "make all orders necessary to protect the rights of the parties for the time and on the conditions it determines."vi
…...
[14]…"The other value to be balanced in a defamation action is the protection of the reputation of the individual. Although much has very properly been said and written about the importance of freedom of expression, little has been written of the importance of reputation. Yet, to most people, their good reputation is to be cherished above all. A good reputation is closely related to the innate worthiness and dignity of the individual. It is an attribute that must, just as much as freedom of expression, be protected by society's laws. In order to undertake the balancing required by this case, something must be said about the value of reputation. Democracy has always recognized and cherished the fundamental importance of an individual. That importance must, in turn, be based upon the good repute of a person. It is that good repute which enhances an individual's sense of worth and value. False allegations can so very quickly and completely destroy a good reputation. A reputation tarnished by libel can seldom regain its former luster. A democratic society, therefore, has an interest in ensuring that its members can enjoy and protect their good reputation so long as it is merited."vii
….
“[16] The same remarks apply to the respect to be given to private life, a value guaranteed in article 5 of the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms R.S.Q. C.C-12. The extent to which the right to privacy may limit the fundamental right to freedom of expression guaranteed in article 3 of the Charter will vary according to the degree of privacy to which each person is entitled. Corporations have a lesser right to privacy than individuals. Furthermore it is far from apparent that publication of the email address of a corporate officer constitutes an invasion of the latter's privacy.
[17] Petitioner cites the decision in Investors Group Inc. v. Hudson (1999) R.J.Q. 599 (C.S.) in support of its application. The judgment rendered in that case is not a useful precedent, since the facts upon which it was based cannot be compared to the present circumstances, for two reasons. First of all, in the Hudson case the safeguard order followed a full hearing of the litigation between the parties and a careful reading of the judgment rendered, reported at J.E. 98-1329, reveals that most of Mr. Hudson's allegations about the treatment he had received at the hands of Investors Group Inc. were held to be unfounded. In other words, the defamatory nature of the statements published on his web-site had already been established. Secondly, the particulars of the statements is not known; possibly they were much more intemperate than those by Respondent in the present case.
[18] Respondent is defending herself in this matter without the assistance of an attorney. She says she does not have the means to engage counsel. This is unfortunate; she finds herself embroiled in litigation where the resources of her opponent are enormous, and its readiness to use all the means at its disposal to intimidate her and to contest her claims is evident. Furthermore, because she is not a member of the Bar, costs in her favor cannot be awarded.
[19] For These Reasons, Petitioner's application for a safeguard order is dismissed without costs.”viii
Criminal Code of Canada:
“423.1 (1) No person shall, without lawful authority, engage in conduct referred to in subsection (2) with the intent to provoke a state of fear in
….
(c) a journalist in order to impede him or her in the transmission to the public of information in relation to a criminal organization.
(2) The conduct referred to in subsection (1) consists of
(a) using violence against a justice system participant or a journalist or anyone known to either of them or destroying or causing damage to the property of any of those persons;
(b) threatening to engage in conduct described in paragraph (a) in Canada or elsewhere;
(c) persistently or repeatedly following a justice system participant or a journalist or anyone known to either of them, including following that person in a disorderly manner on a highway;
(d) repeatedly communicating with, either directly or indirectly, a justice system participant or a journalist or anyone known to either of them; and
(e) besetting or watching the place where a justice system participant or a journalist or anyone known to either of them resides, works, attends school, carries on business or happens to be.
(3) Every person who contravenes this section is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than fourteen years. 2001, c. 32, s. 11.”ix
Summing up the above legal framework:

Author, of this book, is allowed to express her/his views on Canada, Canadian politicians, and criminal agents of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Canada or outside of Canada because Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as, Canadian legal rights has given permission to this author to express her/his views on Canada, Canadian politicians, and terrorist agents of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Canada or outside of Canada. In case, Canada, Canadian politicians, terrorist agents of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Canada or any given entity commenced a civil-action against this author with respect to this book or content of this book, or any allege tort law against this author. The civil-action will be constituted as an instrument against this author to cause fear, and to intimidate this author's safety and security. Consequently, this author will seek criminal charge/s against the petitioner/s from a Justice of Peace, and in case the Canadian legal system fails, this matter will be brought before United Nations for violation of Human Rights forthwith.

The author of this book acted in good faith at all times, and all materials were located in public domain, and all materials were presented as evidences to reader’s knowledge, and this author did not misrepresent, slandered, mislead, omitted facts, deformation of character, invasion of privacy, breach of trust or violating any kind of tort laws, or criminal laws. This book, solely, was written for educational purpose. Only reader of this book will interpret disclosed evidences for their own reason, and will read this book with their own common sense. Thus, this author has no control over readers mind.

On a different note, I am not a writer, I am just a soldier for my country Iran, Iranian and His Imperial Majesty King of Kings Reza Cyrus PAHLAVI, who instructed Iranian not to use any form of coercive method to confront the regime in Iran. Thus, I am following His Imperial Majesty's order.

I am using a pseudonym name not because I am hiding my identity from the regime in Iran or Canada. I already know Canada has sold me to the regime in Iran. In past, I used Ahmad KASRAVI and Iran Zamin as my pen names in order to revive Iranian identity, and not to allow to the regime in Iran to destroy Iran's identity.

Let's put it on record that nothing matter for me any more, you can hurt me, you can imprison me, you can kill me, do whatever you want to do to me. I am willing and ready to pay ultimate price for my country Iran, Iranian, and my King. My last wish would be, when I will die, I would like to be wrap around lion and sun flag of Iran. Nothing matter for me any more. I am true to my word because Iranian do not lie, and liars are enemy of Ahura Mazda.

Long Live Iran, Long Live Constitutional Monarchy for Iran, and Long Live Freedom for Iran

i 03 August 2007. PG 01
ii 30 August 30. PG 01
iii http://cmte.parl.gc.ca/cmte/CommitteePublication.aspx?SourceId=53741 30 August 2007. PG 19
iv Human Rights <http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html> 17 July 2007
v Justice of Canada <http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/charter/index.html#juridiques> 17 July 2007
vi CANLII<http://www.canlii.org/en/qc/qccs/doc/2002/2002canlii37381/2002canlii37381.pdf> 17 July 2007. PG 2
vii CANLII <http://www.canlii.org/en/qc/qccs/doc/2002/2002canlii37381/2002canlii37381.pdf> 17 July 2007. PG 4-5
viii CANLII<http://www.canlii.org/en/qc/qccs/doc/2002/2002canlii37381/2002canlii37381.pdf>17 July 2007
ix CANLII 03August 2007

Ridiculing US Official Just Made Your Border Wait Longer

We overreacted to Napolitano's gaffe. Why we'll pay for it.
View full article and comments here http://thetyee.ca/News/2009/04/27/Napolitano/
By Edward Alden
Published: April 27, 2009
TheTyee.ca
After years of frustration dealing with the George W. Bush administration over the tightening of the border, Canadian officials were hoping for better under President Barack Obama. It does not appear to be working out quite as planned.
Obama's homeland security secretary, former Arizona governor Janet Napolitano, caused a furor last week when she suggested in a CBC interview that some of the 9-11 terrorists had entered the United States from Canada, and therefore stricter border measures were necessary. The statement threw the Canadian government and media into apoplexy. It seemed to confirm the always compelling storyline that Canada is once again being "harassed" by an ignorant American officialdom eager to blame its northern neighbour for its own mistakes. The National Post dismissed her as "irrational" and the commissioner of the RCMP declared himself "surprised and somewhat disappointed that the secretary isn't better informed."
Little matter that Napolitano's slip should rightly be considered a gaffe. "I knew the minute it came out of my mouth it was wrong," she said later. Neil Macdonald, the veteran CBC reporter who caught her out, set her up perfectly. The secretary, defending American plans to impose new document requirements at the border this June, noted quite accurately that "to the extent that terrorists have come into our country or suspected or known terrorists have entered our country across a border, it's been across the Canadian border. There are real issues there. "
"Are you talking about the 9-11 perpetrators?" MacDonald asked, dangling the noose. "Not just those, but others as well," said Napolitano. Drop the words "just" and "as well" and she would have been home free.
Instead, the furor that has erupted is certain to poison efforts by the two governments to cooperate over border issues at a time when it is critically important to deal with festering problems. Washington is set in June to require passports or other secure documents from everyone -- Canadians and Americans -- crossing into the United States, Napolitano made it clear she will not reconsider that deadline.
Get ready to wait, and wait
The biggest effects will be on Americans travelling north into Canada. Fewer than 10 per cent of Americans living near the border have passports, and getting one is costly and time-consuming. Several states -- Washington, Michigan and New York -- are developing more secure drivers' licences that can be used for border crossing, but very few have been issued to date. Enrollment in the Nexus program to speed cross-border shopping remains disappointingly small.
For Canadians going south, it is hard to see how it can get much worse. A recent study by the Border Policy Research Institute at the University of Western Washington in Bellingham produced some striking figures. Researchers examined southbound vehicle traffic at the three main B.C.-Washington border crossing (Blaine, Sumas and Lynden) dating back to 1985. Historically, they concluded, southbound traffic rose when the Canadian dollar was strong and Canadians headed south to shop, and fell when the dollar was weak.
The biggest volumes -- close to two million travelers for each three-month period -- were in the early 1990s when the Canadian dollar hovered near 90 cents U.S. That had fallen to a low of a just over one million visits each quarter by the late 1990s, when the dollar fell below 70 cents and Bellis Fair was no longer much of a bargain.
After 9-11, however, that historic relationship between exchange rates and travel volumes was ruptured. Even in early 2008, when the loonie was briefly worth more than the greenback, the numbers never exceeded 800,000. As the project's researchers concluded: "A structural break in the relationship between economic conditions and travel volumes occurred in 2001 and has since persisted. People's discomfort with new inspections processes at the border is the likely cause of low travel volumes."
Walling towns in half
For officials on both sides of the world's largest trading relationship along what was once the world's longest undefended border, such trends should be deeply disturbing. And they aren't too pleasant for the millions of Americans and Canadians who live near the border either. In the town of Derby Line/Standstead, which literally straddles the border between Vermont and Quebec, U.S. Border Patrol agents are planning to construct fences to cut the town in half. Up for grabs is the public library, which spans both sides of the border. In the interim, U.S. agents are promising to be flexible in guarding the invisible line: "If a kid [on the Canada side] throws a Frisbee over here, he can come and get it," the local Border Patrol chief told the Washington Post. "But if he got the Frisbee and kept walking down to the Arby's to get a soda, we're going to stop him."
Such twisted formulations clearly cry out for some direction from Washington and Ottawa. But none has come since the early months following the 9-11 attacks, and the spat between Napolitano and the Canadian establishment does not augur well for any improvements.
Right after 9-11, as I show in detail in my recent book The Closing of the American Border, the Canadian and U.S. governments collaborated on a series of "smart border" initiatives that seemed to provide a blueprint for how to manage borders in the face of the terrorist threat. As Napolitano certainly knows now, not a single one of the 9-11 terrorists came from Canada; all arrived in the U.S. on airplanes with legal visas stamped by the U.S. State Department.
Canadians, don't be smug
But Canada hardly had clean hands. Ahmed Ressam, the Algerian who intended to destroy the Los Angeles airport, exploited weaknesses in Canada's asylum system to plot his operation and was only stopped after a U.S. Customs agent in Port Angeles searched his car and found the trunk filled with explosives. Several others living in Canada were part of that plot. Gazi Ibrahim Abu Mezer, who was sentenced to life in prison for a 1997 plot to detonate a nail bomb on the New York subway, snuck across the Canadian border into the U.S., where he was caught and then released by U.S. officials pending a court date for entering illegally.
After 9-11, both governments recognized their common interest in keeping future al-Qaeda operatives and their allies outside of North America. The 30-point "Smart Border Declaration" signed in December 2001 promised close cooperation towards that end. The idea was to use technology and information to separate out "high-risk" from "low-risk" cross-border traffic, so that both countries could be made more secure against terrorist and criminal threats without disrupting the vast majority of legitimate border crossers.
The two governments agreed to share information on incoming airline passengers, to tighten down on visas from certain countries, to develop secure identification cards, and even to post officials in each other's ports to help with screening of commercial cargo. Frequent border crossers were encouraged to enroll in special pass programs like Nexus and Fast.
The Arar effect
But since that first flurry of cooperation, the two governments have grown increasingly wary of each other. For Canada, the Maher Arar case was a turning point, underscoring the danger of cooperating too closely with an administration that had no scruples -- as the recent release of new Bush-era documents has demonstrated -- in practicing or outsourcing torture as a central strategy in its war against al-Qaeda. To that list should be added the horrific story of Benamar Benatta, an Algerian avionics expert who sought asylum in Canada right before 9-11 only to be spirited across the border after the attacks, where he spent five years in brutal conditions in American jails charged with nothing more than minor immigration violations.
On the U.S. side, the fear among congressional leaders and senior administration officials of being held responsible should another terrorist find his way into the country has led to a series of increasingly intrusive efforts to create a "secure" border. Airline passengers from Europe, for instance, are now required to pass along rather detailed personal information to the U.S. government at least two days in advance of any flight to the United States. This is so they can be checked carefully to ensure they are not terrorists like the infamous Richard Reid, the British citizen who tried to light his shoe on fire during a transatlantic flight in late 2001. On the southern border, the U.S. has built more than 600 miles of fences and is deploying sensors, video cameras and drones -- a vast and costly effort aimed at keeping out illegal immigrants and drug smugglers as well as terrorists.
How weak a link?
In light of those measures, Canada is starting to look like a weak link. L'affaire Napolitano, indeed, was set off by comments she had made earlier noting that "we shouldn't go light on one (border) and heavy on the other... If things are being done on the Mexican border, they should also be done on the Canadian border."
A recent internal briefing that was mistakenly posted on the web by the U.S. Northern Command, the arm of the Pentagon charged with security in North America, was similarly alarmist. Canada, it noted, has a large population of "special interest aliens" -- immigrants from countries where al-Qaeda has a presence -- and therefore represents "the greatest potential for foreign terrorists' access to the homeland." Napolitano, in her CBC interview, echoed these concerns, noting that "our two countries have different standards for visas and who is allowed in our countries."
In reality, the differences are small, and in fact after 9-11 Canada went a long way towards adopting tougher U.S. measures on visas and asylum applications. But the comment underscored the conviction -- shared in both the late Bush and early Obama administrations -- that Canada cannot really be counted on to take the tough measures needed to deal with the terrorist threat.
That conviction has damaged efforts to facilitate cross-border travel. Ottawa still hopes that the U.S. might agree to establish "pre-clearance" facilities on the Canadian side of some of the Ontario border crossings, where bridges and tunnels can create long delays. The Harper government is willing to let U.S. agents carry their guns inside Canada, but the U.S. wants more -- full arrest authority that would allow them to detain anyone who arrives at the inspection facilities. The Canadians, the Department of Homeland Security concluded, can not be trusted to deal with such suspicious individuals.
The election of President Obama appeared to offer an opportunity to rebuild that trust. But now it has probably been squandered. Secretary Napolitano knows the Mexican border well, and that experience has made her something of a hawk on border security. In addition, Obama wants to reform the terribly dysfunctional U.S. immigration system, and legalize the nearly 12 million illegal migrants already in the country. Politically that will require that he prove his determination to tighten the southern border.
For Canada, the challenge was to educate Napolitano gently, and try to help her see why the problems on the unfamiliar northern border are so different from those on the southern border. Instead, in her first northern exposure, she has been humiliated. Canadians, unfortunately, are the ones who will pay the price.
Related Tyee stories:
Terrorism: Today's 'Yellow Peril'?Author Roy Miki studied the official language that stripped his Japanese Canadian family of rights. He sees lessons for today.
Secret Summit on Shared 'Security'Why was North America's power elite invited to Banff?
LSD as Therapy? Write about It, Get Barred from USBC psychotherapist denied entry after border guard googled his work.
Brush up on Border Issues
"Trade & Travel Patterns at the Canada-U.S. Border: Policy Implications" published by the Border Policy Research Institute at Western Washington University in Bellingham, Washington.
Edward Alden, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, D.C., is the author of The Closing of the American Border: Terrorism, Immigration and Security Since 9/11. He was a reporter for the Vancouver Sun, and was the Toronto and later Washington bureau chief for the Financial Times.
Back to Ridiculing US Official Just Made Your Border Wait Longer

Obama's First Hundred Days and U.S. Presidential Realities

By George Friedman

U.S. presidential candidates run for office as if they would be free to act however they wish once elected. But upon election, they govern as they must. The freedom of the campaign trail contrasts sharply with the constraints of reality.
The test of a president is how effectively he bridges the gap between what he said he would do and what he finds he must do. Great presidents achieve this seamlessly, while mediocre presidents never recover from the transition. All presidents make the shift, including Obama, who spent his first hundred days on this task.
Obama won the presidency with a much smaller margin than his supporters seem to believe. Despite his wide margin in the Electoral College, more than 47 percent of voters cast ballots against him. Obama was acutely aware of this and focused on making certain not to create a massive split in the country from the outset of his term. He did this in foreign policy by keeping Robert Gates on as defense secretary, bringing in Hillary Clinton, Richard Holbrooke and George Mitchell in key roles and essentially extrapolating from the Bush foreign policy. So far, this has worked. Obama’s approval rating rests at 69 percent, which The Washington Post notes is average for presidents at the hundred-day mark.
Obama, of course, came into office in circumstances he did not anticipate when he began campaigning — namely, the financial and economic crisis that really began to bite in September 2008. Obama had no problem bridging the gap between campaign and governance with regard to this matter, as his campaign neither anticipated nor proposed strategies for the crisis — it just hit. The general pattern for dealing with the crisis was set during the Bush administration, when the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve Board put in place a strategy of infusing money into failing institutions to prevent what they feared would be a calamitous economic chain reaction.
Obama continued the Bush policy, though he added a stimulus package. But such a package had been discussed in the Bush administration, and it is unlikely that Sen. John McCain would have avoided creating one had he been elected. Obviously, the particular projects funded and the particular interests favored would differ between McCain and Obama, but the essential principle would not. The financial crisis would have been handled the same way — just as everything from the Third World debt crisis to the Savings and Loan crisis would have been handled the same way no matter who was president. Under either man, the vast net worth of the United States (we estimate it at about $350 trillion) would have been tapped by printing money and raising taxes, and U.S. assets would have been used to underwrite bad investments, increase consumption and build political coalitions through pork. Obama had no plan for this. Instead, he expanded upon the Bush administration solution and followed tradition.
The Reality of International Affairs
The manner in which Obama was trapped by reality is most clear with regard to international affairs. At the heart of Obama’s campaign was the idea that one of the major failures of the Bush administration was alienating the European allies of the United States. Obama argued that a more forthcoming approach to the Europeans would yield a more forthcoming response. In fact, the Europeans were no more forthcoming with Obama than they were with Bush.
Obama’s latest trip to Europe focused on two American demands and one European — primarily German — demand. Obama wanted the Germans to increase their economic stimulus plan because Germany is the largest exporter in the world. With the United States stimulating its economy, the Germans could solve their economic problem simply by increasing exports into the United States. This would limit job creation in the United States, particularly because German exports involve automobiles as well as other things, and Obama has struggled to build domestic demand for U.S. autos. Thus, he wanted the Germans to build domestic demand and not just rely on the United States to pull Germany out of recession. But the Germans refused, arguing that they could not afford a major stimulus now (when in fact they have no reason to be flexible, because the U.S. stimulus is going to help them no matter what Germany does).
Germany’s and France’s unwillingness to provide substantially more support in Afghanistan gave Obama a second disappointment. Some European troops were sent, but their numbers were few and their mission was limited to a very short period. (In some cases, the European force contribution will focus on training indigenous police officers, which will take a year or more to really have an impact.) The French and Germans essentially were as unwilling to deal with Obama as they were with Bush on this matter.
The Europeans, on the other hand, wanted a major effort by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Central European banking system, largely owned by banks from more established European countries, has reached a crisis state because of aggressive lending policies. The Germans in particular don’t want to bail out these banks; they want the IMF to do so. Put differently, they want the United States, China and Japan to help underwrite the European banking system. Obama did agree to contribute to this effort, but not nearly on the scale the Europeans wanted.
On the whole, the Europeans gave two big nos, while the Americans gave a mild yes. In substantive terms, the U.S.-European relationship is no better than it was under Bush. In terms of perception, however, the Obama administration managed a brilliant coup, shifting the focus to the changed atmosphere that prevailed at the meeting. Indeed, all parties wanted to emphasize the atmospherics, and judging from media coverage, they succeeded. The trip accordingly was perceived as a triumph.
Campaign Promises and Public Perception
This is not a trivial achievement. There are campaign promises, there is reality and there is public perception. All presidents must move from campaigning to governing; extremely skilled presidents manage the shift without appearing duplicitous. At least in the European case, Obama has managed the shift without suffering political damage. His core supporters appear prepared to support him independent of results. And that is an important foundation for effective governance.
We can see the same continuity in his treatment of Russia. When he ran for president, Obama pledged to abandon the U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) deployment in Poland amid a great show made about resetting U.S. Russia policy. On taking office, however, he encountered the reality of the Russian position, which is that Russia wants to be the pre-eminent power in the former Soviet Union. The Bush administration took the position that the United States must be free to maintain bilateral relations with any country, to include the ability to extend NATO membership to interested countries. Obama has reaffirmed this core U.S. position.
The United States has asked for Russian help in two areas. First, Washington asked for a second supply line into Afghanistan. Moscow agreed so long as no military equipment was shipped in. Second, Washington offered to withdraw its BMD system from Poland in return for help from Moscow in blocking Iran’s development of nuclear weapons and missiles. The Russians refused, understanding that the offer on BMD was not worth removing a massive thorn (i.e., Iran) from the Americans’ side.
In other words, U.S.-Russian relations are about where they were in the Bush administration, and Obama’s substantive position is not materially different from the Bush administration’s position. The BMD deal remains in place, the United States is not depending on Russian help on logistics in Afghanistan, and Washington has not backed off on the principle of NATO expansion (even if expansion is most unlikely).
In Iraq, Obama has essentially followed the reality created under the Bush administration, shifting withdrawal dates somewhat but following the Petraeus strategy there and extending it — or trying to extend it — to Afghanistan. The Pakistani problem, of course, presents the greatest challenge (as it would have for any president), and Obama is coping with it to the extent possible.
Obama’s managing of perceptions as opposed to actually making policy changes shows up most clearly in regard to Iran. Obama tried to open the door to Tehran by indicating that he was prepared to talk to the Iranians without preconditions — that is, without any prior commitment on the part of the Iranians regarding nuclear development. The Iranians reacted by rejecting the opening, essentially saying Obama’s overture was merely a gesture, not a substantial shift in American policy. The Iranians are, of course, quite correct in this. Obama fully understands that he cannot shift policy on Iran without a host of regional complications. For example, the Saudis would be enormously upset by such an opening, while the Syrians would have to re-evaluate their entire position on openings to Israel and the United States. Changing U.S. Iranian policy is hard to do. There is a reason Washington has the policy it does, and that reason extends beyond presidents and policymakers.
When we look at Obama’s substantive foreign policy, we see continuity rather than changes. Certainly, the rhetoric has changed, and that is not insignificant; atmospherics do play a role in foreign affairs. Nevertheless, when we look across the globe, we see the same configuration of relationships, the same partners, the same enemies and the same ambiguity that dominates most global relations.
Turkey and the Substantial U.S. Shift
One substantial shift has taken place, however, and that one is with Turkey. The Obama administration has made major overtures to Turkey in multiple forms, from a presidential visit to putting U.S. anti-piracy vessels under Turkish command. These are not symbolic moves. The United States needs Turkey to counterbalance Iran, protect U.S. interests in the Caucasus, help stabilize Iraq, serve as a bridge to Syria and help in Afghanistan. Obama has clearly shifted strategy here in response to changing conditions in the region.
Intriguingly, the change in U.S.-Turkish relations never surfaced as even a minor issue during the U.S. presidential campaign. It emerged after the election because of changes in the configuration of the international system. Shifts in Russian policy, the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and shifts within Turkey that allowed the country to begin its return to the international arena all came together to make this necessary, and Obama responded.
None of this is designed to denigrate Obama in the least. While many of his followers may be dismayed, and while many of his critics might be unwilling to notice, the fact is that a single concept dominated Obama’s first hundred days: continuity. In the face of the realities of his domestic political position and the U.S. strategic position, as well as the economic crisis, Obama did what he had to do, and what he had to do very much followed from what Bush did. It is fascinating that both Obama’s supporters and his critics think he has made far more changes than he really has.
Of course, this is only the first hundred days. Presidents look for room to maneuver after they do what they need to do in the short run. Some presidents use that room to pursue policies that weaken, and even destroy, their presidencies. Others find ways to enhance their position. But normally, the hardest thing a president faces is finding the space to do the things he wants to do rather than what he must do. Obama came through the first hundred days following the path laid out for him. It is only in Turkey where he made a move that he wasn’t compelled to make just now, but that had to happen at some point. It will be interesting to see how many more such moves he makes.

A Pacific Alliance for Peace

By William R. HawkinsFrontPageMagazine.com 4/27/2009 As the left-leaning news media relish reports that President Barack Obama is seeking to temper the image of the United States as the world’s preeminent power, it can be forgotten that there are overseas allies who want and need America to remain strong and vigilant against rising threats. They want America to continue its leadership role in forging coalitions to meet global dangers. This message was very clear at a conference April 17 in Washington sponsored by two Japanese think tanks, the Sasakawa Peace Foundation and the Ocean Policy Research Foundation.
The theme of the conference was the U.S.-Japan Maritime Alliance and how it can be expanded. Japan’s ambassador Shotaro Yachi opened the session by reading a message from Prime Minister Taro Aso calling for Washington and Tokyo to take the lead in building an “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” which would sweep across “Japan, the Republic of Korea, Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent, the Middle East, Central Asia, Guam, Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltic region and Scandinavia roughly speaking.” This geographical description is of the opposite side of the “Arc of Instability” that has been used since the 1970s to describe the main trouble spots in the Eurasian landmass. The positive concept of the Arc would be founded on the values of “freedom, democracy, basic human rights, the rule of law and the market economy” according to Aso. The Asia-Pacific section of the Arc, extending as far as the Persian Gulf, would be backed by a “Seapower Network” that should expand beyond the current U.S.-Japan alliance to include Australia, India and the United Kingdom.
In this formulation, it is not difficult to understand from where the threats to those protected by the Arc alliance are expected to come. For diplomatic reasons, Aso had to say that the Arc “is not intended to contain China or Russia,” but his extended remarks were filled with examples of the dangers Beijing and Moscow pose to peace, stability and economic development. The Prime Minister noted
China’s advancement to the ocean is particularly spectacular. The Chinese Navy is proactively modernizing. We also have information that China is working to build aircraft carriers. China’s opaque expansion and modernization of its military, including the Navy, may greatly impact the maritime security environment which is so important to both Japan and the U.S. Moreover, Russia is increasingly more actively engaged in military activities in the Far East.
A major element in the “Japan-United States Seapower Alliance for Stability and Prosperity on the Oceans” paper presented at the conference by the Ocean Policy Research Foundation is development of seabed resources, both minerals and energy. The proposal calls for joint research and the sharing of new technology that can reach these untapped resources. But it is also clear that ocean wealth will also have to be protected from rivals. Prime Minister Aso pointed out that Japan and China have conflicting claims in the East China Sea, and that “China continues to carry out unilateral development based on its own claims. This cannot be considered to be an action of a responsible major power.” He also noted “excessive claims of jurisdiction by coastal states. This is a problem the U.S. Navy has faced from Chinese harassment of its ships in international waters. Beijing claims that the Exclusive Economic Zones awarded by the UN Law of the Sea Treaty confer sovereignty over large ocean expanses and not just a limited right to exploit resources.
Japan also has territorial disputes with Russia, and Aso mentioned the construction plan Moscow has for a strategic nuclear submarine base on the Kamchatka peninsula. China has recently built a similar base on Hainan Island menacing the South China Sea.
Former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe appeared in person to deliver the keynote address at the Sasakawa conference. He echoed Aso’s arguments, and even compared, without naming names, the rising Chinese threat to that posed earlier by the Soviet Union. He stated that during the Cold War, Japan was the “cap in the bottle” past which the Soviet fleet could not pass from its Pacific base at Vladivostok. He then observed that the “Japanese island chain can fulfill the same role against another power if it pushes the envelop.” Geographically that chain could be seen as extending all the way south to Taiwan and the Philippines, forming a base for containing China’s naval ambitions.
Beijing is well aware of island geography. In the 2005 report on China Military Power issued annually by the U.S. Defense Department, General Wen Zongren, Political Commissar of the elite People’s Liberation Army Academy of Military Science, is quoted as saying that taking control of Taiwan is of “far reaching significance to breaking international forces’ blockade against China’s maritime security….to rise suddenly, China must pass through oceans and go out of the oceans in its future development.” Chinese strategists have discussed the creation of their own “string of pearls” naval bases to control the sea lanes of the Pacific Rim.
The OPRF paper urges Washington and Tokyo “to cooperate with all nations opposing the emergence of any aspiring hegemonic state that could disrupt the balance of power on the seas and create instability in the security environment” another thinly veiled reference to the rise of China. “The process of building the new seapower alliance will also serve as a new challenge for the Japan-U.S. alliance that many believe is beginning to waiver, “says the OPRF document.
An example of those who believe the alliance should not just waiver but dissolve was presented during the question period following Abe’s speech. Stanley Kober, a research fellow at the libertarian Cato Institute, cited out of context George Washington’s warning against “entangling alliances.” He then claimed such alliances only serve to keep the world divided. He asked the former Prime Minister, “If the U.S. and Japan strengthen their alliance, what will Russia and China do?” Kober also thought it was a mistake to try to include India in the alliance. Cato has a history of trying to undermine American defense policy, and has been exhibiting a growing pro-Chinese bias.
Cato Vice President Gene Healy made the same reference to “entangling alliances” in a recent op-ed calling for “genuine, and deep, cuts in military spending” in which he also cited the “counterintuitive claim” of Christopher Preble, Cato’s Director of Foreign Policy Studies, that “our military dominance actually makes us less safe.” Last summer, Malou Innocent, another Cato foreign policy analyst, wrote an op-ed criticizing presidential candidate Sen. John McCain for “talking too tough on Russia and China.” She called on the next president “to continue cooperating with China and Russia.” Cato pronouncements are obsessed with trade and investment in China, reflecting the views of corporate interests who hope to profit from helping Beijing rise as a great power without regard for the impact on world politics or American security.
Abe responded to Kober by restating that the U.S., Japan and India “are democracies with shared interests” who also believe in human rights and the rule of law. Next year will mark the 60th anniversary of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Abe declared, “The United States has no better friend in the world than Japan.” Other Japanese speakers at the conference reinforced this point. Shunji Yanai, an advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and professor at Waseda University argued that the Iraq War has helped pull Washington and Tokyo closer together, as has the crisis over North Korean nuclear and missile programs. Japan sent military engineers to Iraq to help with reconstruction and has deployed naval units to support coalition operations in Afghanistan. Yanai also believes that North Korea has a secret uranium enrichment program that has not been addressed by the Six Party Talks orchestrated by China.
Naoyuki Agawa, a Dean at Keio University, joined Yanai in support of changes in Japanese constitutional interpretation to allow Tokyo to play a more active role in collective security operations. He agreed that joint operations in the Middle East have pulled the two fleets together and proclaimed, “Despite legal and constitutional restraints, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force is willing to fight alongside its fellow sailors” in the U.S. Navy.
It may not come to that. A strengthened and expanded alliance of maritime nations can serve as a powerful deterrent to the ambitions of China, Russia and their dangerous prodigies in Iran, Burma, North Korea and elsewhere. It will, however, take more than proclamations. Words must lead to actions.
The lunch speaker at the conference was Deputy Chief of Naval Operations Vice Admiral William Crowder, who had been commander of the U.S. 7th Fleet in the Pacific. He was dismayed by how much the size of the U.S. Navy has declined in recent decades. Today it has less than half the warships that were as sea when Ronald Reagan was president. The cuts in naval programs announced April 6 by the Obama administration, along with other cuts in high end programs involving aviation and missile defense that are part of the proposed 2010 defense budget, will undermine the favorable balance of power now enjoyed by the United States.
A warning from Japanese leaders of what is at stake in Asia could not have come at a more important moment.

Body of soldier who died in Afghanistan returns to Canada

The body of a Canadian soldier found dead last week at Kandahar Airfield in Afghanistan was returned to a military base in eastern Ontario on Sunday.
An aircraft carrying the casket of Maj. Michelle Mendes touched down at 2 p.m. ET as hundreds of supporters lined a fence outside Canadian Forces Base Trenton to watch the repatriation.
Mendes, 30, was found dead in her room last Thursday afternoon at Kandahar Airfield. She had recently begun a second tour of duty. Military officials provided few details about her death but said they have ruled out enemy action and are still investigating.
Mendes is the 118th Canadian soldier and third female soldier to die as part of Canada's combat mission in Afghanistan since it began in 2002.
On Sunday, Ray Hellam and his wife, Debbie, felt compelled to drive one hour from their home in Port Hope, Ont., to Trenton to watch the repatriation ceremony in person because Mendes had roots in the area.
The casket containing the body of Maj. Michelle Mendes was carried to a hearse on the tarmac during a repatriation ceremony at Canadian Forces Base Trenton in eastern Ontario on Sunday. (Peter Redman/Canadian Press)Mendes, a graduate of Kingston's Royal Military College, was from Wicklow, a small town near Colborne, Ont.
About 100 family members and military officials lined the tarmac to watch as the flag-draped casket was unloaded from the aircraft and placed in a waiting hearse.
Defence Minister Peter MacKay and the Chief of Defence Staff Gen. Walt Natynczyk attended the ceremony.
Moments later, the brigade of vehicles left the base and received salutes from military supporters and members of the Canadian Army Veterans motorcycle club, who lined the streets.
The procession then proceeded up to Highway 401 and toward Toronto, where an autopsy will be conducted.With files from The Canadian Press

His Excellency Amir Abbas HOVEYDA

Ebrahim Yazdi- His Excellency Amir Abbas HOVEIDA

Former US Democrat President Jimmy CARTER is toasting to H.I.M Mohammad Reza PAHLAVI I

H.I.M. Mohammad Reza PAHLAVI of Iran quoted "We are not toys of any country-even US"

Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Persia and Mike Wallace

McCain defends Napolitano, insists 9/11 perpetrators came from Canada

Arizona Senator John McCain is the latest high-profile politician to repeat the diehard American falsehood that the Sept. 11, 2001, attackers entered the United States through Canada.
Just days after Janet Napolitano, the U.S. homeland security secretary, sparked a diplomatic kerfuffle by suggesting the perpetrators took a Canadian route to the U.S. eight years ago, McCain defended her by saying that, in fact, the former Arizona governor was correct.
"Well, some of the 9/11 hijackers did come through Canada, as you know," McCain, last year's Republican presidential candidate, said on Fox News on Friday.
The Arizona senator's remarks prompted the Canadian embassy to immediately reissue remarks made Tuesday by Ambassador Michael Wilson, who reminded Americans once again that none of the attackers came to the U.S. via Canada.
"Unfortunately, misconceptions arise on something as fundamental as where the 9/11 terrorists came from," Wilson said.
"As the 9/11 Commission reported in July 2004, all of the 9/11 terrorists arrived in the U.S. from outside North America. They flew to major U.S. airports. They entered the U.S. with documents issued to them by the U.S. government. No 9/11 terrorists came from Canada."
Canadian embassy officials were also in touch with McCain's office to set the record straight. McCain recently visited the Canadian Embassy and had lunch with Wilson.
CBC interview with Napolitano
The normally reserved Wilson made his 9/11 remarks on Tuesday, a day after Napolitano suggested to the CBC's Neil Macdonald in a televised interview that the hijackers entered the U.S. from Canada.
She later said she had misunderstood a question asked during the interview and was well aware there had been no Canadian 9/11 connection, but added that the Canada-U.S. border had, in the past, posed a security risk to Americans.
The next day, Napolitano appeared at a border conference and suggested Canada was more lax in its immigration policies than the U.S., alleging Canadian authorities allow people into the country that would not pass muster south of the border.
Napolitano has also ruffled diplomatic feathers with her insistence that the Canadian border must not be treated any differently than the U.S.-Mexican boundary, where a drug war rages and countless illegal immigrants flood into America every year.
McCain expressed some sympathy for Canada on that front on Friday.
"The difference, obviously, is, with all due respect to the Mexicans, there's not corruption on our northern border," he told Fox News. "And, unfortunately, there is significant corruption, great corruption and drug cartels on our southern border."

1953 Coup d'état in Iran

Justice for All
Address
E-mail: immortalguardofiran@yahoo.com

Freedom, Honor, Justice, Courage
******************************************************************

Friday April 24th, 2009

“Men was born free, and everwhere he is in chains. There are some who may believe themeselves masters of others, and are no less enslaved than they”; Jean-Jacques Rousseaui
The below document was extracted from the book “The Rotted Garden of Paradise” by Iran Zamin which was forthcoming April 2009, and it would available for purchase at www.amazon.com. Hoping readers would enjoy reading the below paper.
Black Gold and Agony for Iran:
In May 1901, King Mozzafar al-Din from Qajar Dynasty negotiated an oil concession with William Knox D’Arcy for sixty years who was representing interest of Britain.ii King Mozzafar al-Din agreed for sixty years oil concession because the King wanted to alleviate his personal debt to Britain.iii Interestingly, William Knox D’Arcy was facing financial pressure due to high cost of exploration in Iran, and he was forced to sell substantial amount of his stock of Burmah Oil Company Ltd.iv in order to recover his oil exploration expanses.
In 1909, oil reserves were discovered in city of Masjed Soleiman, and Burmah Oil Company Ltd. created Anglo-Persian Oil Company.v In 1913, Abadan Refinery became operational, and Winston Churchill instructed First Lord of the Admiralty to partially nationalize Iran’s oil so that the United Kingdom would control Iran’s oil.vi As it turned out King Mozzafar al-Din made poor negotiation with D’Arcy, and only 16% of net profit was given to Iran.vii Iranian demanded more profit sharing and when Abdol Hussein Teymoutash became Minister of Foreign Affairs, and John Cadman was chairperson of Anglo-Persian Oil Company from 1928-1932 began to negotiate on terms of oil concession with each other.viii Abdol Hussein Teymoutash took a position that in 1901 King Mozzafar al-Din was from previous dynasty, and today Iran was governed under Constitutional Monarchy of Pahlavi Dynasty.ix Henceforth, the past oil concession was declared null, and Teymourtash invited the Birtish to have a new oil concession. “The Persian Government would have insisted not on 25 % but on a 50-50 basis. Teymourtash also asked for a minimum guaranteed interest of 12.5% on dividends from the shares of the company, plus 2s per ton of oil produced. In addition, he specified that the company was to reduce the existing area of the concession. The intent behind reducing the area of the concession was to push APOC operations to the southwest of the country so as to make it possible for Iran to approach and lure non-British oil companies to develop oil fields on more generous terms in areas not part of APOC's area of concession.”x
In 1931, First Baron John Cadman stated that Teymourtash won negotiation in principle.xi However, Teymourtash soon learned economic lesson in a hardway as supply increased demand would decline, and price of goods would decline. “In that year APOC informed the Iranian government that its royalties for the year would amount to a mere 366,782 pounds, while in the same period the company's income taxes paid to the British Government amounted to approximately 1,000,000. Furthermore, while the company's profits declined 36 % for the year, the revenues paid to the Iranian government pursuant to the company's accounting practices, decreased by 76%t. Such a precipitous drop in royalties appeared to confirm suspicions of bad faith, and Teymourtash indicated that the parties would have to revisit negotiations.”xii His Imperial Majesty, King of Kings Reza PAHLAVI the Great assumed Teymourtash was an incompetent man who was unable to handle negotiation with the Britain, and His Imperial Majesty dismissed Teymourtash from the negotiation process, and His Imperial Majesty Reza PAHLAVI took over the negotation process with the British.xiii His Imperial Majesty Reza PAHLAVI drafted a letter to the British and declared D’Arcy agreement to be null.xiv The British took the matter before International Justice at the Hauge, and there was a Czech Foreign Minister who was appointed as a mediator for this matter. The mediator put the matter into abeyance so both parties Iran and the British would resolve their problems by means of dialogue rather than a third party to pass a judgment between them which would create a winner and loser situation.xv
On May 28th, 1933 Iran and the Britain came to a mutual agreement and Iran’s parliament ratified D’Arcy agrement, “the terms of the new agreement provided for a new sixty year concession. The Agreement reduced the area under APOC control to 100,000 square miles, required annual payments in lieu of Iranian income tax, as well as guaranteeing a minimum annual payment of 750,000 pounds to the Iranian government. These provisions while appearing favourable are widely agreed to have represented a squandered opportunity for the Iranian government. The agreement extended the life of the D'Arcy concession by an additional thirty-two years, negligently allowed APOC to select the best 100,000 square miles, the minimum guaranteed royalty was far too modest, and in a fit of carelessness the company's operations were exempted from import or customs duties. Finally, Iran surrendered its right to annul the agreement, and settled on a complex and tediously elaborates arbitration process to settle any disagreements that would arise.”xvi
In 1951, Major-General Ali RAZMARA was Prime Minister of Iran, and “successfully ratifying the Supplemental Oil Agreement between Iran and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), which would have improved the revenues paid to Iran by the company.”xvii His Excellency RAZMARA took drastic measure by promoting “a plan for decentralization of government together with decentralization of the Seven-Year Plan for infrastructure development and improvement.”xviii His Excellency wanted to establish 84 local councils or manuciplaities in order to deal with “health, education, and agricultural programs.”xix His Excellency implemented “Point IV Program via Agreement with US President Harry Truman.”xx
His Excellency's policy was not welcomed by some individuals whom became his enemy, when His Excellency eliminated 187,000 civil-servant jobs.xxi Additionally, His Excellency eliminated 400 high paying offical jobs.xxii At this point, His Excellency made enemy with feudal lords, merchants, clerics, and the Tudeh Party.xxiii His Excellency made matter worst, when he opposed “to expropriation of AIOC assets at Abadan earned him the wrath of the small but powerful group of Majlis deputies known as the National Front. The National Front was lead by Majlis Member, Mohammad Mossadegh, whose leading ally in Parliament was Assembly Speaker Ayatollah Kashani.”xxiv
On March 07th, 1951 His Excellency went to Shah Mosque, and was attending a funeral of a deceased mullah. Once, funeral session was over, and he was leaving the Shah Mosque, Khalil TAHMASSEBI positioned himself behind His Excellency and opened fire at His Excellency's head. The culprit fired two more rounds of shot at His Excellency as the bullets ripped apart His Excellency's chest, and his vital organs were mutilated. His Excellency departed from this world instantly.
His Imperial Majesty Mohammad Reza PAHLAVI appointed Dr. MUSADDIQ, from National Front Party, to Prime Minister Office “within two months of Razmara's assassination. However, control of the party was held by Ayatollah Seyid Abol Ghasim Kashani, the leader of the country's mullahs. Kashani, along with other National Frontists, defended the act as justified. The National Front declared Prime Minister Ali Razmara an enemy of Islam and a traitor to Iran for his opposition to the terms of the Oil Nationalization Law.”xxv
RAZMARA culprit’s never brought before justice, as the Tudeh Party, the National Front Party and the Fadayan-e-Islam seized the street of Tehran and demanded release of the assassin. Also, the mobs stated that it would carry another act of terrorism by murdering His Imperial Majesty Mohammad Reza PAHLAVI {already detail of the above account was given and no need to write}. In November 1952, the parliament issued a pardon to the assassin, and the culprit was relased from the prison. “He was hailed as a hero and was granted an audience with Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh. Mossadegh barred photographers from the meeting.”xxvi
Road to the 1953 Coup d'état:
“The assassination of Prime Minister Ali Razmara effectively put an end to the democratic aspirations of Iran. Iran was plunged into a period of assassination, threats of assassination and mob rule. For the next few years political leaders would not endure the inconvenience of appealing to the people's best judgment. Rather, they would call on the mob to upset order until their aims were met. These riots and demonstrations were usually accompanied by threats against political enemies who made constant use of the privilege of bast.”xxvii
His Imperial Majesty with power of constitution “appointed Hussein Ala to succeed Razmara as Prime Minister. This move was met by further assassinations, riots and demonstrations throughout the country. Ala ultimately resigned his post as Prime Minister. The Shah opted to go with former Primer Minister Sayyid Ziya al-Din Tabatabai but the Majlis, lead by the National Front, [voted 79-12] on a referendum naming Mohammed Mossadegh to the post. Although the Shah had sole constitutional authority to appoint Prime Ministers, he reluctantly acquiesced and gave Mossadegh his appointment on April 28, 1951.”xxviii
In March 1951 Iran’s parliament passed a bill to nationalization Iran’s oil, and His Excellency Dr. Muhammad MUSADDIQ made sure the parliament would pass the bill.xxix Particularly, the Britain was taking 85% of Iran’s oil profit.xxx The International Court of Justice settled Iran and British dispute by sharing 50/50 of profit. His Excellency and the Britian rejected International Court of Justice’s settlement.xxxi Consequently, “the Abadan Crisis occurred from 1951 to 1954, after Iran nationalized the Iranian assets of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) and expelled Western companies from oil refineries in the city of Abadan. Britain was brought close to outright war with Iran, who retained an ally in the United States, hoping Iran would continue as a bulwark against.”xxxii
His Excellency Mohammad MUSADDIQ asked lawyers to alter constitution in order to curtail His Imperial Majesty King of Kings Mohammad Reza PAHLAVI’s constitutional authority in the parliament to the point that His Imperial Majesty would not become head of state of Iran. Also, His Excellency was not working on any kind of policy to improve Iran’s econmy because the British would not allow Iran to generate revenue from its oil. In the mean time, public servants did not receive any kind of salary for a long time, as poverty began to prevail in Iran. There was social unrest in Iran.
1953 Coup d'état:
In February 1953 His Imperial Majesty Mohammad Reza PAHLAVI asked His Excellency to render his resgination from Prime Minister Office, and His Execllency refused to do so.xxxiii There was General Fazlollah ZAHEDI and his son Ardasher ZAHEDI that they wanted the Prime Minister out of Office, and there was a general will among masses that they wanted His Excellency out of office, as riot and social unrest began to escalate in Iran.
In August 1953, His Excellency suggested to His Imperial Majesty Mohammad Reza PAHLAVI to leave the country, and His Imperial Majesty declined His Excellency's request. His Imperial Majesty issued a Royal Decree to His Excellency and dismissed His Excellency from the Prime Minister Office.xxxiv However, His Excellency did not follow the Royal Decree from His Imperial Majesty.xxxv On August 15th, 1953 His Imperial Majesty left Iran to Baghdad, and went to Rome because there was social unrest in Iran, and Iran was no longer a safe place for His Imperial Majesty to stay. On August 19th, 1953 “Zahedi sent out thousands of copies, along with the proclamation of himself as Prime Minister of Iran,”xxxvi these thousands of copies disseminated in Tehran, and questioned legitimacy of His Excellency Dr. Muhammad MUSADDIQ's government. The Imperial Iranian Armed Forces intervened as a last resource to bring back social order in Tehran. The Imperial Iranian Armed Forces had a duty to their country, Iranian and their King, the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces decided to detain His Excellency because His Imperial Majesty already declared His Excellency government as an illegal one, as the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces used reasonable force against His Excellency, and His Excellency agreed to surrender to the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces.
On August 22nd, 1953 His Imperial Majesty Mohamamd Reza PAHLAVI returned to Iran, and from this point on His Imperial Majesty was no longer a Constitutional Monarch.
His Excellency Dr. MUSADDIQ faced military court and was sentence to death. His Imperial Majesty commuted His Excellency’s death sentence to three years of house arrest.
On March 05th, 1967, His Excellency departed from this world, and was burried in his own home.
What is a Coup d'état?
The term coup d'état “is French for "a (sudden) blow (or strike) to a state" (literally, coup, hit, and état, state). The term coup can also be used in a casual sense to mean a gain in advantage of one nation or entity over another.”xxxvii A coup d'état is the sudden overthrow of a government.xxxviii Proffessor Thomas Childers of the University of Pennsylvania defined coup as “a sudden unconstitutional change of government derives from the political institutions of England.”xxxix
The coup “involves control of some active portion of the military while neutralizing the remainder of a country's armed services. This active group captures or expels leaders, seizes physical control of important government offices, means of communication, and the physical infrastructure, such as streets and power plants. The coup succeeds if its opponents fail to dislodge the plotters, allowing them to consolidate their position, obtain the surrender or acquiescence of the populace and surviving armed forces, and claim legitimacy.”xl
Edward Nicolae Luttwak defined a coup in term of “pronunciamiento literally, "pronouncement" or "declaration"xli or “near cousins of the coup”xlii “The difference, according to Edwrd Luttwak, between a Pronouncement Coup and a coup d'etat is that in a coup, the overthrow of the civilian government is undertaken by a faction of the country's armed forces, whereas a pronunciamiento is the overthrow of a civilian government by the official action of the command structure of its armed forces. The term itself de-emphasizes the forceful aspect of the coup, and instead focuses on the customary statement issued by the leader or leaders of the military, which declares the existing government null and void and explains their reasons for assuming control. These pronunciamientos were often published as formal written documents in order to attract popular support for the uprising, thus blurring the line between coup and insurrection.”xliii
Therefore, the 1953 coup would be “Pronouncement Coup” as public began to revolt against His Excellency Dr. Muhammad MUSADDIQ's government, and His Imperial Majesty dissolved the government, but His Excellency refused to accept order from His Imperial Majesty. Eventually, the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces stepped in to end the saga in Iran, and to direct Iran toward road of progress.
Who did Mastermind the 1953 Coup d'états in Iran?
There were three CIA documents that they explained how the Tudeh Party was staging a coup in Iran, and in case the Tudeh Party failed to do a coup in Iran, Russia would invade Iran. As a result, the US had to provide arsenal to the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces to repel the Russia from Iran. In case, the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces was defeated by the Russia, the US would launch direct military strike at the Russia.
On November 20th, 1952 United States drafted the below paper:
“1. It is of critical importance to the United States that Iran remain an independent and sovereign nation, not dominated by the USSR. Because of its key strategic position, its petroleum resources, its vulnerability to intervention or armed attack by the USSR, and its vulnerability to political subversion, Iran must be regarded as a continuing objective of Soviet expansion. The loss of Iran by default or by Soviet intervention would:
Be a major threat to the security of the entire Middle East, including Pakistan and India.
Permit communist denial to the free world access to Iranian oil and seriously threaten the loss of other Middle Eastern oil.
Increase the Soviet Union’s capability to threaten important United States-United Kingdom lines of communication.
Damage United States prestige in nearby countries and with the exception of Turkey and possible to resist communist pressures.
Set off a series of military, political and economic developments, the consequences of which would seriously endanger the security interests of the United States.
Present trends in Iran are unfavorable to the maintence of control by a non-communist regime for an extended peroid of time. In wresting the political initiative from the Shah, the landlords, and other traditional holders of power, the National Fron politicans now in power have at least temporarly eliminated every alternative to their own rule except the Communist Tudeh Party. However, the ability of the National Front to maintian control of the situation indefinitely is uncertian. The political upheaval which brought the nationalists to power has heightened popular desire for promised economic and social betterment and has increased social unrest. At the same time, nationalist failure to restore the oil industry to operation has led to near-exhaustionof the governent’s financial reserves and to deficit finacing to meet current expenses, and is likely to produce a progressive deterioration of the economy at large.
It is now estimated that communist forces will propably not gain control of the Iranian government during 1953*. Nevertheless, the Iranian situation contains very great elements if instability. Any US policy regarding Iran must accordingly take into account the danger that the communists might be enable to gain the ascendency as a result of such possible development as a struggle for power within the National Front, more effective communist infiltration of the government than now appears probable, government failure to maintain the security forces and to take effective action against communist activity, or a major crop failure. It is clear that the United Kingdom no longer possesses the capability unilaterally to assure stability in the area. If present trends continue unchecked, Iran could be effectively lost to free world in advance of an actual Communist takeover of the Iranian Government. Failure to arrest present trends in Iran involves a serious risk to the national security of the United States.
For the reasons outlined above, the major United States policy objective with respect to Iran is to prevent the country from coming under communist control. The United States should, therefore, be prepared to pursue the policies which would be most effective in accomplishing this objective. In the light of the present situation the United States should adopt and presue the following policies:
Continue to assist in every practiable way to effect an early and equitable liquidation of the oil controversy.
Be prepared to take the necessary measures to help Iran to start up her oil industry and to secure markets for her oil so that Iran may benefit from substantial oil revenues.
Be prepared to provide prompt United States budgetary aid to Iran if, pending restoration of her oilindustry and oil markets, such aid is necessary to halt a serious deterioration of the financial and political situation in Iran
……..
Recognizing the strength of Iranian nationalistfeeling; try to direct it into constructive chennels and be ready to exploit any opportunity to do so, bearing in mind the desirability of strengthening in Iran the ability and desire of the Iranian people to resist communist pressure.
Continue present programs of military, economic and technical assistance to the extent they will help to restore stability and increase intenal security, and be prepare to increase such assistance to support Iranian resistance to communist pressure.
Encourage the adoption by the Iranian Government of necessary financial, judicial and administrative and other reforms.
Continue special political measures designed to assist in achieving the above purpose.
Plan now for the eventual inclusion of Iran in any regional defense arragment which may be developed in the Middle East if such inclusion should later prove feasible.
In the event of either an attempted or an actual communist seizure of power in one or more of the provincess of Iran or in Tehran, the United States should support a non communist Iranian Government, including participation in the military support such a government if necessary and useful.* Preparation for such an eventuality should include:
Plans for the specific military, economic, diplomatic, and spychological measures which should be taken to support a non-communist Iranian Government or to prevent all or part of Iran adjacent areas from falling under communist domination.
Political-military discussion with the Biritish Government and such other governments as may be appropriate, with a view to determining (1) courses of action which might be pursued and (2) the allocation of responsibility in carrying out such courses of action in the area.
Preparatory measures for the implementation of special political operations in Iran and adjacent Middle East areas, including the procurment of such equipment as may be required. Effective liaison with the United Kingdom should be maintained with respect to such operations.
Perfection of pplans concerning the handling of the matter by the United Nations if and when that becomes necessary.
In the event that a communist government achieves complete control of Iran so rapidly that no non-communist Iranian Government is available to request assistance, the position of the United States would have to be determined in the light of the situation at the time, although politico-military-economic discussions leading to plans for meeting such a situation should be carried on with the British Government and with such other governments as may be appropriate. In this contingency, the United States should make every feasible effort, particularly through special political operations, to endeavor to develop or maintain localized centers of resistance and to harras, undermine, and if possible, to bring about the overthrow of the communist government.
In the event of a Soviet attck by organized USSR militray forces against Iran, the United States in common…would have to proceed on the assupmtion that global war is probably imminent. Accordingly, the United States would then immediately:
Deciede in the light of the circumstances existing at the time whether to attempt to localize the action or to treat it as a cause belli. In either case necessary measures should include direct diplomatic action and resort to the United Nations with the objective of:
Making clear to the world the aggressive charcter of the Soviet acction.
Making clear to the world United States preference for a peaceful solution and the conditions upon which the United States would, in concret with other members of the United Nations, accept such a settlement.
Obtaining the authorization of the United Nations for member nations to take appropriate actionin the name of the United Nations to assist Iran.
Consider a direct approach to the highest Soviet leaders.
Place itslef in the best possible position to meet the increased threat of global war.
Consult with selected allies to perfect coordinated plans.
Take action against the aggressor to the extend and in the manner which would best continue to the security of the United States.
Prepare to maintain, if necessary, an Iranian Government-in-exile.”xliv
On March 20th, 1953 Department of State Washington D.C. ratified November 20th, 1952 US policy with regard to Iran and made clear their policy toward Iran.
Measures to be taken to support a non-communist Iranian Government in the event of an attempted commnist seizure of power:
Military: Predicated on the assumption that the Iranian Government makes an appeal to the U.S. for direct military assistance, the JCS have recognized three feasible U.S. military courses of action, namely:
To conduct a show of force by peroidic flights of carrier aircraft, or aircraft from land bases outside of Iran, over key centers. Recommendations concerning possible employment of U.S. naval SAC units have been requested from CINCELM and CGSAC, respectively. To date these recommendations have not been received.
To assist the legal Iranian Army with logistic support by augmenting the present policy of arms aid. Since there is no way of foretelling what assistance might he needed or requested by the Iranians, meaningful pplans cannot be prepared in advance. However, the Chief of Staff. U.S. Army, could draw up the necessary plans very quickly when the necessary specfic information became available.
Furnishing additional arms aid to appropriate Middle East countries so as to eventually enable them to possess the strength to secure their fronties against effective communist inflitration. The joint Chiefs of Staff keep this matter under continuous review.
Economic: It is doubtful that any increase in the present level of MDAP and Point Four programs ($66.6 and $20.8 million, respectively) would be justified if the Iranian situation became more unstable. If economic conditions in Iran continue to deteriorate as a result of the continued instability of the government and its inability to makert oil, it is possible that a situation might arise where it would be in the U.S. interest o give the National Front Government direct financial assistance should such a request be received. The Department of State has recommended that a contingency fund of $45 million be set aside for this purpose, and the matter is currently under consideration by the Bureau of the Budget. This action would be consistent with NSC 136/1, but would have to be justified in the light of the situation existing at the same time the request us made.
Diplomatic: An attempted commuist seizure of power would probably be designed to exploit the increasing economic and politically difficulties facing Iran. Thus, U.S. diplomatic planning in such a situation requires continued efforst on the part of our Ambassador in Tehran to negotiate a settlement of the oil controversy between Mosadeq and the U.K. and in the event of an attempted coup, to urge positive action, including the prompt use of security forces, upon such Iranian authorities as may be capable of such action with a view to preventing a communist seizure of power.
Psychological: The PSB on January 15, 1953, approved a “Psycological Strategy Program for the Middle East” (D-22) which includes within this broader framework guidance for psycological operations in Iran. When prepared, plans for specific psycological measures in the event of an attempetd communist coup in Iran will be consistent with this program and with the approved PSB policies contained in “A Strategic Concept for a National Psycological Program with Particular Reference to ‘Cold War’ Operations under NSC 10/5” (D-31).
Special Political Operations: Current special political operations in Iran, which are directed toward counter acting and reducing Tudeh influence, would be continued and, if circumstances permit, intesified in the event of an attempted communist coup. These operations are designed to:
Influence specific political, military and religious leaders to speak out strongly against the Tudeh threat.
Induce certain political and military leaders to institute administrative and security actions to curbTudeh activities (demonstrations, strikes, ect.).
Maintain anti-Tudeh propaganda.
Instigate physical attacks upon Tudeh facilities and demonstrations.
Obtain the publication of anti-Tudeh material in the press, and in pamphlets, books, posters, etc.
Influnce the choice of a successor to Mosadeq in the event of his resignation or death.
Maintain liaison with potential resistance groups, in particular elements of certain strong tribal elements in southern Iran.
….
Measures to be taken to prevent all or a part of Iran or adjacent areas from falling from falling under communist domination in the event of an actual communist seizure of power in one or more of the provinces of Iran or in Tehran:
Military: In the event of a Tudeh coup in Iran, the JCS have recognized three feasible U.S. military courses of action, namely:
Furnish additional arms aid to appropriate Middle East countries so as to eventually enable them to possess the strength to secure their frontiers against effective communist infiltration. The Joint Chiefs of Staff keep this matter under continuous review.
Deploy appropriate Air Force units, on the order of 1-1/2 wings plus support units, to southern Turkey with a mission of assisting Middle East governments in preventing the spread of communist power to their countries. The Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, has been requested to recommend the composition of the Air Force organization to be deployed to southern Turkey under this contingency.
Deploy U.S. ground … one Division, reinforced and…and naval forces to the vicinity of Basra with a mission of assisting Middle East governments in preventing the spread of communist power to their countries. This would be accomplished by the physical presence of U.S. military power, demonstrations of strength and as a last resort, when authorized by proper authority, combat operations. CINCNELM has been requested to make appropriate recommendation with regard to this course of action but his reply has not yet been received. Our present state of preparedness is such that the 82nd Airborne Division, the 2nd Marine Division or an infantry division in Europe could be moved on short notice provided the necessary shipping were made available. The movement of any one of these divisions would take approximately 60 days. The logistice support required to maintain the development of these forces could be accompplished only at the expense of critical supplies now destined for Korea. Similarly any force deployments to the Middle East would necessitate a substantial upward revision of U.S. force ceilings or a reduction of our commitments elsewhere.
Economic: The U.S.Government would provide such economic assistance as required to sustain and strengthen whatever non-communist Iranian Government remained after the communist coup. Specific plans for this eventuality cannot be prepared in advance, but it is likely that requirments for such ai would follow the general pattern, though on a reduced scale of the economic assistance being given the ROK Government. The early appointment of an over-all coordinator for economic aid would, on the basis of Korean experince, greatlyincrease the effectivness of any specific economic measures which might be undertaken in such a contingency.
Diplomatic: (1) The United States Government will not recognize a communist government of Iran and will publicly support anti-communist Iranian elements in Iran or abroad. Such support might involve the recongnition of an Iranian Government in exile. Since the Shah might be a useful rallying point for such a Government, arrangments to facilitate his escape from Tehran in an emergency are under consideration. In addition, there will probably always be some prominent Iranian public figures outside of Iran (such as the Iranian Ambassador to the United States) who could participate in such a movement. For political and security reason, no advance planning in this regard can be attempted with any Iranian leaders, including Shah.
….
Special Political Operations: (1) At the present time CIA has a stockpile of small arms, ammunition and demolition material under USAF cover. Wheelus Field Tripoli. The stockpile is in quantity designed to supply a 10, 000-man guerrilla forces for six months without re-supply. In other increments there is sufficeint material to equip basically a 4000-man guerrilla force (Locales of storage are New Jersey, Ismailia Suzez Canal Zone, and Tripoli.) CIA is now considering the feasibility of adding essential food stuffs and clothing to existing or other stockpiles. An estimate of such requirments is in the process of preparation.
These supplies could, within 3 to 4 weeks, be transported by air and sea to certain strong tribal elements in southern Iran (in particular the Qashqai tribe) who might, in the event of a Tudeh coup, be prepare to conduct resistance activity against such a Communist givernment. However, for political and security reasons, no attempt has been made to conduct advanced planning of this sorr with Iranian officials.
CIA has an agreement with the Qashqai tribal leaders in southern Iran to establish a clnadstine safe haven base from which querrilla and intelligence operations could be conducted utlizing the manpower of these elements (estimated 20,000). Four members of one group have been given radio communications traning by CIA. Conditions in South Iran, attitude of the Iranian Army and neighboring tribes, status of an Iranian rump government or goervnment in exile, the political attitudes of the tribe in questions, and degree of our support in time of Tudeh control have a bearing, however, on the tribal will and ability to conduct resistance activity. To date CIA has trained and equiped a total of approximately 10 indigenous clandestine radio operators to be located throughout Iran and who can be called upon to maintain communications with CIA when desire. Others are being trained.
Reception points in the Tehran and Tabriz area and in South Iran where supplies and personel can be clandestinely introduced into Iran are in the process of being established. A certain quantity of communications equipmet, cash and gold has been cached within Iran, and a considerable amount of cash is avaliable in Tehran.”xlv
Overall reading the above CIA documents illustrated the US never drafted a blue print to do a coup in Iran. As a matter of fact, the Tudeh Party was contemplating to do a coup in Iran and overthrowing the MUSADDIQ's government, and in case the Tudeh Party would not be able to do the coup, Russia would invade Iran.
There was a third CIA document which was blurry and difficult to read. It would not lead to anywhere constructive.
Why Some Claim the US Masterminded the 1953 Coup in Iran:
There were some individuals that they claimed the US overthrow democratically elected Prime Minister MUSADDIQ from the Office. However, according to the above legal documents, as well as, historical events, the US did not overthrow democratically elected Prime Minister MUSADDIQ from the Office. In addition, there were good reasons for one author or media outlets to reinvent Iran's history, and acting in bad faith. One, there was an agenda to make Iranian feeling indifference about Iran that the US was controling Iran's domestic politics and not Iranian. Thus, the Islamic Republic would last very long in Iran, as the US would sell arsenal to Iran and other neighboring nations of Iran at high price. Two, these type of individuals that they endorsed conspiracy theory of 1953, they were gaining some kind of reward from the conspiracy theory of 1953. What was so imperative here that the conspiracy theory of 1953 failed because Imperial Iranian Armed Forces took part in th 1953 coup in order to bring back social order in Iran, and did not receive any kind of fund from anyone. The Imperial Iranian Armed Forces carried its duty as it was supposed to be, and their act would be constituted as patriotic for Iran, Iranian and their King. Last, there was this theory that 1953 coup lead to the 1979 fiasco in Iran. In 1979, there were democrat individuals that they wanted to create a green crescent in Middle East to prevent Russia to expand its dominion in other part of the Middle East, and cause the 1979 fiasco in Iran and it turned out not the way the democrated wanted. Thus, the democrat was relying on “post hoc fallacy” that variable “A” caused variable “B”. Assuming, the variable “A” was the 1953 coup in Iran, so by product of the variable “A” would be the 1979 fiasco in Iran which would be the variable “B”. There was no relation between the variable “A” and the variable “B”, and these individuals had not rationality to interrelate the variable “A” to the variable “B”. In fact, in 1953, there was a dynamic for a coup in Iran, but, in 1979, there were foreign elements that they wanted His Imperial Majesty to die right away.
Therefore, Iranian needed to understand that future of Iran was in their own hands, and not to listen to the enemy's propaganda that the US did coup in Iran. Aiming last sentence of this paper to Iranian from diverse background from National Front Party to Monarchist that they needed to work together to emancipate Iran from hands of mullah who have occupied Iran since 1979. There was no alternative way to liberate Iran from hands of callous mullah who received support from the West to remain in Iran in order to plunder Iran's wealth. So what was going to be? Allowing enemy to divide and conquer us, or determining our own future? Determining future of Iran by working together toward freedom of Iran.
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC):
His Imperial Majesty King of Kings Mohammad Reza PAHLAVI was pioneer of OPEC, and was first chairperson of OPEC. His Imperial Majesty's nickname was “Eagle of OPEC”. His Imperial Majesty formed OPEC so that oil exporting countries would sell their oil at equilibrium price. OPEC main’s task was determining quantity of crude oil which would be produced to the world to consume in a year so that the price of crude oil per barrel would be at market value. OPEC had governing body which was determining “best means for safeguarding their interests, individually and collectively; devising ways and means of ensuring the stabilization of prices in international oil markets with a view to eliminating harmful and unnecessary fluctuations; giving due regard at all times to the interests of the producing nations and to the necessity of securing a steady income to the producing countries; an efficient, economic and regular supply of petroleum to consuming nations, and a fair return on their capital to those investing in the petroleum industry.”xlvi
Dr. Benjamin Zycher reflected light on history of OPEC that it “was formed in response to the U.S. imposition of import quotas on oil. In 1959 the U.S. government established a Mandatory Oil Import Quota Program (MOIP) restricting the amount of crude oil (and refined products) that could be imported into the United States. The MOIP gave preferential treatment to oil imports from Mexico and Canada. This partial exclusion of the U.S. market to Persian Gulf producers depressed prices for their oil. As a result oil prices "posted" (paid to the selling nations) by the major oil companies were reduced in February 1959 and August 1960. In its early years the U.S. import quota program also discriminated against oil from Venezuela. In September 1960 four Persian Gulf nations (Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia) and Venezuela formed OPEC, the purpose of which was to obtain higher prices for crude oil. By 1973 eight other nations (Qatar, Indonesia, Libya, the United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Nigeria, Ecuador, and Gabon) had joined OPEC. Ecuador withdrew on the last day of 1992.”xlvii
OPEC was unsuccessful in its first decade. Real (that is, inflation-adjusted) world prices for crude oil continued to fall until 1971. In 1958 the real price was $10.85 per barrel (in 1990 dollars). By 1971 it had fallen to $7.46 per barrel. However, real prices began to rise slowly beginning in 1971, and then jumped dramatically in late 1973 and 1974 from roughly $8 per barrel to over $27 per barrel in the wake of the Arab-Israeli (“Yom Kippur”) War.xlviii
War and Black Gold Price:
“Contrary to what many non-economists believe, the 1973 price increase was not caused by the oil “embargo” (refusal to sell) directed at the United States and the Netherlands that year by the Arab members of OPEC. Instead, OPEC reduced its production of crude oil, thus raising world oil prices substantially. The embargo against the United States and the Netherlands had no effect whatever: both nations were able to obtain oil at the same prices as all other nations. The failure of this selective embargo was predictable. Oil is a fungible commodity that can easily be resold among buyers. Therefore, sellers who try to deny oil to buyer A will find other buyers purchasing more oil, some of which will be resold by them to buyer A. Nor, as is commonly believed, was OPEC the cause of oil shortages and gasoline lines in the United States. Instead, the shortages were caused by price and allocation controls on crude oil and refined products, originally imposed in 1971 by President Nixon as part of the Economic Stabilization Program. By preventing prices from rising sufficiently, the price controls stimulated desired consumption above the quantities available at the legal maximum prices. Shortages were the inevitable result. Countries that avoided price controls, such as West Germany and Switzerland, also avoided shortages, queues, and the other perverse effects of the controls.”xlix
iRousseau Jean-Jacques. The Social Contract. NY, NY:Oxford University Press. 1994. PG 46
ii Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company> 20 September 2007. PG 01
iii Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Ajax> 20 September 2007. PG 01
iv Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company >20 September 2007. PG 01
v Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company > 20 September 2007. PG 01
vi Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company >20 September 2007. PG 01
vii Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company >20 September 2007. PG 01
viii Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company >20 September 2007. PG 02
ix Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company > 20 September 2007. PG 02
x Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company > 20 September 2007. PG 02
xi Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company > 20 September 2007. PG 02
xii Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company > 20 September 2007. PG 02-03
xiii Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company > 20 September 2007. PG 03
xiv Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company > 20 September 2007. PG 03
xv Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company > 20 September 2007. PG 03
xvi Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company > 20 September 2007. PG 03
xvii Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Razmara>20 September 2007. PG 01
xviii Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Razmara>20 September 2007. PG 01
xix Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Razmara>20 September 2007. PG 01
xx Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Razmara>20 September 2007. PG 01
xxi Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Razmara>20 September 2007. PG 02
xxii Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Razmara>20 September 2007. PG 02
xxiii Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Razmara>20 September 2007. PG 02
xxiv Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Razmara#Effects_on_Iranian_Government > 20 September 2007. PG 02
xxv Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Razmara#Effects_on_Iranian_Government >20 September 2007. PG 02
xxvi Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Razmara#Effects_on_Iranian_Government > 20 September 2007. PG 02
xxvii Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Razmara > 20 September 2007. PG 02
xxviii Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Razmara > 20 September 2007. PG 02
xxix Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company > 20 September 2007. PG 04
xxx Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company > 20 September 2007. PG 04
xxxi Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iranian_Oil_Company > 20 September 2007. PG 04
xxxii Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abadan_Crisis > 20 September 2007. PG 01
xxxiii Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fazlollah_Zahedi> 20 September 2007. PG 02
xxxiv Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fazlollah_Zahedi > 20 September 2007. PG 02
xxxv Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fazlollah_Zahedi > 20 September 2007. PG 02
xxxviWikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fazlollah_Zahedi > 20 September 2007. PG 02
xxxvii Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coup > 21 September 2007. PG 01
xxxviii Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coup > 21 September 2007. PG 01
xxxix Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coup > 21 September 2007. PG 01
xl Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coup > 21 September 2007. PG 01
xli Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coup > 21 September 2007. PG 03
xlii Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coup > 21 September 2007. PG 03
xliii Wikipedia<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coup > 21 September 2007. PG 02
xliv http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB126/iran521120.pdf
xlv http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB126/iran530320.pdf
xlvi Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opec#_note-2 > 01 August 2007. PG 01
xlvii Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opec#_note-2 > 01 August 2007. PG 01
xlviii Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opec#_note-2 > 01 August 2007. PG 01
xlix OPEC <http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/OPEC.html > 28 September 2007. PG 01